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Mindaugas Maksimaitis

Abstract

Due to the situation observed during the inter-war period in Lithuania when the review (adjustment or amendment) of constitution without observing the established rules has become a peculiar miserable tradition, this constitutional institution is considered very relevant.
Based on the archived and publicized official materials, this article looks into the course of planning the design of the rules for reviewing the Constitution of the State of Lithuania of 1922. It starts with the first suggestions and ends with the establishment of these rules in the adopted constitution. The constitutional commission of the constituent Seimas that designed the draft of the forthcoming constitution believed that the review of the constitution is an act of the constituent power that belongs to the sovereign nation. Therefore, the draft has provided for a complicated procedure the subject of which was exclusively the nation or the representatives directly elected by it.
Once the norms of the draft designated for regulating the review of constitution have entered the plenary session of the Seimas, they have been quite unanimously, yet essentially, altered. The procedures have been simplified to adapt them to the realities of life. However the well thought and balanced constitutional requirements for the separate elements of the procedure have prevailed. On one hand, these requirements have prevented the newcomer parties in power from making unilateral changes to the constitution without proper cause. On the other hand, these requirements did not create unnecessary obstacles in making the objectively justified and necessary amendments. In general, the qualified, i.e. not less than three fifths, majority of the votes of all representatives of the Seimas has stayed at the heart of the procedure for the review of the constitution, even though it has limited the possibilities of the parliament elected under the classical proportional system.
Moreover, a possibility has been established to repeal the decision of the Seimas to change the constitution by a referendum which could be called upon, once needed, by the president, one quarter of the representatives of the Seimas or 50 thousand voters. Since the possibility for a referendum has not been established, the Seimas decision was considered final once it had been adopted by more than four fifths of all of the Seimas’ representatives.

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