Problematic Aspects of Law Interpretation
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Abstract
It is emphasized in the article that there it can’t exist “pure interpretation” of the Law. The “pure interpretation” of the Law doctrinally was grounded by Hans Kelsen according to whom the only source of the Law is the Law itself. Courts while interpreting the Law use only legal measures in this case.
However, nowadays nearly all philosophers of law agree that nonnormative, nonevaluative, contingent facts – descriptive facts, for short – are among the determinants of the content of the law. A central claim of legal positivism is that the content of the law depends only on social facts, understood as a proper subset of descriptive facts. This tradition in the philosophy of law regards the existence and content of the law as a matter of social fact whose connection with moral or any other values is contingent and precarious. However, there are two different ways of this tradition: first, hard positivism denies that value facts may play any role in determining legal content. Soft positivism allows that the relevant social facts may make value facts relevant in a secondary way. Nonpositivistic views claim that evaluative facts, i. e. morals, determine the content of the law. According to the author, the phenomenon of the law depends on nonevaluative facts and evaluative facts as well as. More over, all social facts are determined by the predominant social consciousness and culture.
Thus, in the opinion of the author, courts while constructing the Law investigate all – descriptive and evaluative – facts in their activities.
It is emphasized in the article that the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania being “the court of norms” is often induced to investigate factual circumstances of the case. The necessity of constitution’s construction when constitutional regulation is abstract or very unclear induces the Constitutional Court to act this way. As a rule, the Constitutional Court investigates factual circumstances of the case when it investigates the validity of law-making procedures.
However, nowadays nearly all philosophers of law agree that nonnormative, nonevaluative, contingent facts – descriptive facts, for short – are among the determinants of the content of the law. A central claim of legal positivism is that the content of the law depends only on social facts, understood as a proper subset of descriptive facts. This tradition in the philosophy of law regards the existence and content of the law as a matter of social fact whose connection with moral or any other values is contingent and precarious. However, there are two different ways of this tradition: first, hard positivism denies that value facts may play any role in determining legal content. Soft positivism allows that the relevant social facts may make value facts relevant in a secondary way. Nonpositivistic views claim that evaluative facts, i. e. morals, determine the content of the law. According to the author, the phenomenon of the law depends on nonevaluative facts and evaluative facts as well as. More over, all social facts are determined by the predominant social consciousness and culture.
Thus, in the opinion of the author, courts while constructing the Law investigate all – descriptive and evaluative – facts in their activities.
It is emphasized in the article that the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania being “the court of norms” is often induced to investigate factual circumstances of the case. The necessity of constitution’s construction when constitutional regulation is abstract or very unclear induces the Constitutional Court to act this way. As a rule, the Constitutional Court investigates factual circumstances of the case when it investigates the validity of law-making procedures.
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Please see Copyright and Licence Agreement for further details.
