Daiktai civilinių teisių objektų sistemoje

Abstract

This article approaches an issue of concept of Thing as an object of civil rights and it’s relation with other objects of civil rights. The particularity of Thing as the object of subjective right is in its materiality. The inference is drawn, that Thing because of mentioned feature has an exceptional place in the catalog of objects of civil rights. Only things have a consuming value, therefore thing is the main object of civil turnover and other objects have only subsidiary function – to serve the demand of civil turnover. The same as things the other objects of absolute legal relations, such as works of science, literature and art, other personal values, are also subsumed to main objects. The analysis of doctrines of material legal relations as absolute legal relations and relative legal relations proves that the object of absolute rights is the object of performance of obligation. The inference is drawn that relative legal relations (obligations) cannot be exercised individually only in well-defined interaction with absolute legal relations (material legal relations).