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Ana Volochova

Abstract

The article deals with the peculiarities of establishing collective dominance, which are considered in the context of the European Community and Lithuanian competition law.
The object of the article is analysed in legal aspects, also taking into account leading economic concepts and theories, and does not include the issues connected with the abuse of the collective dominant position.
The author indicates that the collective dominance must be assessed on the basis of both – quantitative and qualitative – criteria. The main attention is paid to the qualitative criteria, especially to those, which relate to the coordinative behavioural aspects of a group of undertakings, that are “suspected of” holding a collective dominant position on a relevant market, and which especially emphasise the peculiarities of the establishment of collective dominance. It is alleged that the situation of tacit collusion is likely when undertakings are united by certain economic links which may be interpreted as pure economic or structural links. Structural links between undertakings is not a sufficient ground for establishing collective dominance, however, this kind of links may raise danger by inducing entities to coordinate their conduct on the market.
It is also very important to emphasise that oligopolistic market structure may be quite competitive, so it is not correct to acknowledge that all oligopolies create collective dominance, therefore, it is vital to perform a case-by-case analysis of the relevant market, where the fact of collective dominant position is considered to be.
The practice of the European Community Court’s demonstrates that some key aspects are essential in the process of establishing collective dominance: it is critical to estimate the opportunity of each member of a group of undertakings to monitor the actions of other group members, but it is also important to prove that these entities have a possibility to maintain status quo, that is, to apply certain retaliation mechanism to the undertakings whose conduct deviates from the common policy and to reconstitute the former situation of tacit collusion.
The importance of the opportunity to establish collective dominance is particularly seen in the fact that it may fill some legal and practical gaps by creating the basis for the punishment of undertakings for the conduct, which is not covered by the provisions connected with the abuses of individual dominant position and prohibited agreements, and for the prohibition of concentrations that may significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a collective dominant position on a relevant market.
The author of the article also concludes that the criteria of establishing collective dominance are not fully scrutinised in competition law, so it is still enough space for further theoretical discussions and practical developments.

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