On the Dissenting Opinions of the Constitutional Court Justices: Some Behavioural Aspects

Abstract

The article focuses on the new institute of the Lithuanian law of constitutional justice procedure – the dissenting opinion of a Constitutional Court justice as it is consolidated in the Law on the Constitutional Court. It is argued that the current statutory regulation is defective in essence because it creates preconditions for diminishing the quality of both the final act of the Constitutional Court (especially when the dissenting opinion is to be filed by the judge rapporteur) and the dissenting opinion under preparation. The narrative is half-normative and half-behavioural: the institute is analysed in the context of established procedural practice of the Constitutional Court as an extremely collegial institution (also due to the statutory regulation), as well as in the context of the current condition of the public discourse in Lithuania.
Namely, statutory regulation allows filing a dissenting opinion (which is not distinguished from the concurring opinion) within three working days after the public announcement of the decision (ruling, conclusion) of the Constitutional Court. Consequently, it is hardly possible to argue that the justice who filed the opinion did not do this in view of the immediate reaction to the decision by the media, the society, or the establishment, and even that he or she did not do this because such reaction took place.
Also, the three-day period mentioned above puts any justice ready to file a dissenting (or concurring) opinion into the position where he or she simultaneously needs to participate in the collegial activity of the Court in deciding cases, as well as to write the dissenting (concurring) opinion. In the article, the legislative proposal is presented that the Law on the Constitutional Court should be amended so as to allow for a relatively long time span between the adoption of the decision (ruling, conclusion) and its announcement to the public at large. However, it is not suggested that the general mode of collectivism as dictated by the Law and as implemented in the established practice of the Constitutional Court shall be abandoned.
By this article, the author continues his research on the matter as commenced in his two earlier articles (of 2011 and 2012).