The Conception of Human Rights from the Position of Passive Legal Capacity and Subjective Right
##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.main##
Abstract
The analysis of human rights becomes important from the standpoint of passive civil capacity as related to the subjective right when a need for realization of the rights in practice arises. Being definite the rights allow a person to differentiate between the right and the permission to act, i.e. people realize which of the rights they have to acquire by performing their duties and which become subjective when the state adopts the duties they themselves should exercise. Therefore, striving to overcome the vagueness of human rights conception the article tries to analyze the historical development of human rights in the view of passive civil capacity and subjective right. The article suggests the conception of passive civil capacity and subjective right as a means to make human rights more definite.
The French historian first M. Villey initiated a debate on the distinction objective rights and subjective rights in Roman law. A clear shift from objective rights to subjective rights took place only in the late Middle Ages. The subjective rights were rights of particular person, statuses, collectivities or classes.
They were not natural rights. In the beginning of the seventeenth century there were two principal traditions of thinking about rights. The first emphasized natural, subjective, individual rights and the second emphasized objective right and/or civil rights.
At the end of the eighteenth century the concept of individual rights was opposed by conservatives it was too egalitarian and subversive, and by some radicals because it endorsed too much inequality of wealth. The rights were defended not as natural rights but as conducive to the common good, either on utilitarian grounds. Utilitarianism generally replaced natural rights as the basis of movements for social reform. The working–class nevertheless played a vital role in the struggle for economic and social rights. At this moment the state adopts the duties person themselves should exercise.
The French historian first M. Villey initiated a debate on the distinction objective rights and subjective rights in Roman law. A clear shift from objective rights to subjective rights took place only in the late Middle Ages. The subjective rights were rights of particular person, statuses, collectivities or classes.
They were not natural rights. In the beginning of the seventeenth century there were two principal traditions of thinking about rights. The first emphasized natural, subjective, individual rights and the second emphasized objective right and/or civil rights.
At the end of the eighteenth century the concept of individual rights was opposed by conservatives it was too egalitarian and subversive, and by some radicals because it endorsed too much inequality of wealth. The rights were defended not as natural rights but as conducive to the common good, either on utilitarian grounds. Utilitarianism generally replaced natural rights as the basis of movements for social reform. The working–class nevertheless played a vital role in the struggle for economic and social rights. At this moment the state adopts the duties person themselves should exercise.
##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.details##
Section
Articles
Authors contributing to Jurisprudence agree to publish their articles under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public (CC BY-NC-ND) License, allowing third parties to share their work (copy, distribute, transmit) and to adapt it, under the condition that the authors are given credit, and that in the event of reuse or distribution, the terms of this licence are made clear.
Authors retain copyright of their work, with first publication rights granted to the Association for Learning Technology.
Please see Copyright and Licence Agreement for further details.
Authors retain copyright of their work, with first publication rights granted to the Association for Learning Technology.
Please see Copyright and Licence Agreement for further details.
