Tying of Products as a Form of an Abuse of a Dominant Position (text only in LIthuanian)

Abstract

The paper deals with the issue of tying (as well as bundling) practices which are applied by dominant undertakings and which, under certain circumstances, can be considered as abuses of a dominant position. The authors describe the concept of tying, indicate its types, and reveal its economic aspects, since all these issues have a certain impact on the legal assessment of tying practices. The authors conclude that the European Commission (the Commission) and the European Community (EC) courts have usually been too formalistic and unreasonably hostile to tying practices and have not paid due attention to the impact of tying on competition and the beneficial features of tying. Thus certain cases have frequently and rather easily been treated as abuses of a dominant position. A more realistic and effect-based approach was taken by the Commission and the courts in the Microsoft case, where certain criteria for the assessment of tying were formulated. Still, the Microsoft case reflects a rather strict attitude towards tying practices, especially in technological tie-ins.