CONDITIONAL CONFIGURATIONS FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL COLLABORATION IN URBAN AGGLOMERATIONS

Abstract

This research investigates how the conditional elements in combination drive interlocal collaborative activities regarding air pollution control in urban agglomerations in China. By applying a multiple-value qualitative comparative analysis, findings indicate that interlocal environmental collaboration requires two necessary conditions: informal intergovernmental relations and intervention by higher authorities, combined with either balanced power structures or a history of collaboration. Furthermore, case-based comparative analyses indicate that, first, although personalized, non-institutionalized superior intervention may be effective in initiating collaboration. Institutionalized mechanisms should also be enforced to advance the formation of designed organizations and mitigate policy inconsistencies brought by leadership rotation. Second, lasting collaborative environmental governance requires the conditions of informal intergovernmental relations and self-organized networks, which are conventionally developed from designed networks through planned leadership transfers. Third, among China’s local governments, selective benefits (i.e., individual interest) and the distribution of benefits may be more decisive in the formation of environmental collaboration than the integral improvement of collective benefits. It is necessary for tactical sub-regionalism based on partially integrated benefits and preferences to reduce the transaction costs of collaboration, especially in urban agglomerations with two or more dominant leaders.
Keywords: intergovernmental collaboration, air pollution control, configurational analysis, qualitative comparative analysis, urban agglomeration, China.