Žmogaus orumo ir teisės į orumą sampratų įvairovė ir jos kritinė analizė

Abstract

The article analyses the scientific discussion that revises one of the measures of legal thought – person‘s dignity – as legal category. The system of values has changed as a result of political community‘s orientation to establishment of the rule of law state. Etatistic conception of law is changed by civil, according to which the public authority establishing law must take into consideration values that are not dependent on its will such as natural rights thus also the right to dignity. It is generally accepted that dignity is a fundamental legal category in the human rights system, however there is hardly another such a fundamental and indefinite concept.
Person‘s dignity is recognised as universally accepted ideal and is being evaluated twofold in the international and national legal instruments of the democratic countries: as the basis of human rights and as separate law. This raises uncertainty and confusion of the concept. However, none of the legal instruments does not try to reveal the content of dignity and does not formulate the conception of the right to dignity. While unambiguity of the concepts would help persons to regulate their conduct more effectively and to avoid negative outcomes in the legal practice. Person‘s dignity is rather differently interpreted also by scholars. Researches of various braches of science show the reaction towards the narrowness of the concept of dignity. There emerge several viewpoints in the scientific discussions: theological and biological viewpoints that consider the content of dignity as natural characteristics of a person and identify dignity with the right to dignity on the level of capacity. Non-traditional conception, that considers social relation as the content of dignity highlights a role of a person in creating his individual social value.
This article presents and evaluates the most characteristic viewpoints in respect of a person‘s dignity; they are classified according to generality of a method and to the establishment of the right to dignity in legal acts, the problems and contradictions regarding the concept of dignity are revealed. It can be stated that the aim of this analysis has been achieved, since conceptual criticism has been made with regard to viewpoints to dignity and the right to dignity. The author has come to the conclusions that the concept of dignity is deceptive in a sense that the attention of the researcher is drawn at the ontological level while the individual level is being pushed to the second place. Whereas an adequate attention to both of the levels allows to understand the complex nature of dignity and its inner dynamics. It is clear from the scientific studies that a person‘s dignity is cognised on the basis of empirical and fragmentary aspects. Methodological instrument is missed that would help not to lose one‘s way in the above–mentioned interpretations and to reason dignity as legal category. Ideas raised by various authors are the basis for the further wider discussion regarding a person‘s dignity and the concept on the right to dignity, marking its limits and analysing every important aspect.