

ISSN 1648-2603 (print)

ISSN 2029-2872 (online)



VIEŠOJI POLITIKA IR ADMINISTRAVIMAS

2024 m., T. 23, Nr. 1

Vyriausieji redaktoriai

Dr. Rasa Daugėlienė, Kauno technologijos universitetas, Lietuva
Prof. Dr. Tadas Sudnickas, Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Lietuva

Vykdytysis redaktorius

Doc. Dr. Aleksandras Patapas, Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Lietuva

Redaktoriai

Prof. Dr. Erik Albæk (Pietų Danijos universitetas, Danija);
Prof. Dr. Aleksander Aristovnik (Liublianos universitetas, Slovėnija);
Prof. Dr. Larry Bakken (Hamlino universitetas, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos);
Prof. Dr. Thomas Andrew Bryer (Centrinės Floridos universitetas, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos);
Prof. Dr. Eglė Butkevičienė (Kauno technologijos universitetas, Lietuva);
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Drechsler (Talino technologijos universitetas, Estija);
Dr. Jose Manuel Echavarren Fernandez (Pablo de Olavide universitetas, Ispanija);
Doc. Dr. Eglė Gaulė (Kauno technologijos universitetas, Lietuva);
Prof. Dr. Nataliia Gavkalova (Charkovo nacionalinis Simono Kuzneco ekonomikos universitetas, Ukraina);
Dr. Maria del Pilar Cousido González (Madrido Komplutensės universitetas, Ispanija);
Dr. Lukasz Janulewicz (Centrinės Europos universitetas, Austrija);
Prof. Habil. Dr. Marta Grażyna Juchnowicz (Varšuvos ekonomikos mokykla, Lenkija);
Dr. Jurgita Jurkevičienė (Kauno technologijos universitetas, Lietuva);
Prof. Dr. Svitlana Khadzhyradieva (Nacionalinė viešojo administravimo akademija prie Ukrainos Prezidento, Ukraina);
Dr. Anatolij Kruglashov (Černivcių nacionalinis Jurijaus Fedkovičiaus universitetas, Ukraina);
Doc. Dr. Ainius Lašas (Kauno technologijos universitetas, Lietuva);
Prof. Habil. Dr. Borisas Melnikas (Vilnius Gedimino technikos universitetas, Lietuva);
Prof. Dr. Vaidas Morkevičius (Kauno technologijos universitetas, Lietuva);
Dr. Nobuo Nishi (Tokijo miesto universitetas, Japonija);
Prof. Dr. Brainard Guy Peters (Pitsburgo universitetas, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos);
Prof. Dr. Monika Petraitė (Kauno technologijos universitetas, Lietuva);
Dr. Safiya Prysmakova (Centrinės Floridos universitetas, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos);
Prof. Dr. Alvydas Raipa (Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Lietuva);
Dr. Ilka Roose (Eberswalde darnios plėtros universitetas, Vokietija);
Prof. Dr. Vainius Smalskys (Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Lietuva);
Prof. Dr. Andrius Stasiukynas (Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Lietuva);
Dr. Aušra Šukvietienė (Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Lietuva);
Prof. Dr. Theo Toonen (Leideno Universitetas, Nyderlandai);
Prof. Dr. Jolanta Urbanovič (Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Lietuva);
Prof. Dr. Eglė Vaidelytė (Kauno technologijos universitetas, Lietuva);
Prof. Dr. Michiel Stijn de Vries (Radboud universitetas, Nyderlandai);
Doc. Dr. Žilvinas Židonis (Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Lietuva).

Interneto svetainės adresas

<https://vpa.ktu.lt>
<http://www.mruni.lt/leidyba.html>

Redakcijos adresas:

KTU Socialinių, humanitarinių mokslų ir menų fakultetas
Socialinių, humanitarinių mokslų ir menų akademinis
centras

A. Mickevičiaus g. 37
LT-44244 Kaunas
e. paštas: rasa.daugeliene@ktu.lt

Leidžiama nuo 2002

MRU Politikos ir vadybos fakultetas
Viešojo administravimo katedra

Valakupių g. 5
LT-10101 Vilnius
e. paštas: vak@mruni.eu

© Kauno technologijos universitetas
© Mykolo Romerio universitetas

ISSN 1648-2603 (*print*)

ISSN 2029-2872 (*online*)



PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

2024, Vol. 23, No. 1

Editors in Chief

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Rasa Daugėlienė, Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania

Prof. Dr. Tadas Sudnickas, Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania

Executive Editor

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aleksandras Patapas, Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania

Editorial Board

Prof. Dr Erik Albæk, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark

Prof. Dr Aleksander Aristovnik, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

Prof. Dr Larry Bakken, Hamline University, The United States of America

Prof. Dr Thomas Andrew Bryer, University of Central Florida, The United States of America

Prof. Dr Eglė Butkevičienė, Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania

Prof. Dr Wolfgang Drechsler, TalTech, Estonia

Dr Jose Manuel Echavarren Fernandez, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain

Assoc. Prof. Dr Eglė Gaulė, Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania

Prof. Dr Nataliia Gavkalova, Simon Kuznets Kharkiv National University of Economics, Ukraine

Dr Robert Gawłowski, WSB University in Toruń, Poland

Dr Maria del Pilar Cousido González, Universidad Complutense Madrid, Spain

Assoc. Prof. Dr Jurgita Jurkevičienė, Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania

Dr Łukasz Janulewicz, Central European University, Austria

Prof. Hab. Dr. Marta Grażyna Juchnowicz, Warsaw School of Economics, Poland

Prof. Dr Svitlana Khadzhyradieva, National Academy for Public Administration under the President of Ukraine

Dr Anatoliy Kruglashov, Chernivtsi National Yuriy Fedkovych University, Ukraine

Assoc. Prof. Dr Ainius Lašas, Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania

Prof. Hab. Dr Borisas Melnikas, Vilniaus Gedimino Technikos University, Lithuania

Prof. Dr Vaidas Morkevičius, Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania

Prof. Dr Brainard Guy Peters, University of Pittsburgh, The United States of America

Prof. Dr Monika Petraitė, Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania

Dr Sofiya Prysmakova, Central Florida University, The United States of America

Prof. Dr Alvydas Raipa, Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania

Dr Ilka Roose, Eberswalde University of Sustainable Development, Germany

Prof. Dr Vainius Smalskys, Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania

Prof. Dr Andrius Stasiukynas, Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania

Dr Aušra Šukvietienė, Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania

Prof. Dr Theo Toonen, Leiden University, The Netherlands

Prof. Dr Jolanta Urbanovič, Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania

Prof. Dr Eglė Vaidelytė, Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania

Prof. Dr Michel Stijn de Vries, University of Nijmegen, Netherlands

Assoc. Prof. Dr Žilvinas Židonis, Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania

Internet addresses

<https://vpa.ktu.lt>

<http://www.mruni.lt/leidyba.html>

Editorial addresses:

KTU Faculty of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities
Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities Academic Center

A. Mickevičiaus str. 37, Kaunas
LT-44244 Kaunas
email: rasa.daugeliene@ktu.lt

MRU Faculty of Politics and Management
Department of Public Administration

Valakupių str. 5, LT-10101 Vilnius
email: vak@mruni.eu

Published since 2002

© Kauno technologijos universitetas
© Mykolo Romerio universitetas

TURINYS

Viešosios politikos administravimas	Pseudodecentralizacijos ir finansinės priklausomybės analizė įgyvendinant regioninę autonomiją Indonezijos Sumedango regione	9
	<i>Akadun Akadun</i>	
Viešosios politikos finansai	Indonezijos Centrinės Javos provincijos jūrų reikalų ir žuvininkystės tarnybos regioninių mokesčių strategijos	23
	<i>Diah Setyorini Gunawan Icuk Ranga Bawono</i>	
	Veiklos audito tobulinimas siekiant efektyvių biudžeto investicijų	39
	<i>Lyazzat Sembiyeva Assel Ismailova Česlovas Christauskas Begzat Nurmagambeto</i>	
	Politiniai biudžeto ciklai ir merų įtaka Latvijos savivaldybėse: pajamų, išlaidų ir rinkimų dinamikos tyrimas	51
	<i>Malvīne Stučka</i>	
	Kripto valiutų gavybos valstybinio reguliavimo Kazachstane problemos ir perspektyvos	63
	<i>Beimbet Mussin Aigul Kosherbayeva Nurzhan Kuandykov Salamat Yegeubayeva Zukhra Mussina</i>	

Viešoji politika ir saugumas	Nuolatinės privalomosios pradinės karo tarnybos karių požiūris į grėsmes nacionaliniam saugumui ir tarnybos motyvaciją	74
		<i>Gerda Kazlauskienė</i>
	Kaip Kinijos komunistų partija tvarkosi su legitimacijos krize: konfucianizmo propagavimo sąsaja su darbuotojų protesto lygiu	87
		<i>Ligita Šarkutė Jiabin Song</i>
	Pirmosios 1000 vaiko gyvenimo dienų kaip viešosios politikos problemos pateiktis	102
		<i>Ilona Tamutienė Vaida Auglytė</i>
Informacija	Atmintinė žurnalo publikacijų autoriams	114

CONTENTS

Public Policy Administration	Analysis of Pseudo-Decentralization and Financial Dependency in the Implementation of Regional Autonomy in Sumedang Regency of Indonesia	9
	<i>Akadun Akadun</i>	
	Strategies of Regional Levies of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province of Indonesia	23
	<i>Diah Setyorini Gunawan Icuk Rangga Bawono</i>	
Public Policy Finance	Enhancement of Performance Audit for Effective Budget Investments	39
	<i>Lyazzat Sembiyeva Assel Ismailova Česlovas Christauskas Begzat Nurmaganbeto</i>	
	Political Budget Cycles and Mayoral Influence in Latvian Municipalities: An Examination of Revenue, Expenditure, and Electoral Dynamics	51
	<i>Malvīne Stučka</i>	
	Problems and Prospects of State Regulation of Cryptomining in Kazakhstan	63
	<i>Beimbet Mussin Aigul Kosherbayeva Nurzhan Kuandykov Salamat Yegeubayeva Zukhra Mussina</i>	

Public Policy and Security	Perception of Threats to National Security and Service Motivation of Soldiers Enrolled in Permanent Compulsory Initial Military Service <i>Gerda Kazlauskienė</i>	74
	Handling with Legitimacy Crisis of the Chinese Communist Party: How is the Promotion of Confucianism Related with the Labour Protest Levels? <i>Ligita Šarkutė Jiabin Song</i>	87
	Framing the first 1000 days of a child's life as a public policy issue <i>Ilona Tamutienė Vaida Auglytė</i>	102
Information	Author's Guidelines	114

ANALYSIS OF PSEUDO-DECENTRALIZATION AND FINANCIAL DEPENDENCY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY IN SUMEDANG REGENCY OF INDONESIA

Akadun AKADUN

Universitas Sebelas April

Jalan Angkret Situ No. 19 Sumedang 45323, Indonesia

<https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppaa.23.1.33295>

Abstract. *This study examines the phenomenon of pseudo-decentralization and financial dependence in the context of regional autonomy implementation in Sumedang Regency, Indonesia. Using a case study approach and analyzing financial data from 2019-2022, this research investigates the extent to which Sumedang Regency relies on central and provincial governments for financial resources. The findings reveal a high level of financial dependence due to limited income sources provided by the central government to regions like Sumedang. Despite this dependency, Sumedang Regency has successfully executed development programs and received awards, partly due to effective political lobbying by regional leaders. However, this reliance on local elites may hinder the achievement of decentralization objectives and lead to unequal development outcomes. As a recommendation, the central government is urged to focus on implementing fiscal policies that distribute more lucrative and equitable financial resources to all regencies and cities, promoting genuine decentralization and fair development.*

Keywords: *pseudo-decentralization, financial, autonomy, region, dependence.*

Reikšminiai žodžiai: *pseudodecentralizacija, finansinė, autonomija, regionas, priklausomybė.*

Introduction

Since 2001, the implementation of regional autonomy in Indonesia has faced significant challenges. The primary goal of regional autonomy, namely to improve the welfare of the population through enhanced services, community participation, empowerment, and increased regional competitiveness, has not been fully realized (Badrudin and Siregar 2015). The failure to achieve these goals in the context of regional autonomy can be attributed to various distortions in its implementation. These distortions involve the emergence of oligarchies, clients, and regional fanaticism (Sabara 2022), as well as significant dependence on political elites (John T Sidel in Sabara, 2022). (John T Sidel in Sabara 2022). Furthermore, the escalating development of corruption further complicates the challenges faced (Badrudin and Siregar 2015).

According to the legal framework and regulations governing decentralization and regional autonomy in Indonesia, local governments are obliged to achieve a certain level of self-reliance in managing their own affairs (Article 18, paragraphs (2) and (5) of the 1945 Constitution; Article 10, paragraph (2) of Law No. 32 of 2004; Law No. 23 of 2014, Article 1, paragraph (12)). Fiscal decentralization is a crucial aspect, requiring local governments to finance their expenditures, primarily from their own revenue sources, while the central government is obligated to delegate authority to local governments over their revenue sources, including setting tax rates or tax bases (Hardiana, Tanuatmodjo, and Kurniati 2020). Habibi argues that autonomy demands regional self-reliance in various domains, including financial independence for local development initiatives (Habibi 2015). Kaunang et al. emphasize that the core objectives of re-

gional autonomy and fiscal decentralization are to enhance autonomy and reduce the fiscal dependence of local governments on the central government (Kaunang, Naukoko, and Londa 2016). According to the views of Halim (2004) and Kaunang et al. (2016), regional financial independence, or fiscal autonomy, reflects the ability of regions to fund their own governance activities, development projects, and public services from taxes and levies collected (Tahar and Zakhya, 2011; Kaunang, Naukoko and Londa, 2016).

The execution of government tasks by both the central and regional governments stems from the division of responsibilities and functions between them. This division also carries financial consequences, especially concerning the financing of these responsibilities. Therefore, regions need to have financial resources, including local revenue sources and other income sources provided by the central government.

Financial aspects play a key role in regional governance (Musa'ad, 2010; Hendawati, Komarasakti and Ansori, 2017). Regions must have adequate financial resources to effectively carry out the delegated functions of governance (Hastuti 2018). The effective implementation of local government authority heavily relies on the availability of sufficient financial resources (Hastuti 2018). However, the reality in Indonesia, including in Sumedang Regency, raises questions about the effectiveness of regional autonomy in the decision-making process, considering the substantial allocation of funds from the central government to regional entities.

Local governments have access to various sources of Regional Original Revenue, such as taxes, levies, income from regional enterprises, and revenue from activities or other legal businesses conducted by the local government. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental issue regarding the sufficiency of these sources of Regional Original Revenue to generate profitable income.

The financial capacity of a region is determined by the existence of sources of Regional Original Revenue and their income potential (Purbadharmaja et al. 2019). The profitability of local revenue sources, especially local taxes, depends on how the tax base responds to factors such as inflation, population growth, and economic expansion (Yasrina, 2020; Slattery and Zidar, 2020). In countries that implement decentralization policies, typically in developed countries, there is a tendency to grant greater authority to regions to manage profitable revenue sources (Nasution, Handoko, and Pohan 2018; Agyemang-Duah et al. 2018). Conversely, in developing countries, where profitable financial resources are generally controlled by the central government, the local government's access to these resources is limited, especially for sources with limited revenue potential, such as entertainment tax, corporate registration tax, property tax, and similar levies. This limitation is due to a lack of comprehensive assessment of the revenue potential from various types of local taxes and levies (Rosyada 2017).

The issue of limited local revenue sources has given rise to a phenomenon known as pseudo-decentralization, impacting income and development planning. Fiscal pseudo-decentralization occurs when formal decentralization seemingly grants authority to regions to acquire revenue sources, but in reality, only a small portion of the income is transferred, rendering local revenue sources inadequate (non-profitable). This fiscal pseudo-decentralization ultimately leads to pseudo-decentralization in regional development planning. Essentially, this situation creates the impression that local governments have the authority to carry out governance functions in regional development planning, even though, in reality, regions may not be able to propose or implement programs tailored to the needs of the region and its community. Instead, local governments often implement more development programs initiated by provincial or central governments.

Local governments in developing countries generally have limited access to profitable revenue sources, such as income tax, sales tax, and income tax from international trade. Instead, they are often restricted to taxes with lower revenue potential, such as entertainment tax, corporate registration tax, property tax, and similar levies. This limitation arises due to a lack of comprehensive evaluation of all types of local taxes and levies to assess their suitability and sufficiency as sources of Regional Original Revenue (Rosyada 2017).

In the implementation of regional financial autonomy in Sumedang, Indonesia, significant challenges

are evident. Over 70% of the budget for governance, public services, and development relies on financial assistance from the provincial and central governments. This creates a high level of financial dependence, necessitating adherence to programs outlined by the central government.

Despite extensive literature on these challenges, there remains a gap in understanding the specific mechanisms contributing to pseudo-decentralization and financial dependence at the local level. To address this gap, this research employs a qualitative approach.

This article aims to explore why pseudo-decentralization persists in Sumedang despite significant achievements. We will also delve into the extent to which the regency government can achieve the goals of regional autonomy. The following sections will detail the research methodology, bridging the existing literature gap, and providing an in-depth perspective on the implementation of regional autonomy in Sumedang.

Literature Review

Theoretically, the distribution of governmental power can be pursued through two main approaches: the distribution of institutional power and the distribution of territorial power (Hamja 2020). The institutional power distribution approach aligns with the concept of Montesquieu's *Trias Politica*, where power is divided into three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. On the other hand, the territorial power distribution approach encompasses aspects of decentralization and deconcentration, each demonstrating specific dynamics in the distribution and exercise of governmental authority. This phenomenon highlights the complexity of power structures in the governance context and depicts the theoretical evolution to achieve effective and responsive balance in policy implementation and governance.

Decentralization, as a phenomenon, takes two forms: functional decentralization and territorial decentralization. Functional decentralization involves the transfer of authority from the central government to specialized institutions, while territorial decentralization involves the delegation of authority from the central government to local institutions within specific geographic boundaries (Talitha, Firman, and Huldalah 2020). Emphasizing the duality of these decentralization forms is essential in understanding the concept and implementation of decentralization in the context of public policy. The implications of this study reinforce the understanding of the roles and impacts of both forms of decentralization within the framework of a decentralized governance.

Fiscal readiness is often overlooked in the context of the dimensions of regional autonomy, an aspect that holds significant implications in the government structure. The success of fiscal decentralization, as an integral part of regional autonomy, relies entirely on the financial management capabilities of the local government. Regions with limited revenue sources, as seen in Sumedang Regency, face serious challenges due to constraints on financial autonomy. This phenomenon becomes the focus of studies, as revealed by (Suprayitno, Nurseto, and Supriyanto 2017) and (Hardiana, Tanuatmodjo, and Kurniati 2020), highlighting the urgency of effective financial management in achieving the goals of fiscal decentralization and optimizing regional welfare.

Financial dependence on the provincial and central governments is a limiting factor for the autonomy of regency/city governments in setting development priorities, resulting in a condition known as pseudo-decentralization in development planning and budgeting (Purwanto and Pramusinto 2018). This phenomenon reflects the complexity of the financial relationships between central and regional government entities, influencing the dynamics of local development policy implementation.

In line with these challenges, regions are encouraged to enhance their Local Own Source Revenue (*PAD*) as an effort to reduce dependence on the central government (Habibi 2015). The improvement of *PAD* is considered a strategic step to enhance the financial independence of regions, providing more room for local governments to determine and implement development policies according to local needs. The implications of emphasizing the enhancement of *PAD* are essential in overcoming barriers of financial

dependence that may limit the flexibility and autonomy of regency/city governments.

The hierarchical government structure facilitates the division of government functions at various levels of governance (Sawir 2019). However, it should be noted that the perspective of the central government has the potential to influence this balance, with impacts felt on local revenue generation (Roza 2021). This dynamic reflects the complex relationship between the government structure and the central viewpoint in the context of task distribution and resource allocation at the regional level. As an integral part of governance and public policy analysis, understanding this interaction becomes crucial in detailing the complexity of decentralization implementation and its impacts at the regional level.

The financial relationship between the central government and regions in Indonesia follows a second approach, where specific government functions are delegated to regions before financial resources are provided (Faguet 2014; Gray and Barford 2018; Hariyanto 2020). This phenomenon reflects a strategy in the implementation of fiscal decentralization, where the delegation of government functions aligns with efforts to provide financial autonomy to regions. In this context, Faguet (2014), Gray and Barford (2018), and Hariyanto (2020) contribute to understanding the dynamics of the financial relationship between the center and regions, as well as the effectiveness of decentralization implementation in Indonesia.

From a policy impact perspective, fiscal decentralization significantly influences capital spending but does not have a significant impact on economic growth and social welfare at the regency/city level (Salam and Izzatusholekha 2020). Debates surrounding decentralization arise as a result of shortcomings in centralized planning, which could potentially lead to political instability and social conflict (Leigh and Lee 2019). These findings provide crucial insights in the context of fiscal policy and development formulation at the regional level, emphasizing the need to understand the dynamics of the decentralization effects on key aspects of local development.

The role of development planning and budgeting becomes highly crucial in shaping the economy and ensuring fair resource allocation (Wildavsky 2017). This practice has become increasingly significant in many countries that link their annual budgets with medium-term plans for both capital and routine expenditures, creating a framework that supports strategic decision-making in resource utilization (Wildavsky 2017). This phenomenon reflects a commitment to long-term planning and budget precision, contributing to the stability and balance of the national and local economies. In the discourse of public policy, a profound understanding of the interaction between planning and budgeting has significant implications for achieving sustainable development and equitable resource distribution.

Method

This qualitative research aims to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of pseudo-decentralization in the implementation of regional autonomy in Sumedang Regency. Intensive field research was conducted from 2019 to 2022. Sumedang Regency was chosen as the research locus due to its lack of natural resources and not being an investment destination, resulting in a small *PAD* for Sumedang Regency. Nevertheless, during the period of 2019-2023, Sumedang Regency has received 50 national and provincial-level awards. Some of these awards include:

1. National-level Best Public Service Award from the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform.
2. Second rank in Indonesia for the implementation of anti-corruption programs in the third quarter, as issued by the Corruption Eradication Commission (*KPK*) in 2021.
3. Second rank nationally in preventing stunting in the community in 2021, in the category of information technology usage through innovation, specifically the use of the *e-Simpat* application.
4. First national rank and the Government Performance Accountability System (*SAKIP*) award from the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform.

5. Best implementation nationally of the meritocracy system and human resources management, indicating that Sumedang Regency has implemented personnel management policies based on qualifications, competencies, and performance.
6. In financial management, Sumedang Regency received Unqualified Opinion (*WTP*) from the Supreme Audit Agency (*BPK*) seven times consecutively.
7. Second rank in national-level development planning, achievement, and innovation from the National Development Planning Agency (*Bappenas*) in 2022.

The unique characteristics of Sumedang Regency make it an interesting study subject, especially to answer the question of why, despite the existence of pseudo-decentralization in financial planning and regional development, Sumedang Regency continues to receive awards at both the national and West Java Province levels.

Data Collection

Regional autonomy data were obtained through the use of secondary data obtained from *BPS* in the form of regional budget (*APBD*) data, *PAD* data, and revenue data from Sumedang Regency. The analysis method applied uses the ratio of regional financial independence and the ratio of *PAD* growth. The following are the formulas for calculating these ratios:

- a. Calculating the Regional Financial Independence (RFI) Ratio

$$\text{RFI Ratio} = \frac{\text{Locally-generated revenue}}{\text{Central or Provincial Government Assistance and Loans}} \times 100\%$$

- b. Calculating the *PAD* Growth Ratio

$$\text{PAD Growth Percentage} = \frac{\text{PAD year } p - \text{PAD year-1}}{\text{PAD year-1}} \times 100\%$$

To analyze the level of regional financial independence using the following criteria for the pattern of relationships and the level of regional ability:

Table 1. Relationship Patterns and Regional Capability Levels

Financial capability	Independence	Relationship Patterns
That's low	0% - 25 %	Instruktif
Low	25% - 50 %	Konsultatif
Currently	50% - 75 %	Partisipatif
Tall	75% - 100 %	Delegatif

Source: Nataluddin in Hardiana et al., (2020).

Data Collection for Pseudo-Decentralization

To obtain data on the occurrence of pseudo-decentralization in regional development planning in Sumedang Regency, participatory observation and interviews were used as data collection techniques. The applied method of analysis is thematic analysis. Data were collected through participatory observation during the formulation of the Medium-Term Development Plan. Information about the dependency

of Sumedang Regency government on the central and provincial governments, the local leaders' ability to convey programs and development activities from the central and provincial governments, and the achievements of Sumedang Regency government were gathered through in-depth interviews with several key informants. Data were obtained from HS, DS, DSuk, Su, KG (Bureaucrats); TM (Politician), FAM (Academician, Youth Activist). After all data were collected, the next step was to analyze the data. The analysis process used was the interactive analysis model (Matthew B. Miles, A, Michael Huberman 2014).

By adopting a mixed-methods approach, this study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the factors perpetuating pseudo-decentralization and financial dependence in Sumedang Regency.

Results and Discussion

Sumedang Regency Regional Financial Independence

Theoretically, decentralization and regional autonomy should provide freedom for regency/city governments to regulate and manage the interests of the region and the local community, especially in improving the quality of public services, fostering growth and development, reducing poverty, achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), enhancing the efficiency of public sector governance, or achieving macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability (Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Peñas, and Sacchi 2017). Many of the unmet goals of decentralization and regional autonomy are due to separatism, corruption, accountability and political representation issues, as well as the nationalization of the political system (Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Peñas, and Sacchi 2017).

Conceptually, there are three dimensions of decentralization: political, administrative, and fiscal (Schneider 2003). However, in practice, there is a tendency in some countries, including Indonesia, to prioritize political and administrative decentralization over fiscal decentralization. The central government tends to prioritize political and administrative decentralization, especially in terms of devolving government revenue sources. This political decentralization policy results in low autonomy for regencies/cities in Indonesia in carrying out governance functions. High dependence on the central and provincial governments is a manifestation of the low level of autonomy for regencies/cities. For example, in 2020, the allocation of balancing funds flowing to the West Java Provincial Government reached 15,881.42 billion Rupiah, experiencing an increase of 7.2 percent compared to the previous year. Meanwhile, regencies/cities in West Java Province experienced a decrease in the realization of revenue from balancing funds by 8.06 percent, reaching a figure of 43,659.63 billion Rupiah. During the same period, other revenue realizations in the West Java Provincial Government increased significantly by 29.04 percent, reaching a total of 100.98 billion Rupiah. The income structure between the West Java Provincial Government and the Regencies/Cities Government shows a striking difference. The West Java Provincial Government is dominated by *PAD* at 52.23 percent, while the Regencies/Cities Government relies more on balancing funds, contributing 53.52 percent of the total revenue (Figure 1).

In this context, the dominance of the Equalization Fund received by the Regency/City Government reflects that the entity is still highly dependent on transfer funds, both received from the Central Government in the form of the General Allocation Fund (*DAU*) and Special Allocation Fund (*DAK*), as well as from the Provincial Government in the form of profit-sharing funds. This indicates that the majority of the financing sources for regency/city expenditures come from transfer funds originating from the central and provincial governments.

Although Law Number 1 of 2022 provides equal opportunities for Provincial and Regency/City Governments to explore local revenue sources, especially in terms of local levies, there is, in fact, no significant difference. In this law, both Provincial and Regency/City Governments can explore their revenue sources from local levies through three main categories. First, Public Service Fee Collection such as health services, cleanliness, public road parking, market services, and traffic management. Second, Business Service Levies in the form of providing places for business activities, including wholesale markets, shops, and




Figure 1. Revenue Structure of West Java Province and Regencies/Cities in West Java Province in 2020

Source: BPS, 2022.

other business venues; providing places for fish auctions, agricultural products, and forest products. Third, Specific Permit Granting Services in the form of building permits; the use of foreign labor; and the management of artisanal mining.

When Regency/City Governments seek to increase PAD, they are required to further develop business service levies compared to general service levies or specific permit granting service levies. Prioritizing general service levies and specific permit granting service levies can pose a risk, namely a reduced interest of investors to invest in the Regency/City area. Table 2 shows the revenue structure in Sumedang Regency from 2019 to 2022.

Table 2. Structure of Regional Revenue in Sumedang Regency 2019-2022

No	Years	Loccally-generated revenue	Balancing Fund	Provincial Grants
1.	2019	Rp. 463.528.449.322,47	Rp. 742.184.434.785,00	Rp. 36.437.021.093,00
2.	2020	Rp. 444.430.236.011,44	Rp.1.628.340.815.970,00	Rp.134.266.775.232,00
3.	2021	Rp. 470.281.819.936,29	Rp.1.619.635.326.253,00	Rp.138.496.690.338,00
4.	2022	Rp. 518.962.803.143,84	Rp.1.765.132.904.738,00	Rp.164.239.295.900,00
SUM		Rp.1.897.203.308.414,04	Rp5.755.293.481.746,00	Rp.473.439.782.563,00

Source: Research Result, 2023

The analysis of Sumedang Regency's financial independence can be conducted through the exploration of Table 3, which presents the Regional Revenue of Sumedang Regency. The financial independence ratio of Sumedang Regency from 2019 to 2022 is also calculated and documented in the table.

The financial independence ratio of Sumedang Regency in 2019 reached 59.5%, indicating a relatively high level of independence. However, a significant decline occurred in 2020, reaching 25.1%, indicating a greater dependency on external sources of income. Nevertheless, there is an observed increasing trend in 2021 and 2022, with ratios of 26.75% and 28.37%, respectively. This signifies efforts to enhance local financial independence, although it remains below the 2019 level.

Table 3. *Financial Independence Ratio and PAD Growth in Sumedang Regency*

No	Rasio	2019	2020	2021	2022
1.	Regional Financial Independence	59,5 %	25,1 %	26,75 %	28,37 %
2.	PAD growth		-4,12 %	5,82 %	10,35 %

Source: Research Result, 2023.

Revenue from *PAD* also saw fluctuations during this period. Although it experienced a decline of -4.12% in 2019, *PAD* successfully recovered and even recorded significant growth in the subsequent years, namely 5.82% in 2020 and 10.35% in 2021. Details for 2022 might not be complete in the data source; nevertheless, the positive growth trend provides an optimistic outlook regarding efforts to enhance Sumedang Regency's local revenue.

In the analysis of regional financial independence data, the average for regencies/cities in West Java Province indicates a very low level of financial independence. Sumedang Regency, as one of the entities in the province, also recorded a financial independence rate that is classified as very low during the period from 2019 to 2022. In 2019, Sumedang Regency's financial independence was already low, reflecting challenges in achieving optimal fiscal autonomy. Nevertheless, the growth of Sumedang Regency's *PAD* showed quite significant fluctuations. There was recorded growth of 5.82% in 2021 and 10.35% in 2022, although there was a contraction in 2020 that led to a negative growth of -4.12%.

It is essential to scrutinize these calculation results in the context of the legal provisions related to expected fiscal decentralization that can be implemented by the central government. However, it is evident that fiscal decentralization policies remain superficial and tend to become political slogans without concrete substance to support regional autonomy. Although the State Budget (*APBN*) spending has increased significantly by 121 percent since 2005, the proportion of transfers to regions remains stagnant, staying at around 30 percent of the total national expenditure (Simanjuntak 2015). This indicates an imbalance that needs careful consideration in efforts to enhance fiscal autonomy and regional financial independence.

The figures for the financial independence of Sumedang Regency consistently reflect a relatively low level. This finding aligns with research results related to the financial independence of regions, indicating its impact on various development aspects. Previous studies, such as those conducted by (Amalia and Purbadharmaja 2014) and (Adipura, Rahayu, and Junaidi 2022), highlight that the low financial independence of regions correlates with the Human Development Index.

Further impacts are also evident in the economic sector, as revealed by the studies of (Saputra, Amzar, and H.P 2015), (Mauludin and Dewi 2020), and (Adipura, Rahayu, and Junaidi 2022). The combination of regional financial independence, efficiency, effectiveness, and harmonization in expenditure has significant effects on community welfare, reflected in indicators such as per capita income, life expectancy, and years of schooling (Hamid 2018).

Therefore, in response to these findings, the Sumedang Regency Government is committed to enhancing regional financial independence. This effort is reflected in the growth of *PAD* from 2020 to 2022. Referring to the Signaling Theory (Malau and Simarmata 2020), the increase in local own-source revenue is used as an informational signal, reflecting the determination of the Sumedang Regency Government to strengthen regional autonomy as a positive step in local economic development.

Several studies, such as those conducted by (Nasution, Handoko, and Pohan 2018) and Malau and Simarmata (2020), have revealed that *PAD* plays a significant Regency Government has taken steps to increase *PAD*, regional financial independence still lags and is considered low. According to (Andriani and Wahid 2018), this situation indicates a decline in the region's ability to fund development programs, forcing it to rely on central government transfers, general allocation funds, and special allocation funds.

It is important to note that the region's ability to obtain balance funds, general allocation funds, and especially special allocation funds, heavily depends on local leadership. In the context of the Sumedang Regency Government, with low regional financial capacity, achieving accomplishments becomes crucial. These achievements not only have a direct impact on regional income but also contribute to increased tax revenues, such as hotel taxes, restaurant taxes, and street lighting taxes. In this regard, DS's statement is relevant:

"The Sumedang Regency Government has received the national second prize for its handling of stunting through e-Simpat. Based on this victory, President Joko Widodo has instructed all districts/cities to study stunting management in Sumedang Regency. There are 150 regency/city governments throughout Indonesia that have conducted comparative studies on stunting. On average, each regency/city conducting a comparative study consists of 21 people. The Sumedang Regency Government has implemented a policy that those conducting comparative studies must stay in hotels in Sumedang Regency for a minimum of 2 days. This policy is expected to boost the local revenue of Sumedang Regency."

Alongside this, Sumedang Regency's achievement of receiving the national first prize in the Government Performance Accountability System (*SAKIP*) from the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform not only stands as a local accomplishment but also serves as a catalyst for several local governments to conduct comparative studies. In this context, HS stated: "Sumedang Regency has received the first prize for *SAKIP* from the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, particularly for Village *SAKIP*. Many district/city governments in Indonesia learn from Sumedang Regency about *SAKIP*, especially Village *SAKIP*. They come to Sumedang to learn. The Sumedang Regency Government itself arranges for those who want to learn about *SAKIP* (especially Village *e-SAKIP*) in Sumedang to stay, contributing to an increase in hotel occupancy, restaurants attracting customers, and souvenir shops selling their products.

The increase in *PAD* in Sumedang Regency is also attributed to the increase in revenue from land and building taxes. Currently, the Sumedang Regency government is actively pursuing arrears of land and building taxes for the years 2020 and 2021, amounting to approximately 3.7 trillion, with the hope of achieving an ambitious target of 6 trillion.

Despite the increase in *PAD* in Sumedang Regency, efforts to achieve more optimal regional financial independence must continue. The Sumedang Regency government needs to develop strategies and policies that can enhance local revenue, achieve efficiency in expenditures, and ensure transparency and accountability in financial management. Improving regional financial independence will have a significant positive impact, not only in enhancing the quality of public services but also in supporting sustainable regional development.

The independence of Regional Development Planning in Sumedang Regency

The meticulous examination of the Sumedang Regency *RPJMD* (Medium-Term Development Plan) development process unveils a pronounced impact of fiscal pseudo-decentralization on regional development planning. Despite the legal empowerment of regions to articulate and enact their development plans, the tangible execution in Sumedang Regency underscores the prevalence of a pseudo-decentralization paradigm.

The commencement of the process entails deliberations between the Regional Head Campaign Team and crucial agencies like *BAPPEDA* (Regional Development Planning Agency), *Bapenda* (Regional Revenue Agency), and *BPKAD* (Regional Financial and Asset Management Agency), aimed at formulating priority programs consistent with the campaign pledges of the elected Regional Head. The subsequent formulation and dissemination of the *RPJMD* to diverse organizational units adhere to established formal procedures. However, an in-depth analysis of the *RPJMD* content reveals a significant congruence with national development priorities, suggesting a deficiency in genuine decentralization within regional planning.

This alignment raises questions about the extent of regional autonomy in shaping development strategies. While the formal procedures indicate a decentralized approach, the substance of the *RPJMD* reflects a broader influence from national agendas. This discrepancy points to a pseudo-decentralization phenomenon, where the appearance of regional authority in planning may not translate into substantial autonomy. It underscores the need for a more nuanced examination of the power dynamics between central and regional entities in the planning process.

The fiscal limitations confronted by Sumedang Regency accentuate the complexities in realizing the envisioned development initiatives. The primary source of local revenue, namely the *PAD*, falls short in providing the necessary financial backing for the prioritized projects. This inadequacy is compounded by the allocation of funds towards the operational expenditures and aspirations of *DPRD* (Regional People's Representative Assembly) members, thereby imposing additional constraints on the budget earmarked for development endeavors.

These financial challenges underscore the critical need for diversified revenue streams or enhanced fiscal management strategies to augment the available resources. The insufficiency of local revenue has implications for the feasibility and scale of the proposed development programs, necessitating a comprehensive review of financial allocations and priorities to ensure the effective implementation of the regional development agenda.

FAM's statement accentuates the constrained financial capacity of Sumedang Regency, constraining the allocation of funds to maintenance-oriented projects rather than substantial capital expenditures. Despite these financial limitations, the local government demonstrates resilience in initiating infrastructure projects, albeit with a more modest scale. This persistence in project implementation, even within financial constraints, highlights the commitment to addressing regional development needs within the available fiscal parameters.

The study unveils the pivotal role played by the Regent in securing external funding to actualize development projects. Leveraging extensive experience and a well-established network forged through roles in various legislative bodies, the Regent adeptly engages in effective lobbying for support from both central and provincial authorities. Noteworthy instances of successful lobbying, exemplified by securing funds for the library building and COVID-19 response, underscore the Regent's instrumental contribution to the region's developmental pursuits.

Yet, the achievement in securing external funds begets a manifestation of pseudo-decentralization, wherein developmental agendas are swayed by external sources rather than adhering strictly to local priorities. While the emphasis on national and provincial programs proves advantageous in securing financial support, it concurrently jeopardizes the authenticity inherent in regional development planning.

The prevailing conditions in Sumedang Regency mirror a state of fiscal pseudo-decentralization, wherein formal decentralization exists only nominally, and the reliance on external financial sources obstructs genuine autonomy. The dearth of authority in determining budget allocation policies, coupled with the influence of political lobbying on budget disbursement, further solidify the pseudo-decentralized state.

The study underscores a crucial point: notwithstanding the formal endorsement of decentralization, the development programs in Sumedang Regency lack viability without external funding. The Regent assumes a pivotal role in navigating the intricate web of intergovernmental relations, ensuring a secure stream of resources for the region. While this strategy has proven effective, it underscores an imperative for a more equitable fiscal policy, essential for fostering fair and sustainable regional development throughout Indonesia.

In the context of developing the *RPJMD* in Sumedang Regency, findings from previous research offer a rich and profound perspective. Simanjuntak (2015) highlights the risk of disproportion in local budget allocation, a finding that resonates with the reality of Sumedang Regency. The limitations of local resources, as emphasized by Amin (2017) and Sari, Garvera, and Sihabudin (2018), pose a tangible obstacle to achieving genuine regional autonomy. The presence of pseudo-fiscal decentralization, as elucidated by Habibi (2015), further complicates Sumedang Regency's efforts to achieve financial self-reliance.

Akadun (2023) underscores the crucial role of leadership in enhancing organizational performance, aligning with the finding that individual capabilities, especially those of local leaders, play a key role in garnering support and resources. Lastly, Sabara (2022) discusses the impact of the political model of fiscal decentralization, creating competition among regions to secure funds from the central government.

Considering these findings, we understand that Sumedang Regency not only faces local financial constraints but also significant external pressures in the development planning process. Dependency on external support, as illustrated by the Regent's ability to secure additional resources, yields positive outcomes in realizing development projects. However, alongside this success, a form of pseudo-decentralization emerges, where the development agenda is more influenced by external factors, sacrificing authenticity and regional autonomy.

Therefore, from a policy perspective, there is an urgent need to consider a more equitable and sustainable fiscal framework. The central government needs to evaluate the fiscal decentralization model that triggers imbalanced competition among regions. In the context of Sumedang Regency, this may involve increased central fund allocations and fiscal policy reforms to ensure that regions like Sumedang have sufficient resources to realize their development vision with full autonomy.

Conclusions

- Sumedang Regency finds itself entangled in financial dependency on both the central and provincial governments due to the absence of lucrative local revenue sources provided by the central government. This fiscal landscape is emblematic of a decentralized system that, in practice, manifests as pseudo-fiscal decentralization, influencing regional development planning.
- Despite the financial reliance, Sumedang Regency remains resilient in executing development programs and activities, garnering accolades, albeit sourced predominantly from the central and provincial governments. The acquisition of awards, both directly and indirectly, contributes to the augmentation of Sumedang Regency's revenue. Notably, the successful implementation of central and provincial development initiatives in Sumedang is facilitated by adept political lobbying and collaborative efforts on the part of regional leaders. However, this reliance on elite figures in the execution of decentralization and autonomy policies poses a significant risk, potentially impeding the attainment of decentralization and regional autonomy objectives and fostering disparate development outcomes. As such, it becomes imperative to scrutinize and reform the fiscal decentralization model, ensuring equitable resource allocation and sustainable development for regions like Sumedang within the overarching framework of decentralization policies.

The political landscape of fiscal decentralization, leading to fiscal reliance of regency/city governments on the central government (pseudo-decentralization), coupled with dependence on elite figures, poses a substantial threat to the successful realization of decentralization and regional autonomy goals, contributing to unequal developmental outcomes. In light of these challenges, the authors advocate for a proactive stance by the central government in promoting fiscal policies that ensure regency/city governments access financially lucrative and equitable resources.

References

1. Adipura, Ira Sri, Sri Rahayu, and Junaidi. 2022. „The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization, Regional Financial Independence, Effectiveness and Efficiency on Economic Growth and Human Development Index as Intervening Variables (Empire Study on Regency/City Government in Jambi Province 2016-2019).“ *Jurnal Akuntansi Dan Keuangan Universitas Jambi* 7 (2): 82-92. <https://online-journal.unja.ac.id/jaku/article/download/16267/14270>. <https://doi.org/10.22437/jaku.v7i2.16267>

2. Agyemang-Duah, Williams, Evans Kafui Gbedoho, Prince Peprah, Francis Arthur, Augustus Kweku Sobeng, Joshua Okyere, and Jennifer Mengba Dokbila. 2018. „Reducing Poverty through Fiscal Decentralization in Ghana and beyond: A Review.“ *Cogent Economics and Finance* 6 (1): 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2018.1476035>
3. Akadun. 2023. “Konstruksi Organisasi Melalui Collaborative Governance.” *JIAPI UT* 4 (1): 47-54.
4. Amalia, Firda Rizky, and Ida Bagus Putu Purbadharmaja. 2014. “Pengaruh Kemandirian Keuangan Daerah Dan Keserasian Alokasi Belanja Terhadap Indeks Pembangunan Manusia | E-Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan Universitas Udayana.” *Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan* 3 (6): 257-64. <https://ojs.unud.ac.id/index.php/eep/article/view/8663>
5. Amin, Ash. 2017. „An Institutionalist Perspective on Regional Economic Development.“ *Economy: Critical Essays in Human Geography*, 59-72. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351159203-3>
6. Andriani, R.Neneng Rina, and Nisa Noor Wahid. 2018. „Pengaruh Pendapatan Asli Daerah Dan Dana Perimbangan Terhadap Kemandirian Keuangan Daerah.“ *Jurnal Akuntansi* 13 (1): 30-39. <https://doi.org/10.37058/jak.v13i1.708>
7. Badrudin, Rudy, and Baldrice Siregar. 2015. „The Evaluation of the Implementation of Regional Autonomy in Indonesia.“ *Economic Journal of Emerging Markets* 7 (1): 1-11. <https://doi.org/10.20885/ejem.vol7.iss1.art1>
8. Faguet, Jean Paul. 2014. „Decentralization and Governance.“ *World Development* 53: 2-13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.002>
9. Gray, Mia, and Anna Barford. 2018. „The Depths of the Cuts: The Uneven Geography of Local Government Austerity.“ *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society* 11 (3): 541-63. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsy019>
10. Habibi, Muhammad Mujtaba. 2015. „Analisis Pelaksanaan Desentralisasi Dalam Otonomi Daerah Kota/Kabupaten.“ *Jurnal Pendidikan Pancasila Dan Kewarganegaraan* 3 (2): 117-24. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-4894\(54\)90048-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-4894(54)90048-X)
11. Hamid, Aceng Abdul. 2018. „Analisis Pengaruh Kinerja Keuangan Daerah Terhadap Tingkat Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Kabupaten Majalengka - Jawa Barat.“ *Jurnal SEKURITAS (Saham, Ekonomi, Keuangan Dan Investasi)* 1 (4): 38-51. <https://doi.org/10.32493/skt.v1i4.1378>
12. Hamja, Buhar. 2020. “Pemisahan Dan Pembagian Kekuasaan Dalam Konsep Negara Hukum Dan Demokrasi.” *Justisia* 7 (3): 248-53.
13. Hardiana, R. Dian, Heraeni Tanuatmodjo, and Fitriana Kurniati. 2020. „Desentralisasi Fiskal Dan Tingkat Kemandirian Daerah Kabupaten/Kota Di Provinsi Jawa Barat Tahun 2015-2019 (Evaluasi Kinerja Pemerintah Daerah Menjelang Dua Dekade Otonomi Daerah Di Indonesia).“ *Jurnal Pendidikan Akuntansi Dan Keuangan* Vol. 8 (2): 197-210. <https://doi.org/10.17509/jpak.v8i2.25757>
14. Hariyanto, Hariyanto. 2020. „Hubungan Kewenangan Antara Pemerintah Pusat Dan Pemerintah Daerah Berdasarkan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia.“ *Volksgeist: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Dan Konstitusi* 3 (2): 99-115. <https://doi.org/10.24090/volksgeist.v3i2.4184>
15. Hastuti, Proborini. 2018. “Desentralisasi Fiskal Dan Stabilitas Politik Dalam Kerangka Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah Di Indonesia.” *Simposium Nasional Keuangan Negara* 1 (1): 784-99. <https://jurnal.bppk.kemenkeu.go.id/snkn/article/view/293>
16. Hendawati, Henda, Dekrita Komarasakti, and Surya Ansori. 2017. “Analisis Faktor-Faktor Yang Mempengaruhi Kinerja Keuangan Di Pemerintahan Daerah Pemerintahan Daerah.” *Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Dan Keuangan* 5 (3): 1643-55.
17. Kaunang, CE, Amran T Naukoko, and Albert T Londa. 2016. “Analisis Kinerja Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah Dan Tingkat Kemandirian Daerah Di Era Otonomi Daerah: Studi Pada Kota Manado (Tahun 2010-2014).” *Jurnal Berkala Ilmiah Efisiensi* 16 (2): 355-65.
18. Leigh, Nancey Green, and Heonyeong Lee. 2019. „Sustainable and Resilient Urban Water Systems: The Role of Decentralization and Planning.“ *Sustainability (Switzerland)* 11 (3): 1-17. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su11030918>

19. Malau, Eve Ida, and Eka Pratiwi Septania Simarmata. 2020. „Pengaruh Pendapatan Asli Daerah (Pad) Dan Belanja Modal Terhadap Kemandirian Keuangan Daerah.“ *Jurnal Ekonomi Dan Bisnis (EK&BI)* 3 (2): 332-37. <https://doi.org/10.37600/ekbi.v3i2.196>
20. Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, Santiago Lago-Peñas, and Agnese Sacchi. 2017. „The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey.“ *Journal of Economic Surveys* 31 (4): <https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12182>
21. Matthew B. Miles, A, Michael Huberman, Johnny Saldana. 2014. *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook*. Third. Los Angeles, London, New Dehli, Singapura, Washington DC: Sage Publications, Inc.
22. Mauludin, Wahyu, and Retno Mustika Dewi. 2020. „Rasio Kemandirian Keuangan Daerah Dan Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Terhadap Indeks Pembangunan Manusia Di Provinsi Banten.“ *Jurnal Pendidikan Ekonomi (JUPE)* 8 (3): 116-21. <https://doi.org/10.26740/jupe.v8n3.p116-121>
23. Musa'ad, Mohammad A. 2010. “Kontekstualisasi Pelaksanaan Otonomi Khusus Di Provinsi Papua: Perspektif Struktur Dan Kewenangan Pemerintahan.” *Kajian* 16 (2): 357-85.
24. Nasution, Anggi Pratama, Bagus Handoko, and Ilham Rizki Adi Pohan. 2018. “Analisis Pengaruh Pendapatan Asli Daerah, Transfer Pemerintah Pusat Dan Efisiensi Belanja Daerah Terhadap Kemandirian Keuangan Daerah Kabupaten/Kota Di Provinsi Sumatera Utara.” *Jurnal Akuntansi Bisnis & Publik* 9 (1): 192-206.
25. Purbadharmaja, Ida Bagus Putu, I. B.P. Maryunani, Candra Fajri Ananda, and Dwi Budi Santoso. 2019. „The Implications of Fiscal Decentralization and Budget Governance on Economic Capacity and Community Welfare.“ *Foresight* 21 (2): 227-49. <https://doi.org/10.1108/FS-05-2018-0052>
26. Purwanto, Erwan Agus, and Agus Pramusinto. 2018. „Decentralization and Functional Assignment in Indonesia: The Case of Health and Education Services.“ *Policy Studies* 39 (6): 589-606. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2018.1530413>
27. Rosyada, Afifah Husna. 2017. *Analisis Efektivitas Pajak Daerah Dan Retribusi Daerah Terhadap Pad Provinsi Lampung Tahun 2011-2015 Dalam Perspektif Ekonomi Islam*.
28. Roza, Nelvia. 2021. “KAITANNYA DENGAN PENYELENGGARAAN OTONOMI DAERAH (Studi Perimbangan Keuangan Antara Pemerintah Pusat Dan Pemerintahan Daerah Dalam Dana Bagi Hasil Migas Provinsi Riau) TESIS OLEH : : HTN / HAN PROGRAM STUDI HUKUM PROGRAM MAGISTER FAKULTAS HUKUM.”
29. Sabara, Abdul Rahman. 2022. „Regional Autonomy in the Political System and Authority in Indonesia.“ *Diponegoro Law Review* 7 (2): 296-311. <https://doi.org/10.14710/dilrev.7.2.2022.296-311>
30. Salam, Rahmat, and Izzatusholekha. 2020. „Decentralization and Its Influence in Determining the Direction of Public Policy as an Effort to Improve Community Welfare.“ *International Journal of Science and Society* 2 (4): 111-20. <https://doi.org/10.54783/ijssoc.v2i4.197>
31. Saputra, Budi, Yohanes Vyn. Amzar, and Purwaka H.P. 2015. „Analisis Pengaruh Kemandirian Keuangan Daerah Terhadap Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Kabupaten Dan Kota Di Provinsi Jambi.“ *Ekonomi Regional* 10 (2): 145-51. <https://doi.org/10.22437/pdpd.v10i2.12858>
32. Sari, Purnama, R. Rindu Garvera, and Aan Anwar Sihabudin. 2018. „What Is the Contribution of Local Original Revenue to Regional Financial Independent?“ *Journal of Public Administration Studies* 3 (2): 78-81. <https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.jpas.2018.003.02.4>
33. Sawir, Muhammad. 2019. “Tinjauan Mengenai Fungsi Birokrasi Pemerintahan Di Indonesia.” *Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi Dan Ilmu Pemerintahan* 3 (1): 208-21. <http://www.jurnal.uniyap.ac.id/index.php/jurnalfsisp/article/view/489>
34. Schneider, Aaron. 2003. „<Schneider Decen Def.Pdf>“ 38 (3): 32-56. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02686198>
35. Simanjuntak, Kardin. 2015. „Implementasi Kebijakan Desentralisasi Pemerintahan Di Indonesia.“ *Jurnal Bina Praja* 07 (02): 111-30. <https://doi.org/10.21787/JBP.07.2015.111-130>
36. Slattery, Cailin, and Owen Zidar. 2020. „Evaluating State and Local Business Incentives.“ *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 34 (2): 90-118. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.34.2.90>

37. Suprayitno, Bambang, Tejo Nurseto, and Supriyanto Supriyanto. 2017. „Produktifkah Human Capital Investment Oleh Pemerintah Daerah Provinsi Dalam Era Desentralisasi?“ *Jurnal Economia* 13 (1): 39. <https://doi.org/10.21831/economia.v13i1.11154>
38. Tahar, Afrizal, and Maulida Zakhya. 2011. “The Influence of Regional Original Income and General Allocation Funds on Regional Independence and Regional Economic Growth.” *Jurnal Akutansi Dan Investasi* 12 (1): 88-99.
39. Talitha, Tessa, Tommy Firman, and Delik Hudalah. 2020. „Welcoming Two Decades of Decentralization in Indonesia: A Regional Development Perspective.“ *Territory, Politics, Governance* 8 (5): 690-708. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2019.1601595>
40. Wildavsky, Aaron. 2017. *Budgeting and Governing*. Edited by Brendon Swedlow. New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315081922>
41. Yasrina, Nova. 2020. „Pendapatan Asli Daerah Untuk Pembangunan Daerah Yang Berkelanjutan Di Indonesia.“ *Ensiklopedia Social Review* 2 (2): 132-39. <https://doi.org/10.33559/esr.v2i2.484>

Akadun, Akadun

PSEUDODECENTRALIZACIJOS IR FINANSINĖS PRIKLAUSOMYBĖS ANALIZĖ ĮGYVENDINANT REGIONINĖ AUTONOMIJĄ INDONEZIJOS SUMEDANGO REGIONE

Anotacija. Šiame tyrime nagrinėjamas pseudodecentralizacijos ir finansinės priklausomybės reiškinys įgyvendinant regioninę autonomiją Sumedango regione, Indonezijoje. Taikant atvejo studijos metodą ir analizuojant 2019-2022 m. finansinius duomenis, šiame tyrime nagrinėjama, kokių mastu Sumedango regionas yra priklausomas nuo centrinės ir provincijų valdžios finansinių išteklių. Tyrimo rezultatai atskleidžia didelę finansinę priklausomybę dėl ribotų centrinės valdžios teikiamų pajamų šaltinių tokiems regionams kaip Sumedangas. Nepaisant šios priklausomybės, Sumedango regionas sėkmingai vykdo plėtros programas ir gauna apdovanojimus. Iš dalies dėl veiksmingo regiono vadovų politinio lobizmo. Tačiau tokia priklausomybė nuo vietos elito gali trukdyti siekti decentralizacijos tikslų ir lemti nevienodus vystymosi rezultatus. Rekomenduojama centrinei valdžiai sutelkti dėmesį į fiskalinės politikos įgyvendinimą, kuri paskirstytų pelningesnius ir teisingesnius finansinius išteklius visam regionui ir miestams. Taip skatinant tikrą decentralizaciją ir teisingą vystymąsi.

Akadun Akadun, Associate Professor, Departemen of Public Administration,
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Sebelas April, Indonesia
E-mail: akadun@unsap.ac.id

Akadun Akadun, Socialinių ir politikos mokslų fakulteto Viešojo administravimo katedros docentas
Universitas Sebelas balandis, Indonezija
El. paštas: akadun@unsap.ac.id



This article is an Open Access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

STRATEGIES OF REGIONAL LEVIES OF THE MARINE AFFAIRS AND FISHERIES OFFICE OF CENTRAL JAVA PROVINCE OF INDONESIA

Diah Setyorini GUNAWAN

*Universitas Jenderal Soedirman,
Jalan Prof. H.R. Boenyamin No. 708 Purwokerto 53122, Indonesia*

Icuk Rangga BAWONO

*Universitas Jenderal Soedirman,
Jalan Prof. H.R. Boenyamin No. 708 Purwokerto 53122, Indonesia*

<https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppa.23.1.33615>

Abstract. *There is still a need to properly increase the role of regional levies in generating revenue for Central Java Province. This is because each region has been granted the authority to manage its affairs, including regional finance, with the expectation that regional governments will become financially independent from the central government. In reality, many regions in Indonesia and other countries still significantly rely on the central government for financial support. Therefore, regional governments must focus on increasing revenue by improving the management of regional levies at the Regional Apparatus Organizations. This is achieved through the development of strategies for the regional levies sector based on the SWOT analysis results and the projected regional levies revenue of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province. This research aimed to identify strategies, create strategies for regional levies, and analyze the projected revenue from these levies. This is expected to support efforts to increase regional levies revenue. This research used primary and secondary data. The primary data were obtained through interview results with key informants to assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats faced by the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office in collecting regional levies. Meanwhile, secondary data comprised information on regional levies and relevant references on the Regional Apparatus Organization. The data collected were analyzed using the SWOT and multiple linear regression analyses as analytical techniques. The results showed the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats used to collect regional levies and also the strategies. Based on the projected revenue, the levies generated by this Regional Apparatus Organization are projected to increase from 2022 to 2027 steadily. The implications include recommendations for activities carried out by the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office, which aligned with the potential and capabilities of the regional and central government regulations governing regional levies.*

Keywords: strategies, regional levies, regional revenue, SWOT analysis, regional government.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: strategijos, regioninės rinkliavos, regioninės pajamos, SWOT analizė, regiono valdžia.

Introduction

In the era of regional autonomy, one of the key objectives is to grant each region the authority to manage its affairs, including regional finance. This shift aims to enhance efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability within local governments. The intention is for regions to have alternative funding sources for development in addition to transferring funds and financial assistance from the central government (Christia & Ispriyarso, 2019). With the implementation of regional autonomy, local governments can now

access local information more easily (Wei, Yabin, & Shaobo, 2018). This enables them to increase their revenue sources by making informed decisions based on local data and circumstances.

Regional governments are expected to achieve financial independence and reduce their reliance on the central government. Therefore, they must prioritize increasing revenue through efforts to increase regional taxes and levies. The existing reality shows that many regions still exhibit a high level of financial dependence on the central government. Several research, such as those conducted by (Sari, Garvera, & Sihabudin, 2018), highlighted that regional revenue had not significantly contributed to fiscal independence in numerous regions in Indonesia. This condition occurs not only in Indonesia but also in other countries. Research conducted by Baskaran, Brender, Blesse, & Reingewert (2016) showed that regions in Israel still depended on the central government to transfer funds. Meanwhile, Kotarba & Anna (2014) stated that regions in Poland were still unable to maximize revenue. Regions with inadequate fiscal capacity rely heavily on the central government for financial support (Marlissa & Blesia, 2018).

The high financial dependence observed in many regions highlights the necessity of revenue reform. This reform plays a vital role in enhancing the quality of regional budgets, which, in turn, ensures improved governance. The effectiveness of national development programs implementation is closely linked to the quality of governance. It is crucial to identify the most suitable paradigm for enhancing governance quality. Bekoe, Danquah, & Senahey (2016) stated that revenue reform positively affected the overall revenue structure. In addition, Nassios, Giesecke, Dixon, & Rimmer (2019) reported that revenue reform was expected to impact the economy positively. Gnanngnon and Brun (2019) researched 95 developing countries and found that revenue reforms benefited revenue enhancement efforts. Bimonte & Stabile (2019) research in Italy reported that revenue reform was the major tool to increase revenue. Revenue reform plays a significant role in increasing regional taxes and regional levies (Hanlon, Hoopes, & Slemrod, 2019).

Regional taxes and levies play a vital role in financing regional development initiatives. Increasing regional revenues is a crucial step towards addressing the financial challenges encountered by regions. The expansion of the scope of regional taxes and levies was made possible by Law Number 28 of 2009, which specifically focuses on Regional Taxes and Levies. This law grants regions the flexibility to establish tariffs within their respective jurisdictions.

The central government has delegated authority to regional governments to collect regional levies. This empowerment is intended to enhance the fundamental principles of autonomy and reinforce the role of regional governments in supporting their fiscal capacity. Regional levies serve as a significant source of funding for regions, enabling them to effectively finance their various endeavours and meet their financial needs.

Law Number 1 of 2022, which governs the financial relations between the Central Government and Regional Governments, simplified the types of regional taxes and levies outlined in Law Number 28 of 2009. This law has streamlined the classification of regional taxes, reducing the number from 16 to 14 types. Similarly, it has rationalized regional levies, consolidating them from 32 to 18 service types and allowed local governments flexibility to adapt to local circumstances and requirements.

With the implementation of the Law on Financial Relations between the Central Government and Regional Governments, this research not only analyzed the projected regional levies revenue based on Law Number 28 of 2009 but also considered the projected revenue based on the new financial relations law. The analysis covered two periods before and after enacting the Law on Financial Relations between the Central Government and Regional Governments. The results are expected to be instrumental in formulating precise strategies to increase regional levies revenue.

Regional levies are payments for services and the issuance of particular permits by the region (Direktorat Jenderal Perimbangan Keuangan, 2021). The role of regional levies in generating regional revenue for Central Java Province still needs to be increased. According to data from 2018 to 2021, regional taxes contribute approximately 82% to the revenue formation of Central Java Province, while the contribution of regional levies remains below 1% (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jawa Tengah, 2022). To enhance revenue from regional levies, developing strategies to be implemented is crucial. The strategies must be based on a comprehensive analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) involved.

Governor of Central Java Regulation Number 28 of 2019, which pertains to the Roadmap of Central Java Province Bureaucratic Reform, emphasizes the importance of having a plan that outlines specific programs to guide the Regional Apparatus Organizations in developing their action plans. The implementation of bureaucratic reform must be comprehensive, simultaneous, and sustainable. The ultimate goal is to transform the mindset, culture, attitudes, and behaviour of the state apparatus towards being clean, professional, service-oriented, prosperous, and neutral. These efforts are part of a broader context of achieving Good Governance and Clean Government.

In Central Java Province, specific Regional Apparatus Organizations stand out for their significant regional levies revenue compared to others. These organizations include the Health, Transportation, Marine Affairs and Fisheries, and Agriculture and Plantation Offices. The Health Office generates its levies revenue through Health Service Levies, General Services Levies, and Business Services Levies, making it the largest contributor to regional levies revenue in Central Java Province. Following closely is the Transportation Office, which obtains its levies revenue from the Terminal, Port Service, Route Permit, and Business Service. It holds the second-largest position in terms of levies revenue in the province. The third and fourth positions are the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office and the Agriculture and Plantation Office, respectively. The Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office generates its levies revenue from Pond Land Leases, Boat Mooring Leases, Entrance Tickets for Fish Auctions, Seed Sales Levies, Ice Cube Production Sales Levies, Laboratory Usage Levies, and Fisheries Business Permit Levies. Meanwhile, the Agriculture and Plantation Office regional levies revenue comes from Land Leases, Laboratory Usage Levies, and Regional Business Production Sales Levies.

Regional Apparatus Organizations in Central Java Province possess unique potentials based on their respective areas of expertise. For example, the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office specializes in the marine and fisheries sector, while the Agriculture and Plantation Office focuses on the agriculture and plantation sectors. These organizations leverage their potential to maximize regional levies revenue.

This research analyzed regional levies specifically for the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province. Regional levies of this Regional Apparatus Organization were included in the group of the top four Regional Apparatus Organizations in Central Java Province, with the largest levies from 2016 to 2021. Based on the potential of Central Java Province in marine affairs and fisheries, it is anticipated that this Regional Apparatus Organization will continue to excel and potentially become the leader in regional levies revenue. This is because the abundance of marine resources and the thriving fisheries sector in Central Java Province provide a strong foundation for increasing regional levies revenue. Therefore, Regional Apparatus Organization must develop strategies to guide and support their efforts to increase regional levies effectively.

Implementing regional autonomy has led to decentralizing marine management, shifting the authority from the central government to provincial and regency governments. This transfer of management authority to the regions encompasses various aspects, including 1) Observation, exploitation, preservation and also marine wealth management, 2) Arrangement associated with spatial, 3) Arrangement associated with administrative, 4) Implementation of government regulations, 5) Security maintenance participation, and 6) Defending sovereign state participation.

Several research have been conducted to examine the role of regional levies and revenue in Indonesia as well as other countries. For instance, Rajab (2020) focused on analyzing the role of regional levies in generating Local Own-Source Revenue for Mamuju Regency. Similarly, Wardani & Trisnaningsih (2022) examined the contribution of regional levies to the Local Own-Source Revenue of Karanganyar Regency.

Several other research by Etel (2019), Glushchenko & Kozhalina (2019), Savitri & Suarjaya (2020), Arintoko & Bawono (2021), Batog & Batog (2021), Kii, Harmono, & Sumtaky (2022), and Maulid, Bawono, & Sudibyo (2022) have also been conducted in the field of regional levies and regional revenue. Etel (2019) analyzed the costs associated with local tax collection in Poland, while Glushchenko and Kozhalina (2019) examined the role of regional taxation in Ukraine.

Savitri & Suarjaya (2020) evaluated the effect of regional levies on Bali Province's economic growth, while Arintoko & Bawono (2021) examined the optimization of regional taxes revenue. Furthermore, Batog & Batog (2021) researched regional government revenues in Poland. The impact of regional levies on East Nusa Tenggara Province was reported by Kii, Harmono, & Sumtaky (2022), while Maulid, Bawono, & Sudibyo (2022) analyzed regional revenue in Indonesia.

The objectives of this research are to identify the strategies of regional levies as well as to analyze the projected revenue of regional levies. Previous research on regional levies did not identify the strategies prepared based on SWOT analysis. This research carefully identifies and considers the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats associated with collecting regional levies. The strategies are derived from the SWOT analysis results. In addition, previous research did not analyze the projected revenue of regional levies by distinguishing between two time periods, namely before the enactment of the Law on Financial Relations between the Central Government and Regional Governments and after its enactment.

Literature Review

Government administration in regions is characterized by autonomy and co-administration to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in providing public services. As part of their empowering functions, regions have a funding source to support their governance and service provision. This includes the authority to collect regional taxes and levies, enabling regions to generate local development revenue. In addition to the autonomy to collect regional taxes and levies, an intergovernmental transfer system exists between different levels of government. The establishment of this transfer system is a key component of fiscal decentralization, which aims to empower regions and strengthen their capacity to govern and provide services effectively.

Regional taxes and levies play important roles in facilitating regional development. The optimization of regional revenues generated from these sources is not only a promising prospect but also a solution to regional financial challenges. Regional levies encompass payments for various services and specific permits provided by regional authorities. The objects include general services, business services, and certain permits associated with services that promote the public interest, commercial principles, and individuals or entities, respectively (Direktorat Jenderal Perimbangan Keuangan, 2021).

It is essential to develop a comprehensive regional levies strategies to increase revenue from regional levies. Strategies to increase revenue from regional levies reflect public policies taken by regional government. Public policy is a decision from various interconnected actors to achieve a goal (Jenkins, 1987). Based on this, it can be emphasized that the most important thing is the policy making process which involves various actors. Policy is not just a choice made by the regional government.

Public policy is a decision from various interconnected actors to achieve certain goals (Jenkins, 1987). This definition emphasizes public policy in a policy-making process, different from the opinion of Dye (1981) who only defines public policy as a choice taken by the government.

Based on the concept of public policy put forward by Jenkins (1987), when the regional government wants to make a policy related to regional levies, the regional government must involve various actors. The actors in this case include Regional Apparatus Organizations within the regional government area as well as parties related to the collection of regional levies.

The process of identifying obstacles in collecting regional levies is not only carried out by the Regional Revenue Management Agency but also involves related Regional Apparatus Organizations and other parties outside the Regional Apparatus Organizations that are related to this matter. Likewise in terms of determining solutions to obstacles in collecting regional levies or developing strategies to increase regional levies revenue. Determining solutions to obstacles in collecting regional levies or developing strategies to increase regional levies revenue also involves related Regional Apparatus Organizations and other parties outside the Regional Apparatus Organizations that are related to this matter.

Several studies have examined the marine and fisheries sector levies in various regions such as the studies conducted by Purnarianto (2016); Chang, Choi, & Choi (2018); Amalia & Tolo (2021); Balukh, Nursalam, & Sayrani (2021); and Berglann (2023). Purnarianto (2016) analyzed about the potential, efficiency, effectiveness and the contribution of the fisheries sector in Tebo Regency to Local Own-Source Revenue. Efficiency and effectiveness affected the contribution of the fisheries sector to the Local Own-Source Revenue of Tebo Regency. Research conducted by Chang, Choi, & Choi (2018) analyzed the challenges of marine levies in South Korea. It emphasized the need to improve the marine levies system in South Korea.

Amalia & Tolo (2021) analyzed the inhibiting factors for the management of fisheries sector levies in Muna Regency. These inhibiting factors include regulations that are no longer relevant, human resources, facilities and infrastructure for collecting levies and the low level of public awareness in paying levies. Balukh, Nursalam, & Sayrani (2021) conducted research related to regional levies with a focus on analyzing the potential loss of regional levies at the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of East Nusa Tenggara Province, identifying challenges in levy collection in the marine and fisheries sector. It emphasized the need to develop regional competitive advantages to compete effectively with other regions and international competitors. Berglann (2023) analyzed the selection of types of fisheries levies in Norwegia. The selection of types of fisheries levies has an impact on efficiency in terms of collection of levies and benefits of levies.

Research Methods

This research employed a combination of primary and secondary data. The primary data were gathered through interviews with key informants from the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office regarding the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats faced by the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office in terms of collecting regional levies. On the other hand, the secondary data consisted of information on regional levies and references related to this particular Regional Apparatus Organization.

Key informants were people selected by the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office and the Regional Revenue Management Office of Central Java Province. Eight key informants were selected from these Regional Apparatus Organizations based on their extensive knowledge and expertise in collecting regional levies. The key informants include the head of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office and the head of Regional Revenue Management Office of Central Java Province.

The technical data collection process involved three visits to the Regional Revenue Management Office, where Focus Group Discussion (FGD) events were conducted. The FGD was attended by the Head and three staff members from the Regional Revenue Management Office and the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office, who were responsible for regional levies. During the first FGD, discussions were held to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of collecting regional levies. Secondly, the research team reviewed and confirmed the identified strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. It also focused on discussing the strategies. Thirdly, the prepared strategies was discussed and further refined. Interviews were conducted, and all discussions were recorded using a recorder for accurate documentation. After the first FGD, the research team was accompanied by four research assistants during a visit to the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office. This visit provided an opportunity to gather additional information and data related to regional levies, which were then stored in an Excel file. Prior to this, the research team had already obtained data from the Regional Revenue Management Office. Furthermore, a dedicated WhatsApp group maintained regular and intensive communication with the key informants.

Representatives from the Development Planning, Research and Regional Development Office, as well as the Legal Bureau of the Regional Secretariat of Central Java Province, were invited by the Regional Revenue Management Office to participate in each FGD. Their presence significantly contributed to this research by providing diverse perspectives and expertise.

The triangulation method, which involved gathering information and data from multiple sources, was used in this research. These sources included interviews with key informants, who were selected for

their expertise and knowledge on regional levies, direct visits to the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office, annual data provided by the Regional Apparatus Organizations, as well as reference searches through the Regional Apparatus Organizations website.

This research used SWOT analysis and multiple linear regression as analytical techniques. Identifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats was conducted by carefully describing and summarizing the data and information gathered from interviews with key informants who possessed the necessary knowledge pertaining to the subject matter.

SWOT analysis has advantages in strategic planning and provides a basis for identifying situations and procedures that will be carried out in the future (Nikolaou & Evangelinos, 2010). This analytical tool allows for a systematic examination of internal and external factors, thereby facilitating the formulation of effective strategies. Internal factors encompass the strengths and weaknesses of an organization, while external factors encompass the opportunities and threats (Manteghi & Zohrabi, 2011).

The strategies were identified using SWOT analysis results, which take into account the internal and external factors to formulate future strategies (Rauch, 2007). Internal and external factors are pivotal in shaping strategies for regions or organizations (Porter, 1997). Porter (1983) also stated that strategy should consider aspects of competition and how to deal with the competition. Based on the SWOT analysis, various strategies can be formulated, including Strength-Opportunity (SO) Strategies, Strength-Threat (ST) Strategies, Weakness-Opportunity (WO) Strategies, and Weakness-Threat (WT) Strategies (Manteghi & Zohrabi, 2011).

The Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office can identify strategic issues that require thorough examination and development to optimize regional levies revenue through the combination of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. SWOT analysis is crucial as it helps identify key areas that demand attention and improvement. The organization can pinpoint critical issues that impact regional levies management by analyzing internal strengths and weaknesses alongside external opportunities and threats. This identification of strategic issues forms the foundation for devising effective strategies aimed at increasing regional levies revenue.

Multiple linear regression analysis was used to forecast regional levies revenue from the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office. By having a forecast of regional levies revenue, it can be seen whether there is a potential for an increase or decrease in regional levies revenue in the future. These were differentiated into projections based on Law Number 28 of 2009 (PDRD) and Law Number 1 of 2022 (HKPD) because the types of levies from the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province based on Law Number 28 of 2009 (PDRD) and Law Number 1 of 2022 (HKPD) are different. Prior to Law Number 1 of 2022 (HKPD), the types of levies for the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province included levies for using regional assets, levies for sales of regional business production, and levies for fisheries business permits. After Law Number 1 of 2022 (HKPD) was issued, the types of levies from the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province only include levies for using regional assets and levies for sales of regional business production. Levies for fisheries business permits are no longer collected by the province. In other words, multiple linear regression analysis was used to project regional levies revenue which was differentiated into two time periods, namely before and after the enactment of the Law on Financial Relations between the Central Government and Regional Governments. The projection model for regional levies revenue was based on the regression equation as follows:

$$REGIONAL\ LEVIES_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GRDP_t + \beta_2 POP_t + e$$

Where: REGIONAL LEVIES = Regional levies revenue of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province; GRDP = Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) of Central Java Province at 2010 Constant Market Price; POP = Population number of Central Java Province; e = Error term

The data used in this study are data from 2011 to 2022. This is related to data availability. Regional levy revenue data of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province is not available in years prior to 2011. Regarding GRDP data, this study uses GRDP data at 2010 Constant Market Price to exclude the effect of inflation or deflation due to fluctuations in the price of goods. The distinction between Cur-

rent Market Price and Constant Market Price only applies to GRDP data. This distinction does not apply to data on regional levies revenue.

Results

The Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province is crucial in overseeing and managing the marine and fisheries sectors. The functions of this Regional Apparatus Organization include formulation of policies, implementation of policies, and implementation of evaluation activities as well as reporting in the marine and fisheries sectors (Dinas Kelautan & Perikanan Provinsi Jawa Tengah, 2019).

The regional levies revenue generated by the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office comprises various types. These include 1) Levies for using regional wealth, which consists of laboratory rent and hall or dormitory rentals, 2) Port service levies, 3) Regional business production sales levies, and 4) Regional levies for fisheries business permits.

Among these types of levies, port services have been the primary contributor to regional levies revenue, accounting for more than 60% of the total revenue. Furthermore, the SWOT analysis in this research was based on data and information obtained from key informants. The results regarding the collection of regional levies are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. *The SWOT Analysis Regarding the Collection of Regional Levies at the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province*

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province has several types of regional levies that contribute greatly to regional levies. • Revenue from several types of regional levies has an increasing trend. • The Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province has the potential to become a Regional Apparatus Organization with the largest regional levies realization. This is because the province has great potential related to marine affairs and fisheries, which can be optimized to increase its regional levies revenue. The optimized object is related to marine and fisheries sector levies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilities and infrastructures that have been damaged have the potential to reduce regional levies revenue. • Port premises are often flooded. • Unsupportive budget.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The payers of regional levies at fishing ports are fishermen and ship owners, hence, fishing ports have the opportunity to increase regional levies revenue. • Fish seed centers have potential when managed properly and given adequate budgets. • Collection of regional levies by cooperating with other Regional Apparatus Organizations and related stakeholders can increase regional levies revenue. An example is cooperation with the Civil Service Police Unit of Central Java Province in efforts to enforce discipline in paying levies. • The value-added and competitiveness of fisheries products are increasing. • Information technology is growing, which has the potential to increase regional levies revenue. Regional levies revenue may increase along with technological developments in levies payments. Levies can be paid using various payment modes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a new law that will eliminate revenue from fishery business license levies. • The new Non-Tax State Revenue Regulation provides the potential for fishermen to be able to sell their catch without home, thereby reducing the number of fishermen who sell to ports in Central Java Province. This condition has the potential to reduce regional levies revenue. • Existing regulations have not been fully integrated synergistically, therefore, it can cause obstacles in the implementation of duties and service functions. • There are competitors from the private sector.

Source: Authors.

The strategies were identified using SWOT analysis results. Table 2 shows the implementable strategies of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province.

Table 2. *The Implementable Strategies of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province*

	Opportunities	Threats
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payers of regional levies at fishing ports are fishermen and ship owners, therefore fishing ports have the opportunity to increase regional levies revenue. • Fish seed centers have potential when managed properly and given adequate budgets. • Collection of regional levies by cooperating with other Regional Apparatus Organizations and related stakeholders can increase regional levies revenue. • The value-added and competitiveness of fisheries products are increasing. • Information technology is growing, which has the potential to increase regional levies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a new law that will eliminate revenue from fishery business license levies. • The new Non-Tax State Revenue Regulation provides the potential for fishermen to be able to sell their catch at the same spot without returning home. Therefore, it has the potential to reduce the number of fishermen who sell their catch to ports in Central Java Province. This condition can also reduce regional levies revenue. • Existing regulations that have not been fully integrated synergistically can create obstacles in the implementation of duties and service functions. • There are competitors from the private sector.
Strengths	Strength-Opportunity Strategies	Strength-Threat Strategies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province has several types of regional levies that contribute greatly to the region. • Revenue from several types of regional levies has an increasing trend. • The Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province has the potential to become a Regional Apparatus Organization with the largest regional levies realization considering the province has great potential related to maritime affairs and fisheries which can be optimized to increase its regional levies revenue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancing administration and operation of the properties. • Maximizing the domestic and international marketing of the Central Java Province's fisheries products. • Developing information technology in collecting regional levies to increase revenue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulation of an integrated application or information system that facilitates the process of collecting regional levies. • Optimizing revenue generation from regional levies using integrated information technology. • Increasing the production of fisheries products and also the quality in order to optimize the revenue of Regional Business Production Sales Levies.
Weaknesses	Weakness-Opportunity Strategies	Weakness-Threat Strategies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilities and infrastructures that have been damaged have the potential to reduce regional levies revenue. • Port conditions are often flooded. • Unsupportive budget. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collecting regional levies in association with connected stakeholders and other Regional Apparatus Organizations. • Renovation and maintenance as well as optimizing the utilization of assets, facilities and infrastructure to enable them to function properly and increase retribution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rules controlling regional levies that fall under the jurisdiction of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries of Central Java Province must be synchronized and harmonized to be in compliance with local laws, regulations, and circumstances. • Procurement of adequate budget based on needs analysis.

Regional levies revenue were divided into projections based on Law Number 28 of 2009 (PDRD) and Law Number 1 of 2022 (HKPD). The projection model for regional levies revenue was calculated using the following regression equation:

$$REGIONAL\ LEVIES_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GRDP_t + \beta_2 POP_t + e$$

Based on regional levies data from the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province, the real GRDP and the population of Central Java Province for the 2011-2021 period, the regression equation based on Law Number 28 of 2009 (PDRD) and Law Number 1 of 2022 (HKPD) is as follows:

Based on Law Number 28 of 2009 (PDRD):

$$REGIONAL\ LEVIES_t = -7,686,395 + 1.222352*GRDP_t + 0.216384*POP_t + e$$

Based on Law Number 1 of 2022 (HKPD):

$$REGIONAL\ LEVIES_t = -6,306,395 + 1.005023*GRDO_t + 0.177519*POP_t + e$$

Table 3 shows the regional levies revenue and the projections for the 2022-2027 period in accordance with Law Number 28 of 2009 (PDRD) and Law Number 1 of 2022 (HKPD).

Table 3. *The Central Java Provincial Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office's Regional Levies Revenue and the Projections for the 2022-2027 Period*

Year	Regional Levies Based on Law Number 1 of 2022 (in Rupiah)	Regional Levies Based on Law Number 28 of 2009 (in Rupiah)
2011	2,268,739,189	2,755,249,189
2012	2,547,110,375	3,053,710,375
2013	3,298,329,094	3,771,354,094
2014	4,592,410,278	5,503,065,118
2015	5,193,203,263	6,282,573,483
2016	4,104,552,224	5,084,644,464
2017	5,142,300,180	10,197,491,980
2018	6,729,303,069	9,889,271,269
2019	9,235,492,275	12,595,066,535
2020	10,001,720,739	14,469,450,639
2021	11,498,546,792	14,303,100,192
2022*	12,558,488,142	15,284,107,842
2023*	13,738,436,258	16,720,810,921
2024*	14,953,925,514	18,200,755,465
2025*	16,206,547,751	19,725,877,675
2026*	17,497,974,324	21,298,210,462
2027*	18,829,960,159	22,919,888,384

Source: Authors.

Note: * indicates the year of projection

Table 3 shows the revenue trend of regional levies collected by the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office. Despite experiencing fluctuations at certain points between 2011 and 2021, there has been an overall increasing trend. Projections indicate that this trend will continue from 2022 to 2027. These findings suggest that the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office has the potential to become the Regional Apparatus Organization with the highest regional levies revenue in Central Java Province.

Discussion

The SWOT analysis conducted for the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province showed valuable insights into its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in the collection of regional levies. Strengths emerged from the resources and capabilities which can make this Regional Apparatus Organization superior to other Regional Apparatus Organizations in Central Java Province. The weaknesses showed internal problems, while threats indicated external ones. Problems in collecting regional levies are classic and faced by other regions or countries. This is supported by research conducted by Sinaga (2016) on tax collection issues in Indonesia and Bogacki & Martyniuk (2022) on regional tax and levy collection in Poland. Opportunities reflect favourable external conditions that can be leveraged to enhance regional levy collection efforts.

Adisaputra, Pratama, & Nawawi (2014) researched marine and fisheries sector levies in Majene Regency. The research identified inhibiting factors that influenced the management of marine and fisheries sector levies in the regency, such as communication, resources, regulations, and bureaucratic structures, as well as supporting factors, including community participation. Balukh, Nursalam, & Sayrani (2021) and Hansyaekh (2022) also conducted research related to marine and fisheries sector levies. Balukh, Nursalam, & Sayrani (2021) conducted research related to regional levies with a focus on analyzing the potential loss of regional levies at the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of East Nusa Tenggara Province, identifying challenges in levy collection in the marine and fisheries sector. It emphasized the need to develop regional competitive advantages to compete effectively with other regions and international competitors. Hansyaekh (2022) analyzed the management of marine and fisheries sector levies in the Cirebon Regency, highlighting suboptimal regional levy management. Factors such as inadequate socialization and unclear regulations were found to impact the levy collection process in the region.

During the early days of regional autonomy, the absence of regulations for marine resource management in the regions posed challenges. The lack of clear guidance made it difficult for regions to determine appropriate management approaches. Additionally, the unclear coordination of authority between the central government and the regions further complicated the decision-making process for marine management. In the present time, efforts are being made to synchronize regulations and promote integrated management across various sectors. This integration aims to facilitate coordination between the government, fishermen, and society in the entire management cycle, encompassing planning, implementation, and evaluation. Recognizing fishermen as active participants in marine policy is important, allowing them to contribute to the decision-making process and shape the management approaches employed (Imron, 2011).

To strengthen decentralization in fisheries management, addressing the challenges faced at both the central and regional levels is crucial. This requires a commitment from the central government to share authority and responsibilities with local governments. The central government should also strive to improve the legal and policy framework that supports the implementation of decentralization in fisheries management. On the other hand, local governments must actively support collaborative efforts with local communities to ensure optimal fisheries management. In this case, the central government, local governments, and the communities must have mutual trust in fisheries management (Satria & Matsuda, 2004).

Based on identifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats related to collecting regional levies, the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office can develop strategies to optimize revenue collection. For-

ulating effective strategies is crucial for organizations, local governments, and national governments in various regions or countries to maximize revenue. In this context, research conducted by Brajnik, Prebilic, & Kronegger (2022) on Slovenia's regional levies and local tax collection methods highlights the significance of focusing on the unique characteristics and potentials of a region concerning regional taxes and levies.

Developing a strategy involves several key components, including defining the long-term goals and objectives of the institution, implementing and operationalizing these goals, effectively allocating resources, and providing guidelines for coordinating activities. This enables institutions to adapt to and impact a constantly changing environment (Sistawan, Saleh, & Efendi, 2018).

Maximizing regional levies revenue requires a comprehensive approach that considers multiple perspectives, not just that of policymakers. It is important to also take into account the viewpoint of regional levy payers. This is consistent with the assertion made by Martyniuk & Wolowiec (2022) that strategies related to regional taxes and levies should be examined from two angles: the perspective of policymakers and the perspective of regional tax and levy payers.

The Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office can potentially be the leading Regional Apparatus Organization regarding regional levies revenue in Central Java Province. Increasing regional levies revenue is important to increase regional income, which is a source of funding for providing public sector goods and services. This statement is supported by the findings of research conducted by Holbrook & Heideman (2021) and Shapovalov (2022). Holbrook & Heideman (2021) analyzed the role of regional taxes and levies in the provision of public goods and services in the United States, while Shapovalov (2022) examined the role of regional levies in the era of decentralization in Ukraine.

Central Java Province boasts extensive coastal areas, spanning 17 regencies along the north and south coasts of Java Island. The coastline of the province measures a total of 971.52 km, with the north coast stretching 645.08 km and the south covering 326.44 km. Within these coastal areas, Central Java Province possesses rich marine ecosystems, including mangroves (9,933.5 ha), coral reefs (9,745 ha), and seagrass (83.5 ha). The province also has significant potential for sustainable fish resources, estimated at 422,709.7 tons per year, along with a variety of biological and non-biological resources and artificial resources. The marine and fishery potential of Central Java Province includes Capture Fisheries with a total of 24,954 ships and 152,124 fishermen. Fishery Cultivation focuses on producing superior commodities such as shrimp, tilapia, catfish, gourami, milkfish, grouper, and seaweed. Coastal Marine Affairs and Surveillance involve the management of 33 small islands, 6,608.78 Ha of salt land, and 14,061 salt farmers. Counselling and Marine Fisheries Business encompass fish processing units for exporters (40 units), small and medium enterprises (SMEs) engaged in fishery product processing (8,761 units), and fishery product marketers (29,365 units). These vast marine and fishery resources in Central Java Province are harnessed by various stakeholders for multiple purposes, including conservation activities, port infrastructure development, capture fisheries, aquaculture, beach and water tourism, shipping routes, underwater pipelines, submarine cables, and the protection of marine biota (Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan Provinsi Jawa Tengah, 2019).

The development of marine and fishery sectors in Central Java Province centres around the optimization of sustainable natural resource management and utilization. In addition, the development of marine and fishery development in Central Java Province is focused on increasing fish productivity and production, field expansion employment, efforts to increase non-oil and gas exports and increased consumption of fishery products.

Effective management and utilization of the marine and fisheries sector's potential and opportunities necessitate well-designed development planning. Planning for the development of this sector should be comprehensive, taking into account the anticipated changes in the strategic environment, both at the national and international levels, in order to anticipate potential challenges and obstacles. Technically, the management planning must be able to anticipate the character of marine fishery resources, in es-

sence, cannot be limited based on administrative area. The future utilization of marine resources and fisheries will involve the development of market-oriented marine industries and fisheries that prioritize environmental sustainability. Therefore, efforts to harness the potential of marine resources and fisheries in Central Java Province require a planning model that takes into account the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the sector.

The Governor and the pertinent Regional Apparatus Organizations oversee the strategies implementation for the regional levies sector. Their responsibility is to ensure the smooth execution of the strategies. Regular monitoring activities are conducted to verify that the action plan is progressing as scheduled and to address any potential deviations or challenges that may arise during implementation. It is anticipated that the evaluation's findings will consistently offer recommendations for carrying out the strategies.

The effectiveness of managing regional levies is closely tied to their regional-level management. Both management practices and the collection methods employed significantly impact the performance of these levies. Therefore, attention must be paid to the effective management and collection of regional levies. These regional taxes and levies directly contribute to public sector services that directly benefit the residents of a particular area (Belmonte-Martin, Ortiz, & Polo, 2021).

Each Regional Apparatus Organization must match the strategies with the Office's medium-term and annual programs to maintain harmony, commitment, and sustainability of the strategies implementation. Proper agencies with responsibilities at both macro and micro levels need to maintain alignment and exercise control over its execution.

Conclusions

- In conclusion, the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province identified its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats associated with the collection of regional levies based on the SWOT analysis findings. The strengths in collecting regional levies include 1) The ability of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries to manage multiple types of regional levies that significantly contributed to the overall revenue, 2) The revenue generated from these various regional levies showed a consistent upward trend, and 3) The Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office had the potential to become Regional Apparatus Organization with the largest regional levies realization due to the province great potential. On the other hand, the weaknesses associated with collecting regional levies include 1) Damaged facilities and infrastructures possessed the potential to hinder the collection of regional levies and decrease revenue; 2) The port conditions in the area frequently suffered from flooding, which disrupted levy collection activities; and 3) challenges due to an unsupportive budget that affected the effective collection of regional levies. The opportunities for collecting regional levies include 1) The clear identification of payers of regional levies at fishing ports, namely fishermen and ship owners, which presented an opportunity to increase regional levies revenue; 2) The fish seed centres have untapped potential leveraged through better management and adequate budgets; 3) Other Regional Apparatus Organizations and relevant stakeholders collaborated to collect regional levies, which increased revenue; 4) The increase in value-added and competitiveness of fisheries products provided opportunity to enhance regional levies; and 5) The growth of information technology held the potential to contribute to the increase in regional levies. On the other hand, the threats in collecting regional levies include 1) the introduction of a new law that eliminated revenue from fishery business license levies, which posed a threat to the overall regional levies collection; 2) The new Non-Tax State Revenue Regulation enabled fishermen to sell their catch without returning to their place of origin. This potentially reduced the number of fishermen who sold their catch to ports in Central Java Province, and affected regional levies revenue; 3) Existing regulations that are not fully integrated and synergized created obstacles in the implementation of duties and service functions; and 4) Competition from the private sector posed a threat to the collection of regional levies.

- Based on the results of the identification of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats faced by the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office in terms of collecting regional levies, strategies can be developed. These included Strength-Opportunity Strategies, Strength-Threat Strategies, Weakness-Opportunity Strategies, and Weakness-Threat Strategies.
- Regional levies revenue from the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office had an increasing trend even though at several points in time in the 2011-2021 period, it experienced fluctuations. The revenue of regional levies from this Regional Apparatus Organization was projected to continue to increase from 2022 to 2027. This shows the potential for the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office to become the Regional Apparatus Organization with the highest regional levies revenue in Central Java Province.
- Based on the research findings, several recommendations were made for activities that should be carried out by the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office. These activities need to align with both regional and central government regulations governing regional levies in accordance with the potential and capabilities of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office. The recommendations for these activities include 1) rules controlling regional levies that fall under the jurisdiction of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office must be synchronized and harmonized in compliance with local laws, regulations, and circumstances at the time; 2) procurement of adequate budget based on needs analysis; 3) the domestic and international marketing of the Central Java Province's fisheries products need to be maximized; 4) renovation, maintenance and optimization of assets, facilities and infrastructure for proper functioning and to maximize retribution; 5) the administration and operation of the properties need to be enhanced; 6) increase in production of fisheries products and quality to optimize the revenue of Regional Business Production Sales Levies; 7) the development of information technology in collecting regional levies to increase revenue; 8) the formulation of an integrated application or information system that facilitates collecting regional levies; 9) revenue generation from regional levies need to be optimized using integrated information technology; and 10) the collection of regional levies with connected stakeholders and other Regional Apparatus Organizations.
- The limitation of this research is that it only examined regional levies in the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Central Java Province. Therefore, further research needs to analyze regional levies on other Regional Apparatus Organizations.

References

1. Adisaputra, W., Pratama, N., & Nawawi, J. (2014). "Pengelolaan Retribusi Sektor Kelautan dan Perikanan Terhadap Peningkatan Pendapatan Asli Daerah (PAD) di Kabupaten Majene". Government: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan 7(2), 121-128. <https://doi.org/10.31947/jgov.v7i2>
2. Amalia, S., & Tolo, S. B. (2021). "Faktor Penghambat Pengelolaan Retribusi Sektor Perikanan dalam Peningkatan Pendapatan Asli Daerah Kabupaten Muna". Media Keadilan: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 12(2), 440-455. <https://doi.org/10.31764/jmk>
3. Arintoko, & Bawono, I. R. (2021). „The Optimization of Local Tax Revenues for Local Government Within the Framework of Regional Autonomy“. Public Policy and Administration Vol. 2, No. 2, 176-188. <https://doi.org/10.13165/VPA-21-20-2-03>
4. Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jawa Tengah. (2022). Provinsi Jawa Tengah Dalam Angka 2022. Semarang: Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jawa Tengah.
5. Balukh, A. N., Nursalam, & Sayrani, L. P. (2021). „Potential Loss of Business Services Levy Receipts In the Marine and Fisheries Office of East Nusa Tenggara Province“. Journal of Sustainable Tourism and Entrepreneurship Vol.3, No. 1, 37-52. <https://doi.org/10.35912/joste.v3i1.1045>
6. Baskaran, T., Brender, A., Blesse, S., & Reingewert, Y. (2016). „Revenue Decentralization, Central Oversight and the Political Budget Cycle: Evidence from Israel“. European Journal of Political Economy Vol. 42, 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpolco.2015.12.001>

7. Batog, B., & Batog, J. (2021). „Regional Government Revenue Forecasting: Risk Factors of Investment Financing“. *Risks* Vol. 9, No. 12, 1-15. <https://doi.org/10.3390/risks9120210>
8. Bekoe, W., Danquah, M., & Senahey, S. K. (2016). „Tax Reforms and Revenue Mobilization in Ghana“. *Journal of Economic Studies* Vol. 43, No. 4, 522-534. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JES-01-2015-0007>
9. Belmonte-Martin, I., Ortiz, L., & Polo, C. (2021). „Local Tax Management in Spain: A Study of the Conditional Efficiency of Provincial Tax Agencies“. *Socio-Economic Planning Sciences* Vol. 78, 1-12. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seps.2021.101057>
10. Berglann, H. (2023). „Fisheries Management under Uncertainty Using a Convex Tax“. *Marine Resource Economics* Vol. 38, No. 1, 47-64. <https://doi.org/10.1086/722422>
11. Bimonte, S., & Stabile, A. (2019). „The Impact of the Introduction of Italian Property Tax on Urban Development: A Regional Regression Model“. *Housing Studies* Vol. 35, No. 1, 1-26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02673037.2019.1594711>
12. Bogacki, S., & Martyniuk, V. (2022). „Selected Tax Problems of Administrative Enforcement of Taxes and Local Fees“. *Teka Commission of Legal Sciences* Vol. 15, No. 1, 15-27. <https://doi.org/10.32084/ikp.4448>
13. Brajnik, I. B., Prebilib, V., & Kronegger, L. (2022). „Explaining Strategies in Setting Own Local Taxes in Slovenia“. *Lex Localis: Journal of Local Self-Government* Vol. 20, No. 1, 239-257. [https://doi.org/10.4335/20.1.239-257\(2022\)](https://doi.org/10.4335/20.1.239-257(2022))
14. Chang, J.-I., Choi, H.-J., & Choi, S. (2018). „Challenges of the Coastal Use Fee and Levy System in Korea“. *Journal of Coastal Research* Vol. 85, 1511-1515. <https://doi.org/10.2112/SI85-303.1>
15. Christia, A. M., & Ispriyarso, B. (2019). „Desentralisasi Fiskal dan Otonomi Daerah di Indonesia“. *Law Reform* Vol. 15, No. 1, 149-163. <https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v15i1.23360>
16. Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan Provinsi Jawa Tengah. (2019). *Rencana Strategis Tahun 2018-2023*. Semarang: Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan Provinsi Jawa Tengah.
17. Direktorat Jenderal Perimbangan Keuangan. (2021). *Modul Penggalian Potensi Pajak Daerah dan Retribusi Daerah: Peningkatan Kapasitas Pengelola Keuangan Daerah Bimtek 2021*. Jakarta: Kementerian Keuangan Republik Indonesia.
18. Dye, T. R. (1981). *Understanding Public Policy 3rd Edition*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
19. Etel, L. (2019). „How to Reduce Costs of Local Tax Collection“. *Financial Law Review* No. 15, Vol. 3, 75-85. <https://doi.org/10.4467/22996834FLR.19.015.11271>
20. Glushchenko, J., & Kozhalina, N. (2019). „Development Trends of Local Taxes in the System of Local Budgets in Ukraine“. *Public and Municipal Finance* Vol. 8, No. 1, 104-111. [https://doi.org/10.21511/pmf.08\(1\).2019.09](https://doi.org/10.21511/pmf.08(1).2019.09)
21. Gnanngnon, S. K., & Brun, J.-F. (2019). „Trade Openness, Tax Reform and Tax Revenue in Developing Countries“. *The World Economy* Vol. 42, No. 12, 3515-3536. <https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12858>
22. Hanlon, M., Hoopes, J. L., & Slemrod, J. (2019). „Tax Reform Made Me Do It!“ *Tax Policy and the Economy* Vol. 33, 33-80. <https://doi.org/10.1086/703226>
23. Hansyaekh, M. N. (2022). „Management of Levies at Fish Auction Places in Increasing Regional Original Income in Cirebon Regency“. *Social Impact Journal* 1(1), 27-37. <https://doi.org/10.61391/sij.v1i1.4>
24. Holbrook, T. M., & Heideman, A. J. (2021). „Straight to the (Revenue) Source: Contextual and Individual-Level Determinants of Attitudes Toward Local Taxes“. *American Politics Research* Vol. 50, Issue 2, 157-172. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X211063212>
25. Imron, M. (2011). „Otonomi Daerah dan Permasalahannya dalam Pengelolaan Kelautan“. *Jurnal Masyarakat dan Budaya* 13(1), 97-116. <https://doi.org/10.14203/jmb.v13i1.98>
26. Jenkins, W. I. (1987). *Policy Analysis: A Political and Organization Perspective*. New York: St Martin Press.
27. Kii, H. E., Harmono, & Sumtaky, M. (2022). „The Effect of Regional Taxes, Regional Levies, Balancing Funds, and Other Legitimate Regional Revenues on Regional Independence Through Direct Expenditure (Empire Study: District/City Governments in East Nusa Tenggara Province)“. *European Journal of Business and Management Research* Vol. 7, No. 6, 204-213. <https://doi.org/10.24018/ejbmr.2022.7.6.1719>

28. Kotarba, B., & Anna, K. (2014). "Financial Independence of Local Government Units in Poland". *Journal of Universal Excellence* Vol. 3, No. 4, 18-35.
29. Manteghi, N., & Zohrabi, A. (2011). „A Proposed Comprehensive Framework for Formulating Strategy: A Hybrid of Balance Scorecard, SWOT Analysis, Porter’s Generic Strategies and Fuzzy Quality Function Deployment“. *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences* 15, 2068-2073. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.04.055>
30. Marlissa, E. R., & Blesia, J. U. (2018). „Fiscal Dependence in a Special Autonomy Region: Evidence from a Local Government in Eastern Indonesia“. *Journal of Economic Development, Environment and People* 7(1), 55-72. <https://doi.org/10.26458/jedep.v7i1.574>
31. Martyniuk, V., & Wolowiec, T. (2022). "Local Tax Strategy and Its Components and the Formation of Investment Competitiveness of the Municipality". *Biuletyn Stowarzyszenia Absolwentów i Przyjaciół Wydziału Prawa Katolickiego* Vol. 19, No. 2, 239-257.
32. Maulid, L. C., Bawono, I. R., & Sudibyo, Y. A. (2022). „Analysis of Causality among Tax Revenue, State Expenditure, Inflation, and Economic Growth in Indonesia between 1973 and 2019“. *Public Policy and Administration* Vol. 21, No. 1, 143-157. <https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppa.21.1.29950>
33. Nassios, J., Giesecke, J. A., Dixon, P. B., & Rimmer, M. T. (2019). „Modelling the Allocative Efficiency of Landowner Taxation“. *Economic Modelling* Vol. 81, 111-123. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2018.12.007>
34. Nikolaou, I. E., & Evangelinos, K. I. (2010). „A SWOT Analysis of Environmental Management Practices in Greek Mining and Mineral Industry“. *Resources Policy* 35, 226-234. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2010.02.002>
35. Porter, M. E. (1983). *Cases in Competitive Strategy*. New York: The Free Press.
36. Porter, M. E. (1997). „New Strategies for Inner-City Economic Development“. *Economic Development Quarterly* 11(1), 11-27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/089124249701100102>
37. Purnarianto, E. (2016). „Analisis Penerimaan PAD pada Dinas Perikanan dan Peternakan Kabupaten Tebo“. *Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah* Vol. 3, No. 4, 209-230. <https://doi.org/10.22437/ppd.v3i4.3524>
38. Rajab, A. (2020). „Kontribusi Retribusi Pasar terhadap Pendapatan Asli Daerah di Kabupaten Mamuju“. *Jurnal Ilmiah Ekonomi Pembangunan* Vol. 1, No. 2, 144-156. <https://doi.org/10.31850/economos.v2i2.524>
39. Rauch, P. (2007). „SWOT Analyses and SWOT Strategy Formulation for Forest Owner Cooperations in Austria“. *Eur Forest Res* 126, 413-420. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10342-006-0162-2>
40. Sari, P., Garvera, R., & Sihabudin, A. A. (2018). „What is the Contribution of Local Original Revenue to Regional Financial Independent?“ *Journal of Public Administration Studies* Vol. 3, No. 2, 78-81. <https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.jpas.2018.003.02.4>
41. Satria, A., & Matsuda, Y. (2004). „Decentralization of Fisheries Management in Indonesia“. *Marine Policy* 28, 437-450. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2003.11.001>
42. Savitri, N. Y., & Suarjaya, A. G. (2020). "Effect of Local Taxes, Regional Levies and General Allocation Funds (DAU) on the Economic Growth of Local Governments in Bali Province". *American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Research (AJHSSR)* Vol. 4, No. 3, 379-386.
43. Shapovalov, Y. (2022). „The Role of Local Taxes and Fees in the Conditions of Decentralization“. *Innovative Economy* No. 1, 180-187. <https://doi.org/10.37332/2309-1533.2022.1.25>
44. Sinaga, N. A. (2016). „Pemungutan Pajak dan Permasalahannya di Indonesia“. *Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum Dirgantara*, 142-157. <https://doi.org/10.35968/jh.v7i1.128>
45. Sistawan, B. R., Saleh, M., & Efendi, A. S. (2018). "Prospek dan Strategi Peningkatan Penerimaan Retribusi Daerah Kota Samarinda". *Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi Mulawarman*, 1-18. <https://doi.org/10.29264/jiem.v3i4.4191>
46. Wardani, S. K., & Trisnangsih, S. (2022). "Analisis Efektivitas Penerimaan dan Kontribusi Retribusi Daerah Terhadap Pendapatan Asli Daerah Kabupaten Karanganyar". *Jurnal Ilmiah Manajemen, Ekonomi, dan Akuntansi* Vol. 6, No. 2, 534-555. <https://doi.org/10.31955/mea.v6i2.2041>
47. Wei, Q., Yabin, Z., & Shaobo, L. (2018). „The Spatial Spillover Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Local Public Provision: Mathematical Application and Empirical Estimation“. *Applied Mathematics and Computation* 331, 416-429. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2018.03.032>

Diah Setyorini Gunawan, Icuk Rangga Bawono

INDONEZIJOS CENTRINĖS JAVOS PROVINCIJOS JŪRŲ REIKALŲ IR ŽUVININKYSTĖS TARNYBOS REGIONINIŲ MOKESČIŲ STRATEGIJOS

Anotacija. *Vis dar reikia tinkamai didinti regioninių mokesčių vaidmenį kuriant pajamas Centrinėje Javos provincijoje. Taip yra todėl, kad kiekvienam regionui buvo suteikta teisė tvarkyti savo reikalus, įskaitant regionų finansus, tikintis, kad regionų vyriausybės taps finansiškai nepriklausomos nuo centrinės valdžios. Iš tikrųjų, daugelis Indonezijos ir kitų šalių regionų vis dar labai priklauso nuo centrinės valdžios finansinės paramos. Todėl regioninės vyriausybės turi sutelkti dėmesį į pajamų didinimą gerindamos regioninių mokesčių valdymą Regioninio aparato organizacijose. Tai pasiekama kuriant regioninių mokesčių sektoriaus strategijas, pagrįstas SSGG analizės rezultatais ir numatomomis Centrinės Javos provincijos jūrų reikalų ir žuvininkystės tarnybos pajamomis iš regioninių mokesčių. Šiuo tyrimu buvo siekiama nustatyti strategijas, sukurti regioninių mokesčių strategijas ir išanalizuoti numatomas pajamas iš šių mokesčių. Tikimasi, kad tai padės padidinti pajamas iš regioninių mokesčių. Šiame tyrime buvo naudojami pirminiai ir antriniai duomenys. Pirminiai duomenys buvo gauti atlikus interviu su pagrindiniais informatoriais, siekiant įvertinti stipriąsias, silpnąsias puses, galimybes ir grėsmes, su kuriomis susiduria Jūrų reikalų ir žuvininkystės tarnyba rinkdama regioninius mokesčius. Tuo tarpu antrinius duomenis sudarė informacija apie regioninius mokesčius ir atitinkamos nuorodos apie regioninio aparato organizaciją. Surinkti duomenys buvo analizuojami naudojant SSGG ir daugialypės tiesinės regresijos analizę kaip analizės metodus. Rezultatai parodė stipriąsias, silpnąsias puses, galimybes ir grėsmes, naudojamas rinkti regioninius mokesčius, taip pat strategijas. Remiantis numatomomis pajamomis, šios regioninės organizacijos sugeneruotos rinkliavos turėtų nuolat didėti nuo 2022 m. iki 2027 m. Tai apima rekomendacijas dėl Jūrų reikalų ir žuvininkystės tarnybos vykdomos veiklos, kuri atitiko regioninės ir centrinės valdžios reglamentų, reglamentuojančių regioninius mokesčius ir galimybes.*

Diah Setyorini Gunawan, Senior Lecturer at Faculty of Economics and Business Universitas Jenderal Soedirman, Indonesia

E-mail: diah.g@unsoed.ac.id

Icuk Rangga Bawono, Senior Lecturer at Faculty of Economics and Business Universitas Jenderal Soedirman, Indonesia

E-Mail: cukycutes@yahoo.com

Diah Setyorini Gunawan, Ekonomikos ir verslo fakulteto vyresnysis dėstytojas Universitas Jenderal Soedirman, Indonezija

El. paštas: diah.g@unsoed.ac.id

Icuk Rangga Bawono, Ekonomikos ir verslo fakulteto vyresnysis dėstytojas Universitas Jenderal Soedirman, Indonezija

El. paštas: cukycutes@yahoo.com



This article is an Open Access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

ENHANCEMENT OF PERFORMANCE AUDIT FOR EFFECTIVE BUDGET INVESTMENTS

Lyazzat SEMBIYEVA

*L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University,
Satpayev No. 25 Astana 010008, Kazakhstan*

Assel ISMAILOVA

*L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University,
Satpayev No. 25 Astana 010008, Kazakhstan*

Česlovas CHRISTAUSKAS

*Kaunas University of Applied Sciences,
Pramonės pr. No. 20 Kaunas 50468, Lithuania*

Begzat NURMAGANBETOVA

*Korkyt Ata Kyzylorda State University,
Aiteke-bi No. 29a Kyzylorda 120000, Kazakhstan*

<https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppaa.23.1.33809>

Abstract. *The relevance of the study is due to the need to improve the efficiency of budget investments in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Performance audits of the use of these investments will reveal opportunities to optimize expenditures and increase the overall socio-economic impact, which is significant for the sustainable development of the country. In order to improve the efficiency and socio-economic return of budget expenditures, this study is focused on evaluating the efficiency of budget investments during the performance audit. This study is aimed at reviewing the role and capabilities of the performance audit, as a mechanism of public financial control of budget investments. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used as a method for evaluating efficiency. Taking into account the reference management, the DEA algorithm is proposed to address the issue of limited input and output data to evaluate the national socio-economic development indicators. The special study of the budget investments' technical performance in the regions of Kazakhstan shows that this method can be used since it improves the flexibility and performance of evaluation in the performance audit. The stability of the concept of performance audit is therefore confirmed, showing the need for a periodic revision of the legislative and methodological base. The study highlighted the main challenges of performance audit of budget investments in the Republic of Kazakhstan and provided recommendations for improvement.*

Keywords: *performance audit, public funds, budget investment evaluation, DEA, input-output efficiency.*

Reikšminiai žodžiai: *veiklos auditas, valstybės lėšos, biudžeto investicijų vertinimas, DEA, sąnaudų ir produkcijos efektyvumas.*

Introduction

The issue of efficient use of the limited budget resources has always been on the agenda of the governments and Kazakhstan is no exception. Numerous concepts, methods and regulatory acts are developed to improve the performance of the budget system as a whole. But the issue of efficient use of

budget resources, including budget investments¹, remains.

The relevance of the performance audit of budget investments in the Republic of Kazakhstan is caused by the fact that significant volumes of budget funds are injected in development projects but the corresponding effect on the socio-economic development of the country and improving the life of people is not obvious. The average share of budget investments to GDP over the past ten years was 3% per annum, and the annual share of the development budget in the republican budget for this period was 10%. It should be noted that in developed countries, public investments do not exceed 2.5-3.5 % of GDP (Gaspar et al. 2020; Volden and Welde 2022).

The performance audit was started in the Republic of Kazakhstan relatively recently. It was pushed by the reform of the budget process in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Performance-oriented budgeting requires that the financial control system is revised.

The traditional audit concept is focused only on the issues that ensure control over development projects but does not give a complete picture of projects, regardless of whether the expected outcomes were achieved, or resources were wasted or used efficiently (Mahbuba 2012).

In this regard this study sets the goal of reviewing the role and capabilities of the performance audit, as a mechanism of public financial control of budget investments, to develop recommendations for its improvement. The highest goal is to increase the efficiency of budget investments, thereby contributing to the economic development of Kazakhstan. Based on this, it is necessary to consider the following tasks:

- determine the legal status of budget investments and performance audit;
- to consider the possibilities of developing an evaluation of the effectiveness of budget investments in the performance audit.

Considering the nature of evaluating the effectiveness of budget investments, it is proposed to use non-parametric methods and evaluating not the absolute, but technical efficiency. The authors carried out a quantitative assessment of the technical efficiency of budget investments in the regions of Kazakhstan by the DEA method.

The results of this study showed that the use of the DEA method provides auditors with additional analytical evidence, thereby increasing the level of assessment and, accordingly, the recommendations of auditors when performing auditing of budget investments. In addition, recommendations on enhancing the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in this area are provided.

Literature review

According to Waring and Morgan (2007), a performance audit is an objective and systematic evaluation of public programs or activities to determine their efficiency, sustainability, and effectiveness.

Various interpretations for the performance audit were developed by the highest financial control bodies. The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions states that “the performance audit is aimed at promoting the increase in savings, efficiency, and effectiveness in the public sector. It is also aimed at promoting proper governance, accountability, and transparency” (ISSAI 3000 2019).

It is believed that its main goal is to evaluate the efficiency of the use of budgetary funds and resources, that is the correlation between costs and outcomes (Ahlenius 2000).

According to Courville (2003), the audit is understood as an agent of changes to achieve a wider social goal, when auditors can act in accordance with the guidelines, and not just perform the functions of the inspector. In this context, the audit can serve both for diagnostics and verification, which help the control system identify issues and increase the capacity for introducing the necessary changes.

Mattei, Grossi, and Guthrie (2021) considering the trends in the research of the public sector audits

¹ The legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan provides for the concept of “budget investments” and there is no concept of “public investments”.

found out that the focus of research has shifted from compliance to efficiency.

The fact of an increased number of research and the use of performance audit is confirmed by many works (Mackevicius and Daujotaitė 2011; Parker, Jacobs, and Schmitz 2019; Parker, Schmitz, and Jacobs 2021; Rana et al. 2021).

Methodology

The below tasks are the main ones for achieving the goal:

1. Determining the role and possibilities of the performance audit, as a mechanism of public financial control of budget investments of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
2. Rethinking the concept of “budget investments” under the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan so as to properly set the task for performance audit.
3. Consideration of the possible use of the DEA method to evaluate the performance of budget investments during the performance audit.

The analysis of literature revealed the role and possibilities of performance audits.

This article proposes to consider the DEA method for evaluating the performance of budget investments that public auditors can use. This non-parametric method allows to compare the efficiency of processes characterized by inputs and outputs regardless of correlations between them.

The DEA based on optimality Pareto uses multi-purpose programming, which easily adapts to the analysis of input-output efficiency with several inputs and several outputs.

The DEA method assumes that the decision-making unit (DMU) receives some resources (input) and, transforming them during its operation, gets the results of the activity (output). Efficiency is determined as a ratio between the incoming resources and the results achieved. The task of DEA is to assess the boundary of production capabilities, and not the production function itself.

The type of model is usually selected from two options: radial (CCR, BCC) (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes 1978) and non-radial models (RAM, SBM) (Tone 2001). In practice, radial models are used more often, since non-radial models require the weights of indicators, which can distort the results of the analysis.

The choice of return to scale is determined by an assumption of the type of production function. Constant return (CRS) is selected if the costs must be strictly proportionally increased to increase the result, otherwise the variable returns to scale (VRS) is selected.

The model can be oriented on costs and on outcomes. The first one allows evaluating how much the costs can be reduced to achieve the set outcome, and it is used when governance practices can have a significant effect on costs. The second is used when the outcomes can be manipulated based on the given volume and structure of the resources used.

In this empirical study, using DEA method we evaluated the relative efficiency of budget investments in the regions during 2017–2021.

For this work we used an official source of data – the Bureau of National Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan (new.stat.gov.kz). The main indicators from the statistics include indicators of budget investments, as well as indicators of macroeconomic efficiency of budget investments, i.e. gross regional product (GRP), private investment (PI), and employment (Empl). In addition, for the use of DEA it is important to consider that the outcome indicators are straight, i.e., a bigger figure reflects a better outcome. The indicators used are summarised in Table 1.

The unit of analysis is region I during year t used as DMU. The fact that all regions were included in one panel for all years made it possible to evaluate both the efficiency of the regions relative to each other and the dynamics of each region in time. With this approach, the efficient border can include regions from different

Table 1. Indicators used for evaluating the efficiency using DEA method

Item	Input	Output	Unit
Budget investment (BI)	√		billion tenge
Gross regional product (GRP)		√	billion tenge
Employment (Empl)		√	thousand people
Private investment (PI)		√	billion tenge

Source: composed by the authors.

years, and this will give a single “benchmark” for comparison. At the same time, a kind of drawback of this approach may be that the best region can get to the border every year of research and its dynamics will be impossible to evaluate. On the other hand, this will mean that this region is steadily efficient.

It is known that a feature of the DEA method is that the results are hugely sensitive to extreme values. However, this can be addressed by excluding outbreaks from the sample. Thus, we excluded regions with extreme values from the censored sample of the regions: two regions and three cities of republican significance due to high population density and extremely high income/expenses, budget investments. In addition, three regions newly created in March 2022 were not considered. So the final sample for the period 2017–2021 includes 12 of the 20 regions, each of them was given a symbolic name.

When building a DEA model, we used a variable returns to scale (VRS), that is, an increase in costs leads to a disproportionate increase in the outcome. The model we used is performance-oriented. This means that we evaluated to what extent the DMU can achieve results with the specified costs.

The set of inputs is $I = \{1, \dots, m\}$, the set of outputs is $O = \{1, \dots, n\}$ and the set of DMUs is $S = \{1, \dots, s\}$. The inputs are represented by $s \times m$ matrix X , where x_i is a column vector of inputs associated with DMU, i , and x_{ij} represent the i value that DMU uses for input j . The outputs are represented by a $s \times n$ matrix Y , where y_i is a column vector of outputs associated with DMU i and y_j represents the i value that DMU produces for output j . Vector v represents a row vector of input weights, and μ is a row vector of output weights associated with the multiplier form of DEA. Vector λ is a column vector of composite weights, associated with the envelopment form of DEA. Let ϵ be a non-Archimedean element, i.e., a number smaller than any positive real number. Let s_+ and s_- be a vector of slack variables for the outputs and inputs, respectively.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \max \quad & \phi + \epsilon \left(\sum_{i \in I} s_i^- + \sum_{j \in O} s_j^+ \right) \\
 \text{st} : \quad & \sum_{r \in S} x_{ri} \lambda_r + s_i^- = x_{oi}, \text{ for } i \in I \\
 & \phi y_{oj} - \sum_{r \in S} y_{rj} \lambda_r + s_j^+ = 0, \text{ for } j \in O \\
 & \lambda_r, s_j^+, s_i^- \geq 0, r \in S, i \in I, j \in O.
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

In this work, efficient DMU with performance indicator 1, and the efficiency of others is estimated through the distance to the border, their efficiency indicator takes a value from 0 to 1.

The Malmquist Index is also used, which is available for measuring efficiency changes (Lee and Cho 2015).

To calculate the index, various methods are used, including the DEA method, since this method can process many outputs and inputs at the same time. When using DEA, you need to solve several optimization problems for each of the objects in the sample (Coelli et al. 1998, 275):

$$\begin{aligned} \max \phi \lambda(\boldsymbol{\phi}), \\ - \boldsymbol{\phi}^{y_{it}} + Y_t \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0, \\ x_{it} - X_t \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0, \\ \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \phi \lambda(\boldsymbol{\phi}), \\ - \boldsymbol{\phi}^{y_{is}} + Y_s \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0, \\ x_{is} - X_s \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0, \\ \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \phi \lambda(\boldsymbol{\phi}), \\ - \boldsymbol{\phi}^{y_{is}} + Y_t \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0, \\ x_{is} - X_t \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0, \\ \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \phi \lambda(\boldsymbol{\phi}), \\ - \boldsymbol{\phi}^{y_{it}} + Y_s \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0, \\ x_{it} - X_s \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0, \\ \boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

In these problems, indices S and T mean the initial and final periods of time, index i means the object for which calculations are made. As in the model (1), Y and X are the output and input matrixes for all objects in the sample, and λ is the vector of weight coefficients that form a linear combination – a hypothetical object, which is the goal for an inefficient object. Problems (4) and (5) have an important feature – the indicators of the object and the technology, that is tested for efficiency, belong to different time periods: in problem (4) the object from the previous period is compared to the technology of the following period, and in problem (5) on the contrary, the object from the following period is compared to the technology of the previous period. It is important to note that in problems (4) and (5) that efficiency indicator, which in such models is defined as a value reverse to $\boldsymbol{\phi}$, can be above 1. This is possible if problem (4) has a technical regression in this group of objects, and in problem (5), on the contrary, technological progress.

Results

To reveal the problems of performance audit of budget investments in the Republic of Kazakhstan, namely, why control over expenditures is carried out, and not the achievement of socio-economic results, the regulatory framework of Kazakhstan is considered.

According to the results, it was determined that, according to the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the performance audit of the use of funding from the Republican or local budget is carried out, which is happening now in practice.

So, according to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On State Audit and Financial Control”, the performance audit is defined as one of the types of state audit, which is understood as an evaluation and analysis of the operations of the subject of a state audit in terms of its efficiency, economy, productivity, and effectiveness.

The subjects of the state audit include public bodies, state institutions, the quasi-governmental sector, as well as recipients of budget funds.

The supreme body of the audit and financial control of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Supreme Audit Chamber of the Republic of Kazakhstan) audits the efficiency of the budget investments use.

Based on the above definitions, we would like to bring your attention to the fact that an evaluation and analysis of operations of a public body, state institution, a subject of the quasi-governmental sector and a recipient of budget funds in terms of efficiency, economy, productivity and effectiveness of the use of budget investments are carried out.

While the law defines budget investments in the Republic of Kazakhstan as “financing from the Republican or local budget, aimed at creating and (or) the developing the state assets through the implementation of budget investment projects, as well as the formation and (or) increase of the equity of legal entities, with the exception of assets used for taking urgent measures to ensure socio-economic stability.”

Thus, the problem comes from the incorrect definition of budget investments. Investments are not a process, and it can't be defined as financing. An investment is an asset that has value.

That is, the evaluation and analysis in line with the principles of the performance audit is carried out only in terms of disbursement of budget funds aimed at creating infrastructure under budget investment projects. Evaluation and analysis of the efficiency, economy, productivity, and effectiveness of the newly created or reconstructed public assets in terms of its value for the population, its influence on the socio-economic development of a particular region, and the state as a whole, is not carried out. Current government policy is still aimed at expense management rather than managing the results which is characterized by the disbursement of budget funds allocated.

The performance audit of budget investments in Kazakhstan is carried out within the framework of public programs and national projects, which is reasonable and is in line with international practice. However, the targeted indicators for evaluating budget investments that do not correspond or are completely missing is yet another issue. Therefore, the full evaluation and analysis of the efficiency of budget investments is not possible.

In addition, the full-fledged performance audit will require that the control authorities will seek for and decide upon unbiased methods for evaluating the efficient spending of budget funds. This requires adequate development of theoretical and methodological aspects of performance audits, and the creation of reasoned methods for evaluating the efficient spending of budget funds.

In order to develop specific proposals for the Supreme Audit Chamber of the Republic of Kazakhstan and regional audit commissions to assess the effectiveness of budget investments, the authors proposed the DEA method.

This proposal is justified by the fact that when evaluating the effectiveness of budget investments, it is impossible to use profit which is normally used for evaluating performance in commercial sectors, or to create any other absolute indicator. One of the most common approaches is now the use of non-parametric methods and evaluating not the absolute, but technical efficiency.

A full description, justification of this method and characteristics of input and output data are given in the methodology.

To substantiate the proposed proposal, the authors carried out a quantitative assessment of the technical efficiency of budget investments by the DEA method. Technical efficiency reflects the ability of regions to transform budget investments into the results of socio-economic development, namely into gross regional product, employment and private investment.

For the period 2017-2021, three out of 12 regions of Kazakhstan (Alm, Kar and Man) showed stable efficiency of budget investments. That is, with the allocated amounts of budget funds, the maximum targets for the above three indicators of socio-economic development were achieved. One region of Akt has been demonstrating effectiveness for the last two studied years. Their performance indicators are equal to 1 (Table 2).

It should be noted that effective regions are industrially developed regions and it's worth noting that Man has the lowest budget investments volume out of the 12 regions considered, Kar – medium, like Akm, Akt, Zha, Kos and Kyz, and Alm as well as VKO. The closest to the efficient border are three regions as well (Akt, Pav, VKO).

Kyz, Akm, ZKO and Zna demonstrated the worst performance indicators for 2017-2021, however, normally they show no positive dynamics.

Akt, Pav and VKO show sustainable positive dynamics.

Table 2. Efficiency, output orientation, VRS

DMU	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Akm	0,481182	0,803438	0,78717	0,792785	0,638745
Akt	0,898844	0,983488	0,857747	1	1
Alm	1	1	1	1	1
ZKO	0,858872	0,843596	0,875974	0,712992	0,663151
Zha	0,852123	0,968378	0,87304	0,709031	0,760348
Kar	1	1	1	1	1
Kos	1	0,883188	1	0,798385	0,84178
Kyz	0,731797	0,654144	0,670552	0,633271	0,607946
Man	1	1	1	1	1
Pav	0,941898	0,663864	0,611893	0,885455	0,91178
SKO	0,690944	0,583516	1	0,913872	0,851448
VKO	0,957765	0,906624	0,910132	1	0,979395

Source: composed by the authors.

The regions with low efficiency include those that have high-cost indicators and insufficiently high results. At the same time, the level of efficiency remains low and does not change significantly.

We recommend using the information in Table 3 on targeted benchmarks of socio-economic indicators of the regions with the allocated volumes of investment from the budget each year for the purposes of analysis and preparation of audit opinions. These calculations are available when using the DEA method.

Table 3. 2021, Output orientation, VRS

DMU	Efficiency	GRP		Empl		PI	
		Original	Target	Original	Target	Original	Target
Akm	0,638943	2678,0	7175,7	397,0	621,3	418,4	688,8
ZKO	0,667884	3533,0	5475,5	322,3	482,6	352,0	633,6
Zha	0,75884	2263,0	7281,8	502,7	662,5	294,2	688,8
Kos	0,846213	3516,0	6443,3	475,2	561,6	343,4	665,0
Kyz	0,611057	1926,0	6181,7	330,1	540,2	224,1	656,5
Pav	0,916801	3883,8	4690,7	383,7	418,5	504,2	608,1
SKO	0,851529	1790,7	3696,8	287,3	337,4	276,8	575,9
VKO	0,800104	5064,0	11317,8	668,3	835,3	665,7	832,0

Source: composed by the authors.

Table 4. Malmquist index summary of annual means

year	effch	techch	pech	sech	tfpch
2018	1.346	0.659	0.992	1.356	0.887
2019	1.119	0.888	1.034	1.083	0.993
2020	1.007	0.643	0.987	1.021	0.648
2021	0.961	1.284	0.979	0.981	1.234
mean	1.099	0.834	0.998	1.101	0.916

effch – technical efficiency change, techch – technological change
 pech – pure technical change, sech – scale efficiency change
 tfpch – total factor productivity

Source: composed by the authors.

In 2018-2020, the efficiency of budget investments was falling down, since the tfpch indicator is less than 1. Only in 2021, an increase in efficiency is observed by 23.4%. In general, for 2017-2021, the dynamics of the efficiency of these budget funds fell by 8.4%. This shows the overall picture of the effectiveness of budget investments in Kazakhstan.

Thus, the use of the DEA method in assessing the effectiveness of budget investments will provide the auditors with additional analytical evidence during the audit, options and benchmarks during the sampling, determining the object of audit and providing recommendations on the amount of funding and benchmarks for performance targets.

Discussion

Under the limited budget resources and the expansion of state programs, the question now is how the public audit addresses these crises, what are the problems and prospects in this area (Ferry, Radcliffe, and Steccolini 2022).

It should be noted that researchers pose different questions, including whether the audit really helps improve the public sector or it is simply a ritual of checking (Power 1997; Arthur, Rydland, and Amundsen 2012).

Mury (2018) concluded that the performance audit conducted by the highest financial control bodies in several countries is limited to the analysis of the achievement of certain pre-planned goals, and cannot be considered as a verification of the impact of government spending on the target group of the population.

Within the framework of this study, the authors also asked such questions about the performance audit of budget investments of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Having considered the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the initially incorrect definition of “budget investments” was determined. Investments are not a process, defining it as financing is not correct. Accordingly, today in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the evaluation and analysis in line with the principles of the performance audit is carried out only in terms of the disbursement of budget funds aimed at creating infrastructure under budget investment projects. At the same time, there is another issue, which is the targets that do not correspond or are not available at all for assessing budget investments.

In general, the performance audit is still used as a method of control and accountability in the public governance (Johnsen 2019; Lapsley 2008; Parker, Schmitz, and Jacobs 2021). In this connection, it is necessary to introduce appropriate amendments and additions to the legislation of the Republic of Ka-

Based on these data, it is possible to determine which of the indicators has the least or greatest effect, which benchmarks should be set for each region with a specific amount of budget investments. This can also be reflected in the conclusions of state control bodies to draft budgets of different levels as recommendations. In addition, it will show the result-oriented budgets.

Table 4 shows an assessment of changes in the general productivity of budget investments. The changes in the efficiency of selected objects in dynamics are analyzed using the Malmquist index. The results of the analysis are shown starting from 2018, as compared to 2017.

zakhstan for a clear definition of goals and objectives, as well as performance targets when conducting the performance audit of budget investments of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

As previously mentioned, the challenges in evaluating performance of budget investments are that it is impossible to use profit which is normally used for evaluating performance in commercial sectors, or to create any other absolute indicator. Thus, the technical efficiency of budget investments should be evaluated, because technical efficiency is understood as the ability to generate outcomes based on certain resources (Farrel 1957).

Among the methods used to assess technical efficiency, such an approach as DEA is commonly used (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes 1978).

Bibliographic analysis of articles of 1987–2011 shows that DEA was used in 4021 out of 4782 works (Lampe and Hilgers 2015). During 40 years (1978–2016), the number of articles where DEA method is used totals more than 10 thousand (Emrouznejad and Yang 2018), and this method was used to evaluate the performance of public projects by Wang, Hsu, and Tsai (2021) and some articles note that it was used in audits (Karliński 2022).

It comes as no surprise that it is recommended as a source of analytical evidence in performance auditing (GUID 3920 2019).

The main issue of using this method is related to the definition of inputs and outputs comprised in the model. The selection of a set of inputs and outputs should be made considering empirical premisses, experts' opinions, and statistical relation between inputs and outputs (Jones 2004).

To evaluate budget investments in the framework of performance audit, the results of widely cited works on the influence of these investments on socio-economic development indicators are considered below.

Early studies (Aschauer 2000; Milbourne, Otto, and Voss 2003) of the influence of public expenditures on growth included testing the forecasts of the neoclassical growth model, where public capital is complementary to private capital, and also concluded that public investments have a positive and statistically significant impact on the economic growth.

As a result of research some experts (Gaspar et al. 2020; Agénor 2010; Spackman 2001) consider that public investments play a key role in stimulating economic growth. An increase in public investments by 1% of GDP can increase the level of GDP by 2.7%, private investments by 10%, and employment by 1.2% if the quality of investment is high (Gaspar et al. 2020).

Considering the above, the authors proposed the following data set: input – budget investments, output – gross regional product, employment, and private investment.

It needs to be remembered that benchmarking – and the DEA is a natural tool for it – can be, in the public sector, the only trail that allows for evaluating the efficiency of a given entity (Karliński 2022). Substantial flexibility in defining inputs and outputs allows for extending the application of the DEA method to examine outcomes, and not only products – which is especially vital in performance audits. It is worth quoting the objective of a performance audit: it is not only to evaluate but also to show room for improvement and points of reference – and the DEA makes it possible.

Conclusion

In general, the stability of the concept of the performance audit is now confirmed, which requires a periodic revision of the legislative and methodological framework.

To improve the performance audit of budget investments in Kazakhstan, the following is proposed:

1. to amend the Budget Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan regarding the conceptual definition of budget investments;
2. to develop a methodology for evaluating the technical efficiency of budget investments.

Based on the study, the authors concluded that the DEA method can be used to evaluate the technical efficiency of budget investments as part of the performance audit.

Acknowledgment

FINANCIAL SUPPORT: This research has been funded by the Committee of Science of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Grant № BR21882352 “Development of state audit and effective management of national resources: a new paradigm, concept and recommendations”).

References

1. Agénor, Pierre R. 2010. “A Theory of Infrastructure-Led Development.” *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 34 (5): 932-50. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.01.009>
2. Ahlenius, Inga B. (2000). „Performance Audits, Evaluations and Supreme Audit Institutions.“ *Auditing* 27 (1): 1-21.
3. Arthur, Arnfrid, Lars T. Rydland, and Kristin Amundsen. 2012. “The User Perspective in Performance Auditing - A Case Study of Norway.” *American Journal of Evaluation* 33 (1): 44-59. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1098214011408283>
4. Aschauer, David A. 2000. “Public Capital and Economic Growth: Issues of Quantity, Finance and Efficiency.” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 48 (2): 391-406. <https://doi.org/10.1086/452464>
5. Charnes, Abraham, William M. Cooper, and Edwardo L. Rhodes. 1978. “Measuring the Efficiency of Decision-Making Units.” *European Journal of Operational Research* 2 (6): 429-44. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217\(78\)90138-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(78)90138-8)
6. Coelli, Timothy J., Dodla S. Rao, Christopher J. O'Donnell, and George E. Battese. 1998. *An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity Analysis*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5493-6>
7. Courville, Sasha. 2003. “Social Accountability Audits: Challenging or Defending Democratic Governance?” *Law & Policy* 25 (3): 269-97. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2003.00151.x>
8. Emrouznejad, Ali, and Guoliang Yang. 2018. “A Survey and Analysis of the First 40 Years of Scholarly Literature in DEA: 1978-2016.” *Socio-Economic Planning Sciences* 61: 4-8. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seps.2017.01.008>
9. Farrel, Michael J. 1957. “The Measurement of Productive Efficiency.” *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 120: 253-81. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2343100>
10. Ferry, Laurence, Vaughan S. Radcliffe, and Ileana Steccolini. 2022. “The Future of Public Audit.” *Financial Accountability & Management* 38 (3): 325-36. <https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12339>
11. Gaspar, Vitor, Paolo Mauro, Catherine Pattillo, and Raphael Espinoza. 2020. „Public Investment for the Recovery.“ IMF, October 5, 2020. <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2020/10/05/blog-public-investment-for-the-recovery>
12. GUID 3920. 2019. „The Performance Auditing Process.“ INTOSAI. <https://www.issai.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/GUID-3920-The-Performance-Auditing-Process.pdf>
13. ISSAI 3000. 2019. „Performance Audit Standard.“ INTOSAI. <https://www.issai.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ISSAI-3000-03-03-2020.pdf>
14. Johnsen, Age. 2019. “Public Sector Audit in Contemporary Society: A Short Review and Introduction.” *Financial Accountability & Management* 35 (2): 121-27. <https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12191>
15. Jones, Jill. 2004. *Efficiency Measurement*. International Handbook on the Economics of Education. Chapter 16. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
16. Karliński, Wiesław. 2022. „Data Envelopment Analysis in Performance Auditing - Measurement of Efficiency.“ *Kontrola Państwowa* 67 4 (405): 46-66.
17. Lampe, Hannes, and Dennis Hilgers. 2015. “Trajectories of Efficiency Measurement: A Bibliometric Analysis of DEA and SFA.” *European Journal of Operational Research* 240 (1): 1-21. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.04.041>
18. Lapsley, Irvine. 2008. “The NPM Agenda: Back to the Future.” *Financial Accountability & Management* 24 (1): 77-96. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0408.2008.00444.x>

19. Lee, Cheolhaeng, and Keuntae Cho. 2015. "Proposing a Portfolio Model for Performance Management of Korea's Health Technology R&D Programme Using DEA and MPI: A Translational Research Case." *Asian Journal of Technology Innovation* 23 (1): 20-34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19761597.2015.1008197>
20. Mackevicius, Jonas, and Dalia Daujotaite. 2011. „Performance Audit: Tool of Performance Testing and Evaluation.“ *Informacijos Mokslai* 57: 26-38.
21. Mahbuba, Khatoun M. 2012. Impact of Performance Audit on Government Social Program: Case Study on Forest Management in Bangladesh with Particular Focus on Social Forestry. MPPG, 3rd Batch.
22. Mattei, Giorgia, Giuseppe Grossi, and James Guthrie. 2021. "Exploring Past, Present and Future Trends in Public Sector Auditing Research: A Literature Review." *Meditari Accountancy Research* 290 (7): 94-134. <https://doi.org/10.1108/MEDAR-09-2020-1008>
23. Milbourne, R., Glenn Otto, and Graham M. Voss. 2003. "Public Investment and Economic Growth." *Applied Economics* 35 (5): 527-40. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0003684022000015883>
24. Mury, Luiz. 2018. "Performance Audits Focused on the Principle of Effectiveness: An Overview of Public Audit Agencies." *Applied Finance and Accounting* 4 (2): 45-54. <https://doi.org/10.11114/afa.v4i2.3488>
25. Parker, Lee D., Kerry Jacobs, and Jana Schmitz. 2019. "New Public Management and the Rise of Public Sector Performance Audit: Evidence from the Australian Case." *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal* 32 (1): 280-306. <https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-06-2017-2964>
26. Parker, Lee D., Jana Schmitz, and Kerry Jacobs. 2021. "Auditor and Auditee Engagement with Public Sector Performance Audit: An Institutional Logics Perspective." *Financial Accountability & Management* 37 (2), 142-62. <https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12243>
27. Power, Michael. 1997. *The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification*. Oxford University Press.
28. Rana, Tarek, Ileana Steccolini, Enrico Bracci, and Dessalegn G. Mihret. 2021. "Performance Auditing in the Public Sector: A Systematic Literature Review and Future Research Avenues." *Financial Accountability & Management* 38 (3), 337-359. <https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12312>
29. Spackman, Michael. 2001. "Public Investment and Discounting in European Union Member States." *OECD Journal on Budgeting* 1 (2): 213-60. <https://doi.org/10.1787/budget-v1-art13-en>
30. Tone, Kaoru. 2001. "A Slacks-Based Measure of Efficiency in Data Envelopment Analysis." *European Journal of Operational Research* 130 (3), 498-509. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0377-2217\(99\)00407-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00407-5)
31. Volden, Gro H., and Morten Welde. 2022. "Public Project Success? Measuring the Nuances of Success Through Ex Post Evaluation." *International Journal of Project Management* 40: 703-14. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2022.06.006>
32. Wang, Chia-Nan., Hsien-Pin Hsu, and Nien-Tzu Tsai. 2021. "The Performance Evaluation for Government Projects." *Asia Pacific Management Review* 26 (2): 59-66. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apmr.2020.08.002>
33. Waring, Colleen G., and Stephen L. Morgan. 2007. *Public Sector Performance Auditing in Developing Countries*. In A. Shah (Ed.), *Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series: Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption*, 323-52. Washington, DC, USA: The World Bank.

Lyazzat Sembiyeva, Assel Ismailova, Česlovas Christauskas, Begzat Nurmagambetova

VEIKLOS AUDITO TOBULINIMAS SIEKIANT EFEKTYVIŲ BIUDŽETO INVESTICIJŲ

Anotacija. Tyrimo aktualumas yra susijęs su poreikiu pagerinti biudžeto investicijų efektyvumą Kazachstano Respublikoje. Šių investicijų panaudojimo veiklos auditas atskleis galimybes optimizuoti išlaidas ir padidinti bendrą socialinį ir ekonominį poveikį, kuris yra reikšmingas tvariam šalies vystymuisi. Siekiant pagerinti biudžeto išlaidų efektyvumą ir socialinę bei ekonominę grąžą, šiame tyrime daugiausia dėmesio skiriama biudžeto Investicijų efektyvumo vertinimui atliekant veiklos auditą. Šiuo tyrimu siekiama peržiū-

rėti veiklos audito, kaip biudžeto Investicijų viešosios finansų kontrolės mechanizmo, vaidmenį ir galimybes. Duomenų apvarkalo analizė (DEA) naudojama kaip efektyvumo vertinimo metodas. Atsižvelgiant į etaloninį valdymą, DEA algoritmas siūlomas ribotų įvesties ir išvesties duomenų klausimui spręsti, siekiant įvertinti nacionalinius socialinio ir ekonominio vystymosi rodiklius. Specialus biudžeto Investicijų techninių rezultatų Kazachstano regionuose tyrimas rodo, kad šį metodą galima naudoti, nes jis pagerina vertinimo lankstumą ir efektyvumą atliekant veiklos auditą. Todėl patvirtinamas veiklos audito koncepcijos stabilumas, parodantis, kad reikia periodiškai peržiūrėti teisinę ir metodinę bazę. Tyrimas išryškino pagrindinius biudžetinių investicijų į Kazachstano Respubliką veiklos audito iššūkius ir pateikė tobulinimo rekomendacijas.

Lyazzat Sembiyeva, PhD in Economics, Professor, Head of “Public Audit” Department, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana, Kazakhstan
E-mail: lyazzat.sembiyeva@gmail.com

Assel Ismailova, PhD student on “Public Audit”, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana, Kazakhstan (the author is a correspondent)
E-mail: a.sembi1984@gmail.com

Ceslovas Christauskas, Doctor of Technical Sciences. Assoc. Professor, Faculty of Business, Kaunas University of Applied Sciences, Lithuania
E-mail: ceslovas.christauskas@go.kauko.lt

Begzat Nurmaganbetova, Candidate of Economic Sciences, Ass. professor, Korkyt Ata Kyzylorda State University, Kyzylorda, Kazakhstan.
E-mail: nbegzat@gmail.com

Lyazzat Sembiyeva, ekonomikos mokslų daktarė, profesorė, „Valstybinio audito“ katedros vedėja, L.N. Gumiliovo Eurazijos nacionalinis universitetas, Astana, Kazachstanas
El. paštas: lyazzat.sembiyeva@gmail.com

Assel Ismailova, „Valstybinio audito“ doktorantė, L.N. Gumiliovo Eurazijos nacionalinis universitetas, Astana, Kazachstanas
El. paštas: a.sembi1984@gmail.com

Česlovas Christauskas, technikos mokslų daktaras, docentas, Vadybos fakultetas, Kauno kolegija
El. paštas: ceslovas.christauskas@go.kauko.lt

Begzat Nurmaganbetova, ekonomikos mokslų kandidatė, docentė Korkyt Ata Kyzylorda valstybinis universitetas, Kyzylorda, Kazachstanas
El. paštas: nbegzat@gmail.com



POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES AND MAYORAL INFLUENCE IN LATVIAN MUNICIPALITIES: AN EXAMINATION OF REVENUE, EXPENDITURE, AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS

Malvīne STUČKA

University of Latvia,
Raiņa bulvāris 19, Rīga, LV-1586, Latvia

<https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppaa.23.1.34523>

Abstract. *Budget allocation and budget planning can be used in different ways. In addition, it can be part of a political budget cycle. Previous research has highlighted the political budget cycle's existence in European countries, demonstrating its impact on public revenue and expenditure near elections. However, citizens often lack awareness of this phenomenon, underscoring the need for vigilant scrutiny. In addition, elected politicians increasingly rely on voters for support, targeting them during budget allocation and election campaigns. In Latvia, the mayors have a role in budget planning because they work full-time and are the head of the financial commission. In Latvia, despite a lack of trust in local politicians, there is a tendency for most of the mayors to be re-elected. The article aims to examine what kind of role the council's chairperson has in the local government's budget allocation process and what factors affect the budget allocation process in Latvia. The article's scope encompasses the years 2009 to 2017, spanning two election terms (2009-2013; 2013-2017), and focuses on eight state cities in Latvia, excluding the capital city, Riga. Notably, local governments with a higher percentage of council members from the mayor's party tend to exhibit higher expenditure levels. The findings of this study suggest that various socio-economic and political factors impact the financial performance of local governments in Latvia. These results underscore the significance of population and unemployment in shaping local government expenditures. Simultaneously, this research has highlighted the importance of political factors such as the majority in the local government and time spent in the mayor's position. Moreover, it reveals that long-serving mayors and a majority in the council also influence budget allocation decisions. This article's implications can guide policymakers in making informed decisions regarding municipal budget expenditures and revenues.*

Keywords: *mayor, local leader, budgeting, elections, political budget cycle.*

Reikšminiai žodžiai: *meras, vietos lyderis, biudžeto sudarymas, rinkimai, politinis biudžeto ciklas.*

Introduction

The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe led to profound changes in local government systems. In the context of the transformation, democracy's role at the local level and decentralization emerged as indispensable components, intertwining themselves with the overarching process. Introducing new local government institutions facilitated an environment of transparent political competition, fostering active citizen engagement and inclusivity in decision-making processes. Simultaneously, establishing a more decentralized connection between the central and local tiers altered the formal system and empowered local authorities with greater autonomy to address region-specific issues and implement suitable policies, thereby enhancing overall governance effectiveness (Offerdal, 2003).

It is a widely recognized observation that well-established and older democracies display a higher resilience when confronted with cyclic patterns such as the political budget cycle, which frequently trouble young democracies (Mandon & Cazals, 2019). Thus, leaders increasingly depend on voters for competition, targeting them, for instance, during budget allocation and election campaigns.

Local political leaders have fewer policy instruments available than national political leaders. However, they still seek and identify financial instruments to optimize and gain voter support (Sansom, 2012). Moreover, political leaders who have been in their positions for extended periods tend to have better access to financial policy instruments. In the realm of contemporary democracy theory, it is posited that elections provide voters with the opportunity to assess the performance of politicians and subsequently hold them accountable for their actions or lack thereof. This accountability mechanism encourages current politicians to actively exercise their authority in pursuing impactful and visible policies to enhance their re-election chances (Zielinski et al., 2005).

In their 2017 study, Kažoka and StafECKa found that despite widespread distrust in local politicians, most Latvian local governments (over half) remained under the same political leadership after the 2013 elections. In the subsequent 2017 elections, out of 118 local governments, only 30 local governments and two major cities elected new council chairpersons, marking their first term in such roles (Centrālā vēlēšanu komisija). This indicates a low turnover rate of mayors. This trend suggests that incumbent mayors, familiar with financial tools, might leverage them for re-election purposes, potentially leading to increased budgets before elections.

Therefore, it is significant to examine what kind of role the council chairperson (hereinafter – the mayor), together with the deputies, has in the local government's budget allocation process and what factors affect the budget allocation process in Latvia. The utilization of budget allocation as a means to gain support within local governments is subject to many factors, which will be discussed further.

Literature review

National and local government budgets often experience deviations when implemented, resulting in higher public spending than initially intended by politicians (Serritzlew, 2005). This phenomenon is known as the 'political business cycle' or 'political budget cycle' (PBC) in the political economy literature (Brender & Drazen, 2005). It occurs when elected politicians strategically use financial instruments to gain support and to secure re-election.

Recent research has focused on examining the PBC in European countries. Alesina and Paradisi (2017) conducted a study on the budget cycles of smaller municipalities in Italy. Their findings revealed that municipalities tend to choose lower tax rates near elections. Similarly, Turyna et al. (2016) observed PBCs in various expenditure categories across Polish municipalities. They emphasized the presence of strong PBCs in areas essential to winning local elections, such as children's playgrounds, local roads in residential areas, and benefit programs. Another study by Swianiewicz et al. (2019) explored local tax policies during election cycles and suggested that levies used to finance local services are particularly likely to exhibit the presence of the PBC.

A political budget cycle implies a cyclical public revenue or expenditure pattern aligning with local elections. For example, leading up to elections, taxes tend to be reduced. At the same time, expenditures increase, creating a visible impact intended to garner favor within the local community and gain votes for the local elections (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2015).

Opinions on the opportunistic budget allocation process, driven by the PBC, vary among the electorate. Some individuals may view it favorably, perceiving it as a means for politicians to address pressing issues and deliver benefits before elections. However, others may consider manipulating budgets for electoral gain detrimental to society's overall governance and welfare (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2015).

One challenge in addressing the PBC is the limited awareness among citizens regarding its occurrence. The PBC is often not easily discernible, especially without the presence of vigilant watchdog organizations, journalists, or active citizens who closely scrutinize the budget allocation process.

Notably, research has shown that engaging in pre-electoral manipulation of public expenditure enhances the re-election prospects of incumbent mayors (Boukari, 2019). This finding underscores the sig-

nificance of investigating cases where chairpersons have been re-elected multiple times, as is often the case in state cities where incumbents remain in power for extended periods.

Methodology

The model for analyzing PBCs proposed by Drazen and Bender (2008) has been employed to analyze budget allocation. Electoral data and demographic variables for the cities included in this research were collected from the Central Statistical Bureau (hereinafter – the CSB) of the Latvian Ministry of Economics and the official websites of the local governments. Data about the budgets of local governments were retrieved from the Treasury of the Republic of Latvia.

Table 1. Variables overview and descriptive statistics

Variable	Description	Calculation	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
totalexpenditure	Total spending per capita in euros	Based on data from the CSB database (2009-2017 period)	434,46	40,73	373,17	488,33
totalrev	Total revenue per capita in euros	Based on data from the CSB database (2009-2017 period)	436,75	33,52	390,02	488,02
population	The population of the local government	Based on data from the National Statistical System of Latvia (2009-2017 period)	115956,17	3869	112191	123219
popage<15	Percentage of persons who are younger than 15 in the local government	Based on data from the National Statistical System of Latvia (2009-2017 period)	0,15	0,10	0,12	0,18
popage>65	Percentage of persons who are older than 65 in the local government	Based on data from the National Statistical System of Latvia (2009-2017 period)	0,12	0,02	0,09	0,17
unemployment	Percentage of population unemployment of the local government	Based on data from the State Employment Agency (2009-2017 period)	14,16	4,52	4,3	22,8
majority	Mayor political strength	It takes the value of 0 when the municipal government is a coalition of 2 or more political parties. It takes value 1 when only one party forms the government	0,50	0,5035	0	1
mayorterm	It takes value 1 if it is the mayor's second term or more and 0 otherwise	Taken from Central Election Commission	0,722	0,4510	0	1
preelec	The year before the elections	Takes a value of 1 in the year before the election and 0 otherwise	0,22	0,419	0	1
Elec 2009; Elec2013; Elec2017	Election year	Takes a value of 1 in the year of the election and 0 otherwise	0,33	0,50	0	1

Source: Author; Vicente et al., 2013.

Latvian municipalities are primarily focused on service delivery, with public administration designed to separate policy design as the main task at the central level and service delivery as the primary mission at the local level of governance (Reinholde & Stučka, 2022). Because of this, total revenues are intended to provide insights into the financial capacity and resources available for these service-oriented functions, but at the same time, total expenditures are also significant.

The research is based on the analysis of selected local governments in Latvia. Initially, the research focuses on examining local government budgets across two election terms, spanning the years 2009-2013 and 2013-2017. These electoral cycles fall between territorial amalgamation reforms, which will be described in the results section. As a consequence, the election term from 2017-2021 is not considered, as it coincided with significant changes in the local government landscape in 2021. Moreover, the research focus on the state cities results in a more homogeneous sample. The selection process for these local governments is based on their administrative status, thus mitigating any self-selection bias. It is important to note that the capital city, Riga, was not included in the research due to its distinct and comprehensive range of functions compared to other state cities.

In Latvia, elections are held in June, the middle of the election year. For that reason, politicians may decide to make a bigger budget not only in the year preceding the elections but also in the election year itself. However, this study's primary focus is on the years in which local governments approve their budgets a year in advance, leaving limited room for changes during the election year.

The dependent variables are total municipal expenditure and total municipal revenues per capita. Categories of expenditures will not be included in this study. Relative to the data from 2012, there was an escalation in municipal expenditure across various categories, encompassing goods and services, remuneration, subsidies, grants, and capital expenditure. However, the allocation towards social benefits witnessed a marked reduction. Furthermore, there was an evident inclination towards bolstering social benefits, which can be attributed to the support from co-financed projects and the capacity to secure long-term loans (Valsts kase, 2013). Notably, Political Budget Cycles (PBCs) tend to gravitate towards immediate outcomes, rendering EU projects, which are typically prolonged, less attractive in this context.

Furthermore, there is also the variable 'majority', which describes whether the chairperson's party holds a majority in the council. When the mayor's party has the most seats in the council, it becomes more feasible to utilize budget allocation as a financial instrument to gain votes in forthcoming elections. According to Roubini and Sachs (1989), coalition governments typically exhibit larger deficits and higher spending levels than single-party governments. This tendency is often attributed to the coordination challenges that arise in divided governments, where consensus-building among multiple parties can lead to compromises that inflate budgets and deficits.

The dummy variable takes a value of one when the mayor serves at least their second term in office. Research on mayoral re-election has yielded varying results. For instance, Rosenberg (1992) suggests that those who do not run for a second term may seek to secure their position after the elections by increasing the size of the political budget cycle. However, Veiga and Veiga (2007a) conclude that the political budget cycle is not affected by whether the mayor runs for a second term. Chortares et al. (2016) contend that the size of the political budget cycle diminishes when the incumbent seeks re-election for another term. Given these diverse findings and considering that contextual factors may influence results, examining this variable in the context of Latvian municipalities is essential.

Additionally, dummy variables related to elections will be included. These will encompass a pre-election variable, an election year variable, and a post-election variable, each taking the value 1 if the year corresponds to the respective category and 0 if not. Local government elections are fixed in the laws, preventing national or local governments from manipulating election dates for their advantage to receive more votes. The inclusion of the post-election variable will enable an examination of post-election changes.

The population variable is included to investigate the influence of population size on the political budget cycle. To account for population age structure, two demographic variables, namely 'popage < 15' and 'popage > 65', as defined by Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011), represent the percentage of the population under 15 years old and over 65 years old, respectively. Since municipalities often provide various services related to these age groups, these variables are significant in assessing their impact on the results. In addition, both data and literature show that individuals of pension age and women aged 45 to 54 are more likely to participate in elections (Stockemer and Sundstrom, 2023; SKDS, 2022).

Additionally, the municipality's unemployment rate is considered as a variable. There has been discussion on the effect of the unemployment rate on municipalities' budgets. For example, according to Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2008), employment rates can gauge job market competitiveness, with weaker job markets potentially exerting a detrimental effect on municipal spending. However, Bails and Tieslau (2000) found an association between increased levels of unemployment compensation and higher per capita local spending.

Research results

Latvia's municipal institutions and political framework

According to the Local Autonomy Index, Latvian municipalities are measured on average as Latvia scored 19,67 in 1995, 20,33 in 2014 (LA-mean is 39), and 19,50 in 2020 (LA-mean is 21,42) (Ladner et al., 2015; Ladner et al., 2021). Mainly, there has been relative stability regarding organizational autonomy within Latvian municipalities. Administrative supervision and legal protection have remained stable since 1994, with the primary focus on ensuring compliance with the law. However, fiscal autonomy has been constrained. Elected deputies plan and oversee the municipal budget process (Saeima, 1994; Saeima, 2023). In addition, it is common practice that the mayor's party does not hold a majority in the Council, except in the state cities where the mayor's party typically has a majority. Therefore, mayors and coalitions play a significant role in shaping larger projects and municipal financial planning.

The Council is elected for four years through equal, direct, and proportional elections. These elections typically occur on the first Saturday of June. The size of a municipal council and the number of local councilors are directly linked to the municipality's resident population. As a result, smaller towns have 13 councilors, while the largest, Riga, boasts 60 councilors. Following the election, the election committee convenes with all elected deputies to select the new chairperson, vice-chairperson, executive director, and committee chairperson. Each elected deputy is eligible to propose a candidate for the position of chairperson (Saeima, 1994).

The role of the Mayor in the budget process in the municipalities in Latvia

Mayors play a vital role in local governments as they can influence/shape Latvia's economic and social development direction. Every four years, voters who have expressed support for the chairperson of their local government council assess the political leader's – the Mayor's performance, evaluating the results achieved and the work carried out or left undone. Mayors at the municipal level hold positions that require the ability to identify, address, and resolve existing regional issues, often requiring compromise, especially in cases where the City Council Mayor's Party does not hold a majority (Stučka, 2018).

This research focuses on four cities where the chairperson had been in position for a long time – Liepāja, Ventspils, Jēkabpils, and Jelgava. For example, the Mayor of Liepāja was in office for 21 years (from 1997 to 2018), while the Mayor of Jelgava has been in office since 2001 (own calculation).

The roles and responsibilities of the Mayor are outlined in Article 17 of the Local Governments' Law. Before 2022, these functions were described in Article 62 of the law on local governments. The Mayor's duties encompass overseeing the council and committees' operations, managing the finance committee, representing the local government in various meetings and legal proceedings, and signing legal documents on behalf

of the municipality. Additionally, the Mayor is entrusted with recommending issue examinations, preparing submissions for other institutions, proposing the dismissal of local administrative institution heads, and fulfilling other obligations stipulated in relevant laws. The Mayor serves on a full-time basis and holds the position of the financial commission's head, affording them a significant role in regulating the administration and local government operations and the budget adoption process (Saeima, 2023; Stučka, 2018).




Figure 1. The Mayor's ability to influence the budget allocation process at certain stages

Source: Saeima, 2023.

The size of their budgets confirms the importance of local governments, as their spending constitutes approximately one-quarter of the country's total consolidated budget. Notably, over one-third of local government maintenance budgets are allocated to education, as depicted in Figure 2. In 2017, a significant share of expenditure was also directed towards the management of the municipal territory and housing (10%), general government services (6%), social protection (10%), and recreation, culture, and religion (9%) in 2017. It is important to emphasize that local governments receive state-earmarked grants for education (FM, 2022), limiting their ability to influence these specific expenditures.




Figure 2. Maintenance expenditure of Latvian municipal budgets by government function in election years from 2009 to 2017

Source: The Central Statistical Bureau.

Per capita spending exhibited fluctuations over the years, with some years showing increases while others saw decreases. However, from 2014 onward, per capita spending has an upward trend, culminating in a substantial 20,97 % increase in 2015 (see Figure 3). Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that per capita spending in 2017 reached its highest level among all the years analyzed, marking a 12,92 % increase from the previous year.




Figure 3. Expenditure and revenue in the local governments included in this case study

Source: The Treasury of the Republic of Latvia.

Testing the PBC models

A scatterplot was generated to visualize the relationships between total expenditures and total revenues per capita against population. Upon visually examining this scatterplot, a linear negative relationship between the variables is apparent (see Figure 4). This negative correlation may be attributed to factors such as economies of scale, cost-sharing, or revenue-generation challenges, particularly in densely populated areas.

All cases have standardized error terms within the range of ± 3 . Thus, casewise diagnostic tables were not generated. A plot of standardized residuals against standardized predicted values was visually examined to evaluate homoscedasticity. A normal probability plot also indicated that the residuals followed a normal distribution. During the examination of a boxplot, no outliers were detected in the data.

An independent-sample t-test was run to determine whether differences existed in total expenditure and total revenues per capita between the pre-election year and other years. Total expenditure per capita was slightly higher in the pre-election year ($1221,62 \pm 253,06$) than in other years ($1210,86 \pm 262,78$), however, this difference of 0,26 (95% CI, -188,20 to 249,31) was not statistically significant, $t(8,274)=0,320$ and $p=0,757$. No outliers were detected in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. Engagement scores for each level of the pre-election variable were normally distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p>0,05$), and variances were homogeneous, as indicated by Levene's test for equality of variances ($p>0,05$, $p=0,984$).

When testing total revenues, Levene's test confirmed the homogeneity of variances ($p>0,05$, $p=0,672$). Total revenues were slightly higher in other years ($1224,36 \pm 248,016$) than in pre-election years ($1195,49 \pm 259,65$). However, there was no statistically significant difference in total revenue per capita between the




Figure 4. Scatterplot of total expenditure and total revenues per capita against population (2009-2017)

Source: The Treasury of the Republic of Latvia.

pre-election year and other years, as indicated by $t(70)=0,406$ with a corresponding p-value of 0,686, which exceeds the commonly used significance level of 0,05. The mean difference between the two groups was 28,88, indicating that, on average, the total revenue per capita of local governments in the non-pre-election year group was slightly higher than that of the pre-election year group.

Based on the results presented in Table 1, a weak positive relationship is observed between total expenditures per capita and pre-election year, indicating that municipalities may slightly increase their expenditures in the year preceding municipal elections.

However, there are strong negative correlations between total expenditures per capita and population and unemployment, indicating that local governments with higher population and unemployment rates tend to have lower expenditures per capita. The negative correlation between total revenues per capita and population shows that larger local governments may struggle to generate revenue due to greater demands for public services. Similarly, the negative correlation between total revenues per capita and unemployment could suggest that high unemployment rates may result in lower revenues as residents have less disposable income to contribute to local businesses and taxes. In the context of Latvia's tax system, local taxes are not separately defined. Instead, all taxes are collected centrally and distributed among local governments based on predefined criteria. However, an exception to this centralized collection exists for the real estate tax, designed centrally but collected locally by municipalities. The personal income tax is a significant revenue source for municipalities in Latvia, and its distribution between local governments and the state has evolved. In 2021, the allocation was adjusted to 75 % of local government budgets and 25 % of the state budget, as opposed to the previous split of 80 % for local governments and 20 % for the state (FM, 2021).

Additionally, there is a weak positive correlation between total expenditures per capita and the mayor's term in office, suggesting that local governments with longer-serving mayors may have slightly higher expenditures. Finally, there is a moderate positive correlation between total expenditures per capita and the majority in the council, indicating that local governments with a higher percentage of council members from the mayor's party could spend more. This result suggests that the composition of the council, with a more significant representation from the mayor's party, may influence spending decisions, resulting in higher expenditures per capita as it is also easier to affect the budget allocation process.

Table 2. Regression analysis of the impact of the variables on total expenditures and total revenues per capita in municipalities

Variable	Total Expenditure Per Capita	Total Revenues Per Capita
Elec2009	-106,75 (-1,416)	-90,540 (-1,232)
Elec2013	107,38 (1,328)	105,432 (1,337)
Elec2017	115,58 (1,456)	113,843 (1,471)
preelec	14,91 (0,270)	-22,148 (-0,411)
Population	0,00 (-3,025)**	-0,003 (-3,142)**
popage<15	-3240,15 (-1,316)	-3612,685 (-1,505)
popage>65	1624,43 (1,213)	1940,367 (1,486)
unemployment	-21,65 (-3,224)**	-18,490 (-2,824)**
mayorterm	26,52 (0,456)	26,230 (0,463)
majority	126,24 (2,461)**	126,921 (2,538)**

Source: calculations based on SPSS. Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-values, and asterisks denote the level of statistical significance (** $p < 0,01$, * $p < 0,05$).

Conclusions

- The research focused on the role of the council's chairperson in the budget allocation process of local governments in Latvia, specifically covering the period from 2009 to 2017 and examining eight state cities in Latvia, excluding the capital city, Riga.
- The study identified a weak but positive correlation between total expenditures per capita and pre-election year, suggesting that municipalities tend to increase their spending in the year preceding municipal elections slightly. However, more significant factors influencing total expenditures per capita were population and unemployment, indicating that municipalities with higher unemployment rates and lower populations tend to have lower total expenditures per capita.
- In addition, the mayor's term in office showed a weak positive correlation with total expenditures per capita, indicating that municipalities with longer-serving mayors may have slightly higher expenditures per capita. Moreover, this shows that assumptions about the mayors and the use of budget allocation may be valid. They could be more confident about their position and know the budget allocation process well.
- The majority in the council showed a moderate positive correlation, indicating that when the mayor's party has a majority, there are slightly higher expenditures, potentially indicating confidence in the budget allocation process.
- Positive correlations between the mayor's term in office and the majority in the council suggest that stable leadership and strong political support can positively impact revenue generation in local government.
- The findings highlight the importance of municipalities considering their spending priorities and policies in light of demographic and economic factors. This research provides valuable insights for policymakers and researchers interested in understanding the determinants of municipal budget expenditures and revenues.
- However, the research has certain limitations that should be acknowledged. It is crucial to consider territorial reforms, as they can impact the evaluation of local governments. If the borders of local governments

have changed due to such reforms, it becomes impossible to assess them before and after the changes. Also, there is a possibility of errors in budget accounting balances that could affect the research's results.

- To further advance this research, future studies could focus on smaller local governments, especially those whose borders have remained unchanged after the latest territorial amalgamation reform. Additionally, further research could explore the reasons behind the observed correlation between a majority in the council and longer mayoral terms with higher local government expenditures.

References

1. Alesina, A., Paradisi, M. (2017). "Political budget cycles: Evidence from Italian cities." *Economics & Politics* 29(2): 157-177. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpa.12091>
2. Bails, D., Tieslau, M. A. (2000). „The impact of fiscal constitutions on state and local expenditures.“ *Cato Journal* 20(2): 255-277. <https://www.proquest.com/openview/df15cccb8a387843f7e00129203f12ea/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=37750>
3. Balaguer-Coll, M. T., Brun-Martos, M. I., Forte, A., and Tortosa-Ausina, E. (2015). "Local governments' re-election and its determinants: New evidence based on a Bayesian approach." *European Journal of Political Economy* 39: 94-108. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.04.004>
4. Birzulis, T., Indriksons, E. (2019). „Deceitful spenders: examining the existence of political budget cycles in Latvia.“ Rīga. https://www.makroekonomika.lv/sites/default/files/2019-06/10_Birzulis_Indriksons_SSE.pdf
5. Boukari, M. (2019). "The political budget cycle in French municipal elections: unexpected nonlinear effects." *French Politics* 17: 307-339. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41253-019-00091-9>
6. Brender, A., Drazen, A. (2005). "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52(7): 1271-1295. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.04.004>
7. Brender, A., Drazen, A. (2008). "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries." *American Economic Review* 98(5): 2203-2220. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.5.2203>
8. Carruthers, J. I., Úlfarsson, G. F. (2008). "Does "Smart Growth" Matter to Public Finance?". *Urban Studies* 45(9): 1791-1823. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098008093379>
9. Centrālā vēlēšanu komisija (2017). „2017. gada 3. jūnija pašvaldību vēlēšanas. Rezultāti.“ <http://pv2017.cvk.lv/ElectionResults>
10. Chortareas, G., Logothetis, V., and Papandreou, A. A. (2016). "Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities." *European Journal of Political Economy* 43: 1-13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.02.001>
11. Finanšu ministrija (2017). „Pašvaldību finanšu izlīdzināšana (PFI) 2017. gadā - vērtētie un izlīdzinātie ieņēmumi.“ <https://www.fm.gov.lv/lv/media/110/download>
12. Finanšu ministrija (2021). „Izmaiņas nodokļu regulējumā no 2021. gada - iedzīvotāju ienākumu nodokļi (I).“ <https://lvportals.lv/skaidrojumi/323400-izmainas-nodoklu-regulejuma-no-2021-gada-iedzivotaju-ienakumu-nodokli-i-2021>
13. Finanšu ministrija (2022). „Mērķdotācijas pašvaldībām.“ <https://www.fm.gov.lv/lv/merkdotacijas-pasvaldibam-0>
14. Finanšu ministrija (2023). „Pašvaldību finanšu izlīdzināšana (PFI) 2023. gadam.“ <https://www.fm.gov.lv/lv/media/13476/download?attachment>
15. Kažoka, I., Stafecka, L. (2017). „Varas līdzsvars un kontrole Latvijas pašvaldībās.“ https://www.lps.lv/uploads/docs_module/2017_7_p5.pdf
16. Köppl Turyna, M., Kula, G., Balmás, A., and Waclawska, K. (2016). "The effects of fiscal decentralization on the strength of political budget cycles in local expenditure." *Local Government Studies* 42(5): 785-820. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2016.1181620>

17. Ladner A., Keuffer N., and Baldersheim H. (2015). „Self-rule Index for Local Authorities (Release 1.0). Final report. Tender No 2014CE16BAT031.“ https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/self_rule_index_en.pdf
18. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., Bastianen, A., and Brajnik, I. B. (2021). „Self-rule Index for Local Authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD Countries, 1990-2020.“ Publications Office of the European Union. http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
19. Mandon, P., Cazals, A. (2019). “Political budget cycles: Manipulation by leaders versus manipulation by researchers? Evidence from a meta-regression analysis.” *Journal of Economic Surveys* 33(1): 274-308. <https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12263>
20. Offerdal, A. (2003). “Whose mayor? Representational roles in local politics.” In: Baldersheim H., Illner M., & Wollmann H. (eds) *Local Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*. Urban Research International 2: 273-288. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-10677-7_11
21. Oficiālās statistikas portāls (2021). „Vispārējās valdības sektora izdevumi pēc valdības funkcijām sadalījumā pa apakšsektoriem (milj. eiro) 2001-2021.“ https://data.stat.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/OSP_PUB/START__VEK__VF__VVFV/VFV040/
22. Reinholde, I., Stučka, M. (2020). “Urban Governance in Latvia: Feeling Urban and Thinking Rural.” In *Foregrounding Urban Agendas*, edited by S. Armondi and S. De Gregorio Hurtado, 75-94. The Urban Book Series. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29073-3_4
23. Reinholde, I., Stučka, M. (2022). “Latvia: Electoral drama in local governments.” In *The Routledge Handbook of Local Elections and Voting in Europe*, edited by A. Gendzwill, U. Kjaer, & K. Steyvers, 303-315. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003009672>
24. Rosenberg, J. (1992). “Rationality and the political business cycle: The case of local government.” *Public Choice* 73: 71-81. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00142917>
25. Saeima (1994). Likums Par pašvaldībām. Adopted on 19.05.1994. <https://likumi.lv/ta/id/57255-par-pasvaldibam>
26. Saeima (1994). Pašvaldības domes vēlēšanu likums. Adopted 13.01.1994. <https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=57839>
27. Saeima (2023). Pašvaldību likums. Adopted on 20.10.2022. <https://likumi.lv/ta/id/336956-pasvaldibu-likums>
28. Sakurai, S. N., Menezes-Filho, N. (2011). “Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level.” *Public Choice* 148: 233-247. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9654-1>
29. Sansom, G. (2012). „Australian Mayors: What Can and Should They Do?“ UTS: Centre for Local Government, University of Technology, Sydney. <https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/bitstream/10453/42103/3/Australian-Mayors.pdf>
30. Serritzlew, S. (2005). “Breaking budgets: an empirical examination of Danish municipalities.” *Financial Accountability & Management* 21(4): 413-435. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0267-4424.2005.00227.x>
31. SKDS Pētījumu centrs (2022). „Vēlētāju attieksmju pētījums 2022. Pēcvēlēšanu aptauja. LR pilsoņu aptauja.“ https://petijumi.mk.gov.lv/sites/default/files/title_file/P%20C4%93cv%20C4%93l%20C4%93C5%A1anu%20aptauja_CVK_102022.pdf
32. Stockemer, D., Sundstrom, A. (2023). “The gender gap in voter turnout: An artefact of men’s over-reporting in survey research?” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 25(1): 21-41. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211056850>
33. Stučka, M. (2018). “Perception of Political Leadership in Local Governments in Latvia.” *Socialiniai tyrimai* 41(2): 112-123. <https://doi.org/10.21277/st.v41i2.257>
34. Swianiewicz, P., Kurniewicz, A., and Kalcheva, D. (2019). “The Political Budget Cycle in Earmarked Taxes for Local Public Services: A Comparison of Poland and Bulgaria.” *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 21(5): 463-480. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2019.1594775>
35. Valsts kase (2013). Ziņojums par Latvijas Republikas 2013. gada pārskatu par valsts budžeta izpildi un par pašvaldību budžetiem. https://www.kase.gov.lv/sites/default/files/public/PD/Saimniecisk%C4%81%20gada%20p%C4%81rskats/2013/1.sejums/FMInf_300614_Zinojums.pdf

36. icente, C., Benito, B., and Bastida, F. (2013). "Transparency and political budget cycles at municipal level." *Swiss Political Science Review* 19(2): 139-156. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12036>
37. Zielinski, J., Slomczynski, K., and Shabad, G. (2005). "Electoral Control in New Democracies: The Perverse Incentives of Fluid Party Systems." *World Politics* 57(3): 365-395. <https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2006.0006>

Malvīne Stučka

POLITINIAI BIUDŽETO CIKLAI IR MERŲ ĮTAKA LATVIJOS SAVIVALDYBĖSE: PAJAMŲ, IŠLAIDŲ IR RINKIMŲ DINAMIKOS TYRIMAS

Anotacija. *Biudžeto paskirstymas ir biudžeto planavimas gali būti naudojami skirtingais būdais. Be to, jis gali būti politinio biudžeto ciklo dalis. Ankstesniuose tyrimuose buvo atkreiptas dėmesys į politinio biudžeto ciklo egzistavimą Europos šalyse, parodant jo poveikį valstybės pajamoms ir išlaidoms netoli rinkimų. Tačiau piliečiai dažnai nepakankamai informuoti apie šį reiškinį, o tai rodo, kad būtina atidžiai jį stebėti. Be to, išrinkti politikai vis dažniau pasikliauja rinkėjų parama, orientuodamiesi į juos per biudžeto skirstymą ir rinkimų kampanijas.*

Latvijoje merai atlieka svarbų vaidmenį planuojant biudžetą, nes dirba visą darbo dieną ir yra finansų komisijos vadovai. Latvijoje, nepaisant nepakankamo pasitikėjimo vietos politikais, pastebima tendencija, kad dauguma merų yra perrenkami. Straipsnyje siekiama iširti, koks vaidmuo tenka tarybos pirmininkui vietos valdžios biudžeto skirstymo procese ir kokie veiksniai turi įtakos biudžeto skirstymo procesui Latvijoje. Straipsnis apima 2009-2017 m. laikotarpį, apimantį dvi rinkimų kadencijas (2009-2013 m.; 2013-2017 m.), ir daugiausia dėmesio skiriama aštuoniems Latvijos valstybiniais miestams, išskyrus sostinę Rygą.

Pastebėtina, kad vietos valdžios institucijos, kuriose didesnė dalis tarybos narių priklauso mero partijai, paprastai pasižymi didesniu išlaidų lygiu. Šio tyrimo rezultatai rodo, kad įvairūs socialiniai, ekonominiai ir politiniai veiksniai daro įtaką Latvijos vietos valdžios finansiniams rodikliams. Šie rezultatai pabrėžia gyventojų skaičiaus ir nedarbo svarbą formuojant vietos valdžios išlaidas. Kartu šis tyrimas išryškino politinių veiksmų, pavyzdžiui, daugumos vietos valdžioje ir mero poste praleisto laiko, svarbą. Be to, jis atskleidė, kad ilgai dirbantys merai ir dauguma taryboje taip pat turi įtakos sprendimams dėl biudžeto paskirstymo. Šio straipsnio išvados gali padėti politikos formuotojams priimti pagrįstus sprendimus dėl savivaldybių biudžeto išlaidų ir pajamų.

Malvīne Stučka, PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences University of Latvia, Latvia

E-mail: malvine.stucka@gmail.com

Malvīne Stučka, Socialinių fakulteto doktorantūros programos doktorantė, Latvijos Universitetas, Latvija

El. paštas: malvine.stucka@gmail.com



This article is an Open Access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF STATE REGULATION OF CRYPTOMINING IN KAZAKHSTAN

Beimbet MUSSIN

*Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
Abay Avenue, 33a, 010000, Astana, Kazakhstan*

Aigul KOSHERBAYEVA

*Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
Abay Avenue, 33a, 010000, Astana, Kazakhstan*

Nurzhan KUANDYKOV

*Head of the Department of the Department of Administration of the State Revenue
Committee of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
Jenis avenue, 11, 010000, Astana, Kazakhstan*

Salamat YEGEUBAYEVA

*Almaty Technological University,
Tole bi st., 100, 050012, Almaty, Kazakhstan*

Zukhra MUSSINA

*Almaty Technological University,
Tole bi st., 100, 050012, Almaty, Kazakhstan*

<https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppa.23.1.35833>

Abstract. *The cryptocurrency mining sector in Kazakhstan has witnessed remarkable expansion, attracting global miners due to favourable conditions. However, this growth has underscored the country's energy scarcity, leading to the enforcement of stringent regulations by the government.*

This article seeks to offer a thorough comprehension of the regulatory framework governing cryptocurrency mining in Kazakhstan.

Examining diverse aspects such as the legal status of mining, licensing structures, tax considerations, and the impact on energy infrastructure, the study utilizes international experiences and stimulus materials. Through the analysis of media representation and examination of primary trends, it is revealed that while the government has addressed legal gaps and instituted transparent tax procedures, taxing digital mining may discourage foreign investments, given the industry's current fragility due to excessive regulations. The article provides insights into the regulatory landscape, emphasizing challenges and opportunities.

Keywords: *state regulation, cryptocurrency mining, content analysis, energy security, taxation framework, information agenda.*

Reikšminiai žodžiai: *valstybinis reguliavimas, kriptovaliutų kasyba, turinio analizė, energetinis saugumas, apmokestinimo sistema, informacinė darbotvarkė.*

Introduction

Cryptocurrencies are currently capturing substantial attention from investors, giving rise to a burgeoning entrepreneurial pursuit known as “mining.” Mining, in this context, encompasses both the creation and extraction of cryptocurrency.

In Kazakhstan, the emergence of cryptocurrency mining has emerged as a critical element of the national economy, capturing global attention. As of 2021, the nation claimed the second-highest global ranking in cryptocurrency mining hashrate, according to the (Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index (CBECI) 2023). This noteworthy position signifies Kazakhstan’s significance in the global cryptocurrency landscape. However, the ascendancy of cryptocurrency mining in Kazakhstan has not been without its challenges. The country encountered impediments such as illicit mining operations and strains on its electrical infrastructure. The latter issue was exacerbated by an influx of miners relocating from China, seeking more hospitable environments for their operations (Liu et al., 2023). The sudden surge in demand for electricity posed a substantial strain on the existing infrastructure, necessitating comprehensive measures to manage the increased load.

In response to these challenges, the Kazakhstani government implemented a dual-fold strategy. Firstly, it actively encouraged investment in the cryptocurrency mining sector, recognizing its potential economic benefits and global appeal. Simultaneously, to ensure responsible and sustainable growth, regulatory controls were instituted.

This paper conducts a comprehensive examination of challenges arising from the rapid growth of cryptocurrency mining in Kazakhstan and evaluates the implications of the government’s mining taxation framework. The research synthesizes existing literature, analyzes government policies, and draws insights from comparable international cases to provide a holistic understanding of the issues.

Employing a content analysis of domestic media, particularly news websites, the study scrutinizes coverage of the mining industry in Kazakhstan, revealing key trends and problems. By exploring public opinion and regulatory perceptions, the research contributes valuable insights to the discourse on the industry’s development in the country. The study addresses research questions related to government regulation, responsibilities for miners, and the impact of the special tax regime, aiming to inform policymakers, industry stakeholders, and researchers.

Literature review

This literature review serves to synthesize diverse perspectives on cryptocurrency mining, delving into its economic, legal, and environmental dimensions. In particular, it addresses the evolving regulatory landscape, economic implications, and the pressing environmental concerns associated with this burgeoning industry.

The regulatory dimension emerges as a focal point, with scholars such as (Afzal 2019, 103-130) and (Liz Guinan 2023) shedding light on the challenges of regulating cryptocurrency mining amid rapid technological advancements. Notably, Afzal underscores the widening gap between regulatory measures and technological progress, emphasizing the need for proactive regulatory frameworks to navigate the complexities of modern technology.

An intriguing facet of this discourse revolves around divergent views on the classification of cryptocurrency mining. (Maksurov 2018, 256-265) posits a nuanced perspective, arguing for its recognition as a distinct economic and legal technology rather than a conventional entrepreneurial activity. Conversely, (Ershova and Trofimova 2019, 73–82) advocate for viewing mining participants as self-employed individuals, positioning mining as a form of entrepreneurship spurred by the demands of the digital economy.

The decentralized nature of cryptocurrency mining, a key attraction for many, is explored by (Olander 2015, 128–136), while (Bhatnagar, Taneja, and Rupeika-Apoga 2023, 136) caution against the inher-

ent volatility of cryptocurrency markets. They highlight regulatory changes, liquidity challenges, technical complications, and market outlook as factors contributing to the instability, emphasizing the importance of investor awareness.

The environmental impact of cryptocurrency mining emerges as a significant concern, with scholars such as (Halaburda and Yermack 2023) drawing attention to substantial energy consumption. This is further quantified by Swain (2023), indicating a notable fraction of the global energy consumption attributed to blockchain and crypto assets in 2022. (Arslanian 2022, 259-276) underscores global media coverage of the industry's unfavorable aspect – substantial electricity usage for both mining and transaction processing.

In light of these complexities, the literature review concludes by stressing the imperative of a comprehensive and balanced regulatory approach to cryptocurrency mining. It underscores the need to address economic stability, energy consumption, and the evolving role of miners in the digital economy. The multifaceted nature of this topic emphasizes the ongoing requirement for research and dialogue to inform effective policies and practices within the cryptocurrency mining sector.

Materials and Methods

The research employed a method of analyzing secondary data obtained from open sources, including the Committee of State Revenues of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Digital Development, Innovations and Aerospace Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Additionally, the study also included a review of international experiences in countries with significant global mining capacity, specifically China, the USA, and Russia. This review aimed to gather data on regulatory measures employed in the mining industry in these nations, which are recognized as leaders in terms of their mining capabilities.

This study utilized content analysis to examine internet resources focused on mining in Kazakhstan. The analysis considered media language and energy-related aspects of digital mining. The research focused on internet media accounts discussing digital mining in the country. Content analysis was used to process information from news sites between 2015 and 2023, revealing patterns in the presentation of mining information. Four key indicators were identified: regulatory measures, local attitudes (negative and positive), and energy system impact.

Analysis and Results

In order to elucidate the trajectories of state regulation within the mining industry, it is judicious to undertake a comprehensive analysis of regulatory practices observed in three prominent nations: China, the United States, and Russia. The pertinent data, as outlined in Table 1, pertains specifically to the regulation of cryptocurrency mining activities. A meticulous examination of the institutional frameworks implemented by these nations to govern the mining sector is imperative, as it promises to yield valuable insights into the varied global experiences that characterize this domain.

Indeed, the experience of each country in the digital mining industry is distinctive, and government regulation is shaped by a variety of factors. Economic priorities, regulatory frameworks, energy resources, and technological capacities all contribute to the specific approach taken by each nation towards regulating cryptocurrency mining.

In 2020, the Republic of Kazakhstan implemented the Law “On Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Regulation of Digital Technologies.” This law brought about changes to the Civil Code of Kazakhstan and the Law of Kazakhstan “On Informatization,” specifically addressing the inclusion of digital assets in the realm of civil rights and establishing their legal framework. Notably, the law introduced a prohibition on the issuance and circulation of unsecured digital assets, commonly referred to as cryptocurrency, within the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Table 1. *State regulation of mining in foreign countries*

Country	State regulation measures
China	<p>In 2021, a Notice on Regulating Virtual Currency ‘Mining’ Activities was jointly issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and nine other authorities. The objective was to impose restrictions on cryptocurrency mining operations within the country. The notice establishes official guidelines at the national level for cryptocurrency mining activities and imposes limitations on new investments in this sector. It specifically prohibits companies from labeling their cryptocurrency mining businesses as „data centers.“ Furthermore, supplying electricity to cryptocurrency mining enterprises is also forbidden. Illegal provision of electricity to existing mining operations will be investigated and subject to sanctions. The price for supplying electricity should be equivalent to the electricity tariffs specified in the Industrial Structure Adjustment Guidance Catalogue’s outdated category (Zhang, Laney 2022).</p>
USA	<p>Regulations regarding cryptocurrency mining in the United States were still evolving and varied by state. Some states have imposed specific regulations or requirements on cryptocurrency miners, such as obtaining permits or licenses to operate mining facilities. Electricity rates can also impact the viability of mining operations, and some states have implemented regulations to address concerns related to power consumption. Some states have taken steps to regulate mining operations with an emphasis on energy efficiency or to promote the use of renewable energy sources. Some states have implemented licensing or registration requirements for businesses engaged in cryptocurrency-related activities, including mining. These regulations aim to ensure consumer protection, prevent fraud, and promote transparency in the industry. The Digital Asset Mining Energy (DAME) excise tax is a newly proposed measure in this year’s Budget, demonstrating the President’s dedication to tackling existing national issues and emerging risks. Following a gradual implementation period, companies would be subject to a tax equivalent to 30 percent of their electricity expenses related to cryptocurrency mining (The White House 2023).</p>
Russia	<p>Russian legislation doesn’t explicitly mention terms like „cryptocurrency,“ „mining,“ or „mining pools.“ Instead, it broadly states that the regulation of digital currency issuance and circulation in Russia should follow federal laws, which are yet to be established. As of January 22, 2023, the State Duma is reviewing Draft Law No. 237585-844. This draft law defines mining as the activity of performing mathematical calculations using computing devices and software to create digital currency. It also introduces the concept of a mining pool, where multiple device owners combine their capacities for mining and share the resulting digital currency. The bill allows miners to conduct transactions involving digital currency obtained through mining, provided that Russian information infrastructure is not involved, except in cases governed by an experimental legal regime. While the draft law doesn’t specify the tax framework for digital currency mining, it mandates individuals engaged in mining to provide information about their address-identifier to the appropriate authorities in line with Russian tax laws and regulations (Korzhova 2023, 88–95)</p>

Interestingly, despite the restrictions on unsecured digital assets, the law also fully legalized digital mining in Kazakhstan. Table 2 below shows state regulation measures in the field of mining in Kazakhstan.

A subsequent section of this article will undertake a content analysis of the chronologically ordered significant events within the Kazakhstani mining industry, as portrayed in the national media. This analysis aims to shed light on the dynamic path of the industry’s challenges and the corresponding solutions, thus capturing the evolving narrative of Kazakhstan’s mining landscape.

Table 2. A comprehensive set of measures and principles established by the government of Kazakhstan for the systematic supervision and management of cryptocurrency mining

№	Measures
1.	Introduction to the conceptual framework of mining activities
2.	Licensing of mining with the establishment of a legislative prohibition on activities without a license. Cryptocurrency miners are obligated to obtain licenses categorized into two types based on ownership of data processing centers, with associated fees ranging from \$40 to \$15,300 USD.
3.	Introduction of a registry of used equipment
4.	Introduction of electricity consumption quotas for miners
5.	Establishment of a legal framework for the operation of a mining pool
6.	Ensuring the operation of an exchange for unsecured digital assets within the territory of MFCA «Astana»
7.	Staged introduction of mandatory sale of a portion of mined digital assets on the exchange, at a rate of no less than 50% from 2024 and no less than 80% from 2025 of the total volume of digital assets
8.	Establishment of administrative liability for violation of legislation on digital assets, Violations may lead to fines, ranging from \$112 to \$1,144 USD, and potential license suspension (adilet.zan.kz 2023).
9.	Regressive tax rate

Source: Authors.

The analysis commences by examining the earliest news related to mining, establishing the ground-work for the industry's subsequent evolution. The initial mining phase showcases the state's increasing interest in cryptocurrency mining, leading to its rapid expansion.

As the industry progresses, various regulatory interventions and governmental actions become prominent. These interventions reflect the government's acknowledgment of emerging issues and its efforts to address them in a lawful manner.

The graphs depict the results of content analysis of the mining industry in Kazakhstan, which was extensively covered in Kazakhstani news portals during the period from 2016 to 2023. In general, during the mentioned period, a total of 180 mentions on the Internet were identified, related to the benefits of mining, negative consequences associated with energy shortages, and regulatory changes in the law.




Figure 1. Positive dynamics of the publication of digital mining from 2016 to 2023

Source: Authors.

The Government of Kazakhstan has shown increasing interest in the cryptocurrency mining market since 2019, leading to positive developments such as the establishment of mining farms, heightened tax revenues, and governmental support. The peak of activity was observed in 2020, with a notable surge in mentions. However, 2022 saw a significant decline in mentions due to government measures aimed at regulating the industry, reflecting a proactive approach to enforcement (Figure 1).




Figure 2. *Negative dynamics of the publication of digital mining from 2016 to 2023*

Source: Authors.




Figure 3. *Dynamics of the publication on the impact on the energy system of the country*

Source: Authors.




Figure 4. *Dynamics of the publication on the adopted state measures*

Source: Authors.




Figure 6. *The dynamics of registration for mining organizations in the field of digital mining from November 2021 to July 2022*

Source: Ministry of Digital Development, Innovations, and Aerospace Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2022.

Amidst positive developments, there has been a parallel stream of negative information, including reports of illegal mining, economic crimes, corruption, and gray mining. Throughout the period analyzed, a total of 121 mentions on news portals were recorded (Figure 2).

An interesting trend emerges when examining articles discussing the impact of mining on the country’s energy system. The years 2021 and 2022 witnessed a peak in mentions, totaling 91, indicating a growing awareness and concern regarding (Figure 3).

The narrative shifts in 2022-2023, marked by a significant increase in mentions, suggesting an active government engagement in implementing legislative measures to legalize and regulate mining activities. This shift reflects a dynamic policy environment responding to the evolving landscape of the cryptocurrency mining industry (Figure 4).

Figure 6 clearly shows the dynamics of official registration of organizations engaged in digital mining activities.

According to (Ministry of Digital Development, Innovations, and Aerospace Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2022), in October 2021, a total of 27 companies engaged in digital mining were registered in the country. By mid-2022, a total of 330 mining companies were officially recorded in Kazakhstan. This figure reflects the number of companies that were engaged in cryptocurrency mining activities and had undergone the necessary procedures to be recognized within the country’s regulatory framework.

Discussions

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's 2020 initiative to attract more companies and investments to the country's mining sector resulted in a substantial influx of miners. The President publicly supported and highlighted the growth of the emerging digital mining sector in a message to the nation on September 1, 2020, instructing the government to raise digital mining investment to \$1.18 billion by 2025 (Akorda.kz 2020). Notably, this surge in mining activity coincided with China's cryptocurrency ban.

In the same year, a shift in perception occurred, and accusations were levied against miners by the Ministry of Energy and other government agencies. Miners were blamed for causing an electricity shortage in the country, leading to a decision to disconnect them from power grids starting from the end of 2021.

The introduction of a cryptocurrency mining tax, starting with a fee for electricity consumption in the form of an additional fee of 1 tenge electricity (approximately 0.0023 USD) for every 1 kilowatt-hour, starting from January 1, 2022 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2023), and subsequently escalating in 2023, underscores the government's effort to balance economic interests and address energy consumption concerns. These changes entail higher fees for the use of low-cost electricity, with the upper limit of the scale reaching 25 tenge (approximately 0.056 USD), (State revenue committee Ministry of finance of the RoK 2023).

Report from JSC 'KOREM' reveals a significant change in electricity consumption by miners in the Republic of Kazakhstan. In 2022, miners consumed approximately 3 billion kWh of electricity, while in the first quarter of 2023, the consumption dropped significantly to only 650 million kWh ("Quarterly reports | Analytics | JSC 'KOREM'" n.d.). This data indicates a notable reduction in electricity consumption in 2023, likely as a response to the introduced taxation and regulatory changes.

Kazakhstan's energy landscape is grappling with challenges, notably a shortage of energy capacity, particularly impacting the mining sector. To address this, the country has resorted to importing 1.5 billion kWh from Russia, placing a financial burden on consumers and the state (Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2022). The Ministry of Energy's 2022 report emphasizes the gravity of the situation, projecting an energy deficit until 2029 (Kazakhstan Today 2023). Overcoming this requires substantial investment to secure 7 GW of additional energy capacity, but current infrastructure is insufficient. The urgency lies in adopting comprehensive strategies to enhance domestic capacity, reduce dependency on external sources, and build a sustainable and resilient energy future for Kazakhstan.

The decline in revenues from mining fees in 2023, compared to the previous year, has direct implications for Kazakhstan's national budget. The shift from a \$7 million boost in 2022 to revenues exceeding \$541,000 USD in the first quarter of 2023 signals a potential economic downturn in the sector (Haqshanas 2023).

The government's strategic shift from a notification-based system to a licensing regime in 2020 (Adilet.zan.kz 2023) appears to have prompted a noteworthy surge in "white" miners. This shift towards a more transparent and legitimate framework suggests that regulatory adjustments, albeit met with initial resistance, have fostered a sense of compliance within the industry.

These regulations have already led to observable outcomes, as evidenced by the reduction in the number of entities engaged in paying for digital mining. In the first quarter of 2023, there were 150 companies as paying entities for digital mining, whereas in mid-2022, the number was 330 (Ministry of Digital Development, Innovations and Aerospace Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2022).

It's worth noting that the introduction of such a specialized mining tax is not anticipated in most other countries, and many foreign countries typically allow deductions for electricity consumption expenses. In contrast, the Republic of Kazakhstan's law not only lacks provisions for deductions but also obliges individuals engaged in digital mining to pay for the consumed electricity twice.

A comprehensive assessment of the government's actions will be possible in early 2024, once the final report for the year 2023 becomes available. This report should provide valuable insights into the impact of regulatory measures and developments within the cryptocurrency mining industry in Kazakhstan, enabling a thorough evaluation of the outcomes.

Conclusions

1. **Regulatory Milestone:** The introduction of the “On Digital Assets in the Republic of Kazakhstan” law marks a significant stride in regulating the cryptocurrency mining industry. By mandating licensing for participants, the legislation fosters transparency, control, and effectively addresses challenges posed by grey mining.
2. **Energy Stability:** A critical aspect of the regulatory framework is its strategic approach to energy stability. Allowing miners to optimize electricity consumption during stable periods is a noteworthy provision that contributes to the resilience of the national energy grid.
3. **Government Imperatives:** To sustain and enhance the cryptocurrency mining industry’s growth, the government is urged to expedite the development of new energy capacities, including the exploration of nuclear power options. This is pivotal in ensuring a stable and resilient electricity supply.
4. **Economic Incentives:** The suggestion to reconsider digital fee rates for imported electrical energy used in mining is a pragmatic step. This has the potential to incentivize increased investment, offering a dual benefit through enhanced fees and corporate income tax deductions.
5. **Sustainable Development:** The proposal to establish a fund, financed by the mining sector, for modernizing existing energy infrastructure underscores a commitment to sustainability and efficiency. This initiative aims to create a self-sustaining ecosystem that supports the long-term viability of cryptocurrency mining.
6. **Future Trajectory:** As Kazakhstan continues on this trajectory, the judicious management of regulatory frameworks and proactive measures to bolster energy capacities will play pivotal roles. The nation’s trajectory in navigating the evolving landscape of cryptocurrency mining will be crucial in determining its long-term standing in this dynamic industry.

References

1. adilet.zan.kz. 2023. „On Approval of the Rules for Licensing Digital Mining Activities.“ Adilet.zan.kz. April 2023. <https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/V2300032431>
2. adilet.zan.kz. 2023. „On Digital Assets in the Republic of Kazakhstan - ,Adilet’ LIS.“ Adilet.zan.kz. <https://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z2300000193>
3. Afzal, Ayesha. 2019. “Cryptocurrencies, Blockchain and Regulation: A Review.” THE LAHORE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 24 (1): 103-30. <https://doi.org/10.35536/lje.2019.v24.i1.a5>
4. akorda.kz. 2020. „The President of Kazakhstan Took Part in a Working Meeting of the Council of Foreign Investors.“ Akorda.kz. November 18, 2020. http://www.akorda.kz/ru/events/akorda_news/meetings_and_sittings/prezident-kazhstana-prinyal-uchastie-v-rabochei-vstreche-soveta-inostrannyh-investorov
5. Aleksey Anatolyevich Maksurov. 2018. “Mining as Juridical and Information Category.” Actual Problems of Economics and Law 12 (2):256-265. <https://doi.org/10.21202/1993-047X.12.2018.2.256-265>
6. Arslanian, Henri. 2022. “Bitcoin and Crypto Mining.” The Book of Crypto, 259-276. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97951-5_14
7. Bhatnagar, Mukul, Sanjay Taneja, and Ramona Rupeika-Apoga. 2023. “Demystifying the Effect of the News (Shocks) on Crypto Market Volatility.” Journal of Risk and Financial Management 16 (2): 136. <https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm16020136>
8. Calvão, F. 2018. “Crypto-miners: Digital Labor and the power of Blockchain technology,” Economic Anthropology, 6(1), pp. 123-134. <https://doi.org/10.1002/sea2.12136>
9. Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index (CBECI). 2023. Ccaf.io. 2023. https://ccaf.io/cbeci/mining_map
10. Catalini, Christian, and Joshua S. Gans. 2019. “Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain.” SSRN Electronic Journal. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2874598>

11. Ershova, and Trofimova. 2019. "Mining and business activities: in search of the balance." *Actual Problems of Russian Law* 6 (6): 73-82. <https://doi.org/10.17803/1994-1471.2019.103.6.073-082>
12. Halaburda, Hanna, and David Yermack. 2023. "Bitcoin Mining Meets Wall Street: A Study of Publicly Traded Crypto Mining Companies." NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES, February. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w30923>
13. Halaburda, Hanna, and David Yermack. 2023. "Bitcoin Mining Meets Wall Street: A Study of Publicly Traded Crypto Mining Companies." *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4340013>
14. Haqshanas, Ruholamin. 2023. „Crypto Mining Entities in Kazakhstan Paid \$7 Million in Taxes in 2022 - next Crypto Hub?“ *Cryptonews.com*. May 8. <https://cryptonews.com/news/crypto-mining-entities-kazakhstan-paid-7-million-taxes-2022-next-crypto-hub.htm>
15. Kazakhstan Today. 2023. „Analysts Predict Peak Electricity Shortage in Kazakhstan in 2029.“ www.kt.kz. https://www.kt.kz/rus/ekonomika/_1377946930.html
16. Korzhova. 2023. "The Concept of Legal Regulation of Mining." *Law and State: Theory and Practice* 1 (217): 88-95. https://doi.org/10.47643/1815-1337_2023_1_88
17. Liu, Feng, Linlin Wang, Deli Kong, Chen Shi, Zhefu Feng, Jiashen Zhou, Jiaqi Liu, and Zhibin Li. 2023. "Is There More to Bitcoin Mining than Carbon Emissions?" *Heliyon* 9 (4): e15099. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e15099>
18. Liz Guinan. 2023. „The Future of Crypto-Asset Mining: The Inflation Reduction Act and the Need for Uniform Federal Regulation.“ *Sustainable Development Law & Policy* 23 (2). <https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp/vol23/iss2/2>
19. Ministry of Digital Development, Innovations, and Aerospace Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 2022. *Gov.egov.kz*. April 26, 2022. <https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mdai/documents/details/299113?lang=ru>
20. Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 2022. *Gov.egov.kz*. October. <https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/energo/press/news/details/443159?lang=ru>
21. Oleander, N.V. 2015. "Forensic Characterization of Electronic Payment Means and Systems." *LEX RUSSICA*. 10 (2015): 128-136. <https://doi.org/10.17803/1729-5920.2015.107.10.128-138>
22. PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2023. „A Tax on Digital Mining Has Been Introduced in Kazakhstan.“ *PwC*. Accessed April 4. <https://www.pwc.com/kz/en/pwc-news/ta-reports/tax-legal-alert-fy19/100-november-2021.html>
23. Quarterly reports | Analytics | JSC „KOREM“ (Kazakhstan operator of the electricity and capacity market). n.d. www.korem.kz Accessed August 12, 2023. https://www.korem.kz/rus/analitika/kvartalnye_otchety/
24. State revenue committee Ministry of finance of the RoK. 2023. *Gov.egov.kz*. February. <https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/kgd/press/news/details/505417?lang=ru>
25. Steer, Killian. 2018. „Cryptocurrency Mining: The Challenges It Faces and How Regulations Can Help.“ *Carolina Law Scholarship Repository*. 2018. <https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol20/iss5/9>
26. Swain, Smarak. 2023. "Design Options for Pollution Tax on Mining of Crypto Assets." *SSRN*, July. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4531983>
27. The White House. 2023. „The DAME Tax: Making Cryptominers Pay for Costs They Impose on Others | CEA.“ *The White House*. March 2023. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/written-materials/2023/05/02/cost-of-cryptomining-dame-tax/>
28. Thomson, Jeff. 2020. „Tragedy of the Energy Commons: How Government Regulation Can Help Mitigate the Environmental and Public Health Consequences of Cryptocurrency Mining.“ *Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons*. <https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjteil/vol11/iss1/4>
29. Zhang, Laney. 2022. „China: National Development and Reform Commission Issues Notice Restricting Cryptocurrency Mining.“ *Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.* 20540 USA. February 8, 2022. <https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2022-02-08/china-national-development-and-reform-commission-issues-notice-restricting-cryptocurrency-mining/>

Beimbet Mussin, Aigul Kosherbayeva, Nurzhan Kuandykov,
Salamat Yegeubayeva, Zukhra Mussina

KRIPTOVALIUTŲ GAVYBOS VALSTYBINIO REGULIAVIMO KAZACHSTANE PROBLEMOS IR PERSPEKTYVOS

Anotacija. *Kripto valiutų kasybos sektorius Kazachstane labai išsiplėtė ir dėl palankių sąlygų pritraukė pasaulinius kasėjus. Tačiau šis augimas išryškino šalies energijos trūkumą, todėl vyriausybė ėmėsi taikyti griežtas taisykles. Šiame straipsnyje siekiama išsamiai supažindinti su kripto valiutų kasybą Kazachstane reglamentuojančia reguliavimo sistema. Nagrinėjant įvairius aspektus, tokius kaip kasybos teisinis statusas, licencijavimo struktūros, mokesčiai ir poveikis energetikos infrastruktūrai, tyrime pasitelkiama tarptautinė patirtis ir skatinamoji medžiaga. Analizuojant atstovavimą žiniasklaidoje ir nagrinėjant pirmines tendencijas, atskleidžiama, kad nors vyriausybė pašalino teisinę spragas ir nustatė skaidrias mokesčių procedūras, skaitmeninės kasybos apmokestinimas gali atgrasyti užsienio investicijas, atsižvelgiant į dabartinę šios pramonės šakos pažeidžiamumą dėl perteklinio reguliavimo. Straipsnyje pateikiamos išvalgos apie reglamentavimo aplinką, pabrėžiant iššūkius ir galimybes.*

Beimbet Malikovich Mussin, PhD candidate at the Institute of Public Administration at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan

E-mail: beyimbet.mussin@apa.kz

Aygul' Bedelbaevna Kosherbayeva, Doctor of Economic Sciences, Director of the Institute of Applied Research of the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan

E-mail: a.kosherbayeva@apa.kz

Nurzhan Kadyrovich Kuandykov, Doctor of Public Administration, Head of the Department of the Department of Administration of the State Revenue Committee of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan

E-mail: n.kuandykov@ie.gov.kz

Salamat Sabitovna Yegeubayeva, PhD doctor, Senior Lecturer, Almaty Technological University, Kazakhstan

E-mail: salamategeub8888888@gmail.com

Zukhra Mussina, PhD doctor, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Chemistry, Chemical Technology and Ecology at the Almaty Technological University, Kazakhstan

E-mail: muszuhra07@gmail.com

Beimbet Malikovich Mussin, Viešojo administravimo instituto, Viešojo administravimo akademijos prie Kazachstano Respublikos Prezidento doktorantas, Kazachstanas

El. paštas: beyimbet.mussin@apa.kz

Aygul' Bedelbaevna Kosherbayeva, Ekonomikos mokslų daktarė, Viešojo administravimo akademijos prie Kazachstano Respublikos Prezidento taikomųjų tyrimų instituto direktorė, Kazachstanas

El. paštas: a.kosherbayeva@apa.kz

Nurzhan Kadyrovich Kuandykov, Viešojo administravimo mokslų daktarė, Kazachstano Respublikos finansų ministerijos Valstybinio pajamų komiteto administracijos departamento vadovė, Kazachstanas

El. paštas: n.kuandykov@ie.gov.kz

Salamat Sabitovna Yegeubayeva, Doktorantė, vyresnioji dėstytoja, Almatos technologijų universitetas, Kazachstanas

El. paštas: salamategeub88888888@gmail.com

Zukhra Mussina, Almatos technologijų universiteto, Chemijos, fakulteto, chemijos, cheminės technologijos ir ekologijos katedros vyresnysnioji dėstytoja, mokslų daktarė

El. paštas: muszuhra07@gmail.com



NUOLATINĖS PRIVALOMOSIOS PRADINĖS KARO TARNYBOS KARIŲ POŽIŪRIS Į GRĖSMES NACIONALINIAM SAUGUMUI IR TARNYBOS MOTYVACIJĄ

Gerda Kazlauskienė

Klaipėdos universitetas

H. Manto g. 84, 92294, Klaipėda, Lietuva

<https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppa.23.1.33680>

Anotacija. Straipsnyje analizuojamas nuolatinės privalomosios pradinės karo tarnybos (NPPKT) karių požiūris į grėsmes Lietuvos nacionaliniam saugumui ir NPPKT motyvaciją. Buvo aptariami motyvai, kurie skatina prisijungti prie karinės tarnybos, išskirtina, kad tarnauti jauni žmonės privalomoje karo tarnyboje dažniausiai renkasi dėl individualių motyvų. Atliktos 2018 m. ir 2023 m. reprezentatyvios NPPKT karių apklausos, siekiant palyginti rezultatus. Empiriniai duomenys leidžia teigti, kad 2018 m. ir 2023 m. nepakito NPPKT karių išskirta pagrindinė grėsmė nacionaliniam saugumui – ekonominė grėsmė. Be to, 2023 m. iš dalies padidėjo karinės agresijos grėsmės nacionaliniam saugumui akcentavimas. Išaugus karo grėsmei tikėtinas savanorių ir privalomai pašauktų karių pasiryžimas ginti valstybę, reikšmingai skyręsis 2018 m., 2023 m. nesupanašėjo ir reikšmingai nepadidėjo. 2023 m. reikšmingai padidėjo šauktinių tarnybos motyvacija ir pagerėjo Lietuvos krašto apsaugos pajėgų vertinimas.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: karas, grėsmė, nacionalinis saugumas, nuolatinė privalomoji pradinė karo tarnyba, tarnybos motyvacija.

Keywords: war, threat, national security, permanent compulsory initial military service, service motivation.

Įvadas

Privaloma karo tarnyba yra senas karių verbavimo modelis arba kitaip tariant, sistema – masinėms kariuomenės kurti (Lucassen et al, 1998) įtraukiant žmogiškąjį, intelektualinį, moralinį kapitalą siekiant užtikrinti šalies gynybą (Flynn, 2002). K. Keller su bendraautoriais (2009) privaloma karo tarnyba apibūdina, kaip priverstine tarnyba, kuri verčia jaunos vyrus - o kartais ir moteris – tam tikrą laiką tarnauti kariuomenėje, o B. Ertür (2019) - kaip privalomą tarnybos būdą, kuriuo valstybė legaliai įgauna teisę į tos valstybės piliečių gyvybes, siekiant valstybės apsaugojimo ir tausojimo.

Pasibaigus šaltajam karui, nemažai Europos valstybių sumažino nacionalines karines struktūras, gynybos lėšas ir atsisakė šaukimo, nes vyravo požiūris, kad karo nebebus. Pažymėtina yra tai, kad nors dauguma šalių yra atsisakiusios šauktinių, jos vis dar gali teisėtai įvesti privalomąją karo tarnybą savo piliečiams, nes teisinis statusas daugumoje šalių nebuvo modifikuotas (Ronge et al., 2019). Nepaisant akiivaizdžios karinės „profesionalizacijos bangos“ šalyse, paskutinį dešimtmetį, kaip pažymi S. Strand (2021), privalomoji karo tarnyba vėl „sugrižo“ (ang. *comeback*).

Visgi negalima atmesti realybės, kad iki šiol šaukimas į karo tarnybą kaip priemonė, gali būti naudojama karui pradėti, vystyti ar (pra)laimėti. Verta išskirti, kad nuo 2022 m. vasario 24 d. Rusijos tęsiamoje karinėje invazijoje į Ukrainą, Rusijos kariuomenės sudėtyje buvo ne tik profesionalūs kariai, bet ir šauktiniai, kurių paskirtis ne valstybės saugojimas ar tausojimas, bet ir ribų plėtimas. Reaguodama į Rusijos karą prieš Ukrainą, Latvijos gynybos ministerija paskelbė, kad nuo 2023 m. Latvijoje vėl įvedama privalomoji

karinė tarnyba vyrams (Ministry of Defence Republic of Latvia, 2022). Lenkijoje, Prancūzijoje, Vokietijoje ir kt. šalių viešojoje žiniasklaidoje 2022 m. atsinaujino diskusijos dėl privalomosios karo tarnybos.

Pastebėtina, kad dėl globalizacijos procesų, politikos formavimo, sprendimų priėmimo, įgyvendinimo metodų ir procedūrų, demokratizacijos tendencijų viešajame valdyme, technologinių transformacijų, visuomenės solidarumo ir atvirumo tradicinis privalomosios karo tarnybos formavimas keičiasi. Didesnis dėmesys skiriamas privalomosios karo tarnybos formavimo efektyvumo ir legitimumo klausimams bei tokios tarnybos dalyviams, t. y. piliečių karių poreikiams, lūkesčiams bei tarnybos motyvacijai. G. Grigorov (2018) pastebi tendenciją, kad kariuomenėje laisvų vietų daugėja, pritraukti ir išlaikyti motyvuotus asmenis tampa vis sudėtingiau. O dar didesniu iššūkiu tampa jaunų žmonių pritraukimas į kariuomenę, nes tarnauti tokie žmonės ateina dėl konkrečių tikslų (Österber et al., 2020).

Nemažai mokslininkų analizuoja, kokie motyvai skatina prisijungti prie tarnybos (Brett, 2003; Kleykamp, 2006; Gibson et al., 2007; Griffith, 2008; Elder et al., 2010; Asch et al., 2010; Grigorov, et al. 2018; Helmus et al., 2018). Tarptautinės taikos palaikymo operacijos jau prieš kelis dešimtmečius tapo svarbia ginkluotojų pajėgų darbotvarkės dalimi, todėl dalis motyvacijos tyrimų apima šias studijas su Italijos ginkluotojų pajėgų kareiviais (Battistelli, 1997; Battistelli et al., 1999), Vokietijos (Tomforde, 2005), Slovėnijos (Jelusič, 2007; Juvan et al., 2011); Švedijos (Hedlund, 2011), Kanados (Carroll, 2016), Kinijos (Fang et al. 2018) ir kt. Pažymėtina, kad moksliniuose darbuose išskiriama postmodernistinė tarnybos motyvacija (Hedlund E., 2011, Lyk-Jensen S. V. et al., 2016) ir analizuojama, kokio tipo (pragmatinio ar institucinio) motyvacija dažniausiai būdinga kariams (Griffith 2008). Šalyse su ilgamete demokratinio valdymo praktika dažnai nėra paprasta pritraukti asmenų, kad šie savanoriškai eitų į karo tarnybą, todėl dar didesnis iššūkis tampa karių pritraukimas į privalomą karo tarnybą (Woodruff, 2017).

Lietuvoje grąžinus nuolatinę privalomąją pradinę karo tarnybą (NPPKT), 2015 m. ir 2016 m. į šią tarnybą buvo surinktas pakankamas skaičius savanorių, tačiau nuo 2017 m. tas skaičius pradėjo mažėti, taigi kasmet auga privaloma tvarka šaukiamų asmenų skaičius. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad jaunų asmenų pritraukimas į NPPKT dėl pakitusio grėsmių spektro yra išskirtinės reikšmės, verta paminėti, kad 2022 m. Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės saugumo departamentas ir Antrasis operatyvinių tarnybų departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos krašto apsaugos ministerijos įvertino grėsmes nacionaliniam saugumui. Vertinime teigiama: „Didžiausia potencialiai egzistencinė grėsmė Lietuvai ir kitoms regiono valstybėms yra ir išliks Rusija“. Tai tampa rimtu iššūkiu Rytų ir Vidurio Europai dėl bendradarbiavimo formų siekiant užtikrinti nacionalinį saugumą. Kuriant nacionalinį ir regioninį saugumą svarbu didinti ir užpildyti aktyvųjį Lietuvos kariuomenės rezervą, todėl aktualu skirti dėmesį tarnybos motyvacijai, suvokiant, kad veiksminga motyvacinė sistema yra puiki priemonė, siekiant, kad kariuomenė maksimaliai išnaudotų savo pajėgumus bei palaikytų kovinę parengtį. Lietuvoje šauktinių tarnybos motyvacijos temą analizavo D. Kasiliauskytė (2017); A. Pocienė (2018); G. Baltutytė (2019); Šostakas et al., (2019); M. Trumpickienė et al., (2019); I. Akucevičiūtė et al., (2020) ir kt.

Siekdama įvertinti NPPKT karių požiūrį į grėsmes Lietuvos nacionaliniam saugumui ir nuolatinės privalomosios pradinės karo tarnybos motyvaciją, straipsnio autorė 2018 m. ir 2023 m. atliko reprezentatyvias NPPKT karių apklausas. 2018 m. tyrimo duomenys yra pateikti straipsnyje¹. 2023 m. NPPKT karių apklausa pakartota su tuo pačiu klausimynu siekiant palyginti apklausų rezultatus. Šių metodologiškai palygintų apklausų tikslas – išanalizuoti NPPKT karių požiūrį į grėsmes Lietuvos nacionaliniam saugumui ir tarnybos motyvaciją, atskirai tiriant karius, kurie ją atlieka privaloma tvarka, ir tuos, kurie savanoriškai pasirinko atlikti NPPKT, palyginant 2018 m. ir 2023 m. NPPKT karių požiūrių kaitos tendencijas.

Tyrimo metodologinis pagrindas – kiekybinis tyrimas. Pradedant 2023 m. pakartotinį NPPKT karių požiūrio į grėsmes Lietuvos nacionaliniam saugumui ir nuolatinės privalomosios pradinės karo tarnybos motyvacijos tyrimą, karo Ukrainoje, apskritai karo grėsmės ir Lietuvos kariuomenės pajėgumo stiprinimo

¹ Baltutytė G. (2019). Nuolatinės privalomosios pradinės karo tarnybos karių tarnybos motyvacija: subjektyvus dalyvių vertinimas. *Tiltai*. Vol. 82. No. 1. p. 48–66 (pastaba – keitėsi autorės pavardė).

kontekstuose hipotetiškai tikėtasi: H1: 2018 m. NPPKT karių išskirtą ekonominę grėsmę nacionaliniam saugumui 2023 m. pakeis karinės agresijos grėsmė nacionaliniam saugumui akcentavimas; H2: Savanorių ir privalomai pašauktų karių pasiryžimas ginti valstybę 2023 m. supanašės ir reikšmingai padidės; H3: Padidės 2023 m. šauktinių tarnybos motyvacija; H4 : Pagerės 2023 m. šauktinių Lietuvos krašto apsaugos pajėgų vertinimas.

Straipsnį sudaro trys dalys: pirmoje dalyje aptariama karių motyvacija tarnauti NPPKT, antroje dalyje pristatoma tyrimo metodologija; trečioje – empirinio tyrimo rezultatai. Galiausiai išvadose vertinimas hipotezių (ne)pasitvirtinimas remiantis tyrimo rezultatais.

Karių motyvacija tarnauti nuolatinėje privalomoje pradinėje karo tarnyboje

Lietuvoje atlikti NPPKT pirmiausia šaukiami jaunuoliai (vaikiniai ir merginos), kurie patys pareiškia norą atlikti tarnybą, jei nepakanka savanorių, tada privaloma tvarka šaukiami karo prievolinkai – vyrai. Šiuo metu atsižvelgiant į Lietuvos kariuomenės infrastruktūrą, ginkluotę, personalo galimybes maksimalus šaukiamų NPPKT karių skaičius gali būti iki 4000, užtikrinant minimalius karių išlaikymui ir rengimui keliamus reikalavimus. Be to, nuo 2015-2020 m. esamam NPPKT modeliui sukurti iš išlaikyti išleista jau beveik virš 260 mln. eur. arba kasmet po 6 proc. KAS skiriamų asignavimų (KAM, visuotinė karo prievolės galimybių vertinimo studija, 2021).

2015 m. – 2020 m. (žr. 1 lentelė) laikotarpyje, pagal kompiuterinę programą tarnauti NPPKT buvo pašaukti 189 325 piliečiai, o tarnavo – 20 204 (t.y. 10,6 proc. iš pašauktų atliko tarnybą), iš jų buvo 11 582 – karo prievolinkai, kurie nebuvo įtraukti į kalendorinių metų karo prievolinkų sąrašą, bet kurie

1 lentelė. 2015–2020 m. šaukimo charakteristika Lietuvoje

Metai	KP	T	S	P	N	V	M	NS	A
2015	36825	3010	2133	877	0	2932	78	29%	Apie 4000
2016	30228	3000	2044	956	0	2907	93	34%	Apie 2000
2017	25144	3507	1912	1542	53	3380	127	43%	Apie 5000
2018	27633	3638	1896	1601	141	3519	119	42%	Apie 5000
2019	31068	3697	1789	1618	290	3553	144	49%	Apie 9000
2020	38427	3352	1808	1492	52	3215	137	48%	Apie 20000
Viso:	189 325	20 204	11 582	8086	536	19 506	698	-	-

KP – pašaukti tarnauti, pagal kompiuterinę programą;

T – iš viso tarnavo;

S – karo prievolinkai, kurie nebuvo įtraukti į kalendorinių metų karo prievolinkų sąrašą ir kurie pareiškė norą; atlikti tarnybą

P – karo prievolinkai, esantys kalendorinių metų karo prievolinkų sąrašą ir kurie pareiškė norą atlikti tarnybą;

N – karo prievolinkai, esantys kalendorinių metų karo prievolinkų sąrašą ir šaukiami atlikti tarnybą privalomai;

V – vyrai;

M – moterys;

NS – Netinkami dėl sveikatos;

A – Atidėta tarnyba dėl kitų priežasčių (mokymasis, tėvystė ir pan.)

Šaltinis: sudaryta autorės, remiantis karo prievolės komplektavimo skyriaus pateiktais duomenimis²

² Duomenys gauti iš karo prievolės komplektavimo skyriaus, buvo straipsnio autorės pateikta užklausa el. paštu.

pareiškė norą atlikti tarnybą; 8086 – karo prievolinkai, esantys kalendorinių metų karo prievolinkų sąraše ir kurie pareiškė norą atlikti tarnybą; 536 - karo prievolinkai, esantys kalendorinių metų karo prievolinkų sąraše ir šaukiami atlikti tarnybą privalomai, tarnavo 19 506 – vyriškos ir 698 – moteriškos lyties prievolinkų. Taip pat 1 lentelėje pastebėtina, kad beveik kiekvienais metais netinkamų dėl sveikatos būklės skaičius didėja (2015 m. buvo 29 proc. netinkami dėl sveikatos, o 2020 m. – 48 proc.), tendencingai auga ir piliečių skaičius, kuriems atidėta tarnyba dėl tam tikrų priežasčių (2015 m. apie 4000 atvejų, o 2020 m. - 20 000). Visgi teigiama tai, kad stebint duomenis nuo 2015-2020 m. išryškėja, kad savanoriškai ateinančių piliečių į privalomą karo tarnybą yra nemaža dalis.

Galima pastebėti, kad Lietuvoje sugrąžinus privalomą karo tarnybą pasireiškė savanorystės „bumas“. Tiek 2015 m., tiek 2016 m. nereikėjo karo prievolinkų, kurie būtų kalendorinių metų karo prievolinkų sąraše ir būtų šaukiami atlikti tarnybą privalomai. Tačiau visgi negalima praleisti to, kad tais metais netoli 1000 asmenų buvo kalendorinių metų karo prievolinkų sąraše ir kurie pareiškė norą atlikti tarnybą. Visgi ne paslaptis, kad labiausiai tai sietina su piniginėmis išmokomis, kurios esant savanorio-prievolinko statuse yra didesnės. Visgi vėlesniais metais (t.y. 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020) savanorių ir prievolinkų skaičius išlieka panašus ir neviršija 2000. Todėl kyla klausimas, gal tai pilietinės visuomenės apraiška?

Nedetalizuojant pilietinės visuomenės apibrėžties, o atsakant į klausimą remiamasi nuoseklus tyrinėtojo V. Laurėno (2017) atlikta analize apie pilietinę visuomenę, kur konstatuojama, kad pilietinės visuomenės konstravimas Lietuvoje išlieka silpnas ir tegali būti lydimas pačios nesisteminės pilietinės visuomenės perkūros būtinybės konstatavimo. Valstybės gynybos klausimas analizuojamas ir visuomenės nuomonės tyrimuose. Remiantis reprezentatyviu Lietuvos visuomenės nuomonės tyrimu „Geopolitikos ir tarptautinės politikos bei grėsmių suvokimo tyrimas“ (2020), pažymima, kad 58 proc. respondentų teigė, jog grėsmės akivaizdoje, negalėdami priešintis ginklu, priešintųsi kitu būdu, o 32 proc. respondentų teigė, kad esant reikalui prisidėtų prie šalies gynybos ginklu (Kojala et al., 2020). „Pilietinės galios indekso 2022“ apklausa parodė, kad jei Lietuva būtų užpulta kitos šalies, 50 proc. Lietuvos gyventojų yra nusiteikę ginti Lietuvą ginklu ar kitais būdais, 13 proc. nusiteikę pasitraukti iš Lietuvos, 15 proc. laikytųsi nuošalyje, o likusieji 22 proc. nežinojo arba neatsakė, kaip elgtųsi tokioje situacijoje. Atsakymai į šį klausimą gana ryškiai skyrėsi pagal lytį – vyrai gerokai dažniau linkę ginti šalį ginklu, o moterys labiau linkusios laikytis nuošalyje arba pasitraukti iš Lietuvos. Taigi atsižvelgiant į skirtingus autorius visgi sunku vienareikšmiškai teigti ar atmesti mintį, kad piliečiai ateinantys tarnauti į privalomą karo tarnybą savanoriškai tampa pilietinės visuomenės atspindžiu, nes iš minėtų tyrimų galime pastebėti, kad tik pusę piliečių gintų valstybę ginklu.

Klausimas, kokios priemonės būtų veiksmingos pritraukiant, išlaikant ir plėtojant privalomos karo tarnybos karių motyvaciją (atsižvelgiant į turimus kaštus, praktiškumo sumetimus ir svarbiausius uždavinius, kuriuos būtina spręsti ir t. t.), - sudėtingas, nes susijęs su tam tikra „privaloma“ elgsena, kuri gali varijuoti nuo pasyvios iki aktyvios tarnybos. Visgi savanoriai gali atlikti svarbų vaidmenį sprendžiant privalomosios karo tarnybos motyvacijos iššūkius. Savanoriai, kurie yra pasiruošę savanoriškai atlikti karo tarnybą, gali pateikti vertingų pastebėjimų ir pasiūlymų, kaip pagerinti privalomosios karo tarnybos patrauklumą ir veiksmingumą. Todėl svarbu užtikrinti, kad savanoriai turėtų galimybę teikti pasiūlymus ir kad jų dalyvavimas būtų tikrai vertinamas.

I. Akucevičiūtės ir kt. (2020) atliktas tyrimas atskleidė, kad šauktiniais savanoriais į Lietuvos kariuomenę daugiau linkę ateiti patriotiškai nusiteikę jaunuoliai, dar neturintys įsipareigojimų šeimai, mokslams ir profesinei veiklai. Esminiai savanoriškos tarnybos aspektai – žinoti, kaip elgtis karinės grėsmės atveju, noras išmokti ką nors nauja, siekti savirealizacijos. Taip pat atsižvelgus į A. Pocienės (2018), G. Baltutytytės (2019), M. Trumpickienė ir kt. (2019) atliktus tyrimus galima teigti, kad savanoriškai NPPKT tarnybą asmenys renkasi dažniausiai dėl patirties ar noro įveikti iššūkius, tobulėti. Akivaizdu, kad motyvai prisijungti prie tarnybos nereiškia, kad kariai bus motyvuoti visą tarnybos laiką, tačiau karinės sistemos kuriama karių motyvavimo sistema, gali tarnybos motyvaciją „palaikyti“ arba „smukdyti“. Tai leidžia teigti, kad labai svarbi sąveika tarp kario ir karinės sistemos, kuriai išlieka atsakomybė ir pareiga ieškoti tarnybos motyvacijos užtikrinimo galimybių, kad karys pasiektų laukiamą rezultatą.

R. Gal (2016), kuris tyrinėja jaunų izraeliečių karo tarnybos motyvaciją, išskiria: *išgyvenimo motyvacija*, kuri atsiranda tada, kai nėra kitos išeities, kaip tik prisijungti prie kariuomenės ir kovoti; *ideologine motyvacija*, kuri remiasi tautine tapatybe bei kova dėl vertybių ir nebūtinai yra susijusi su egzistencinės grėsmės jausmu; *normatyvine motyvacija*, kuri pasireiškia tuo, kad asmenys daro tai, kas laikoma priimtina, įprasta, teisėta pagal visuomenės socialines normas; *individualistine motyvacija*, kuri remiasi savirealizacijos poreikiu. Nors išvardytos motyvacijos yra skirtingos, tačiau asmenys gali ir neturėti aiškios motyvacijos, motyvai gali būti persipynę, nes motyvacija iš esmės yra subjektyvi. Tačiau mokslinėje literatūroje vis didesnis dėmesys skiriamas kario tarnybos individualistinei motyvacijai (Wish, 2014; Helmus et al, 2018; Horval, 2020; ir kt.), kuri padeda nustatyti karinės tarnybos pasirinkimo veiksnius bei tarnybos nutraukimo riziką didinančius faktorius. Motyvacija nėra pastovi būseną, dėl kintamumo ją reikia periodiškai papildyti. Tiek motyvacijos teorija, tiek praktika remiasi nuostata, kad motyvacija gali „išsisklaidyti“ (Žapatorius, 2007). Taigi svarbu atkreipti dėmesį į tai, kas gali didinti tarnybos motyvaciją (įsipareigojimas, tarnybos prasmės jausmas, žinojimas, kad galima kreiptis pagalbos, kai prireiks, noras būti kompetetingam, noras daryti pažangą, sunkumų priėmimas esamoje padėtyje, teigiama kolektyvinė atmosfera) ar ją mažinti („visada budėti“, būti pasiruošusiam, nuolatinis poreikis prisitaikyti, išsiskyrimas su šeima, ekstremalus fiziniai iššūkiai, intensyvūs psichiniai iššūkiai, užduočių atlikimo skubumas, savo „erdvės“ neturėjimas, neigiama kolektyvinė atmosfera) (Military Motivation: Special Challenges And Techniques, 2022).

Oficialioje internetinėje svetainėje *Karys.lt* pateikiamos penkios svarbiausios priežastys, dėl kurių skatinama pasirinkti tarnybą šauktiniams Lietuvos kariuomenėje: *pareiga* (ginti, tuos kurie negali apsiginti patys, kovoti už laisvę bei vertybes); *veiksmas* (neįprastos užduotys ir patirtys); *tobulėjimas* (asmeninis ir naujų įgūdžių ugdymas); *draugai* (bendrytės jausmas, kreiptis pagalbos, kai prireiks); *atlygis* (mokamos atlyginimas (išmokos), nemokamas maitinimas, nemokamos sveikatos priežiūros paslaugos, socialinės garantijos). Palyginimui galima išskirti ir užsienio autorių išskirtas pagrindines 5 motyvų grupes, kurios skatina prisijungti prie karinės tarnybos: *asmeniniai motyvai*: savirealizacija, pripažinimas ir teisingas vertinimas, galimybė siekti karjeros, kokybiška komunikacija, teigiamas psichologinis klimatas, būti valstybės dalimi, tarnauti ir būti naudingam Tėvynės apsaugai, išmokti drausmės; *kultūriniai motyvai*: socialinės vertybės (jėgos, galios, dominavimo), socialinės vertybės dėl lyties ir šeimos, viešasis diskursas; *socialiniai motyvai*: demografinis elgesio modelis, ekonominiai faktoriai, šeimos tradicijos tarnauti, nedarbas; *politiniai motyvai*: nacionalinė saugumo situacija, civiliniai kariniai santykiai, politinė ideologija, viešoji politika dėl rasės, lyčių, seksualinės orientacijos ir pan., pilietiškumo realizavimas; *kariniai motyvai*: kariuomenės tikslai ir funkcijos, karinė ideologija, kariuomenės technologijos, organizacinė struktūra, kariuomenės didėjimo politika, tarptautinės operacijos (Elder et al., 2010; Grigorov, et al. 2018; Helmus et al., 2018). Teigtina, kad tiek Lietuvos internetinėje svetainėje, tiek užsienio autorių išskirti motyvai turi panašumų, nors pastarieji detalesni.

Galiausiai, ar tai privaloma karo tarnyba, ar ne, bet tai, ką pilietis daro dėl socialinių lūkesčių, spaudimo, terminų ar malonumo tampa varomuoju veiksniu arba kitaip tariant - motyvacija (Pawinski et al., 2019). Veiksminga tarnybos motyvavimo sistema yra puiki priemonė, siekiant karinei institucijai maksimaliai išnaudoti savo pajėgumus ir palaikyti kovinę parengtį, todėl tyrinėti karinės tarnybos motyvus itin aktualu, juolab, kad šiuolaikiniam kariui reikšminga individualistinė motyvacija, kai patenkinami tam tikri asmeniniai poreikiai, lūkesčiai. Karinė tarnyba savaime nenulemia motyvuotos tarnybos galimybių, todėl tęstinė tarnybos motyvacijos stebėseną svarbi kintamumui vertinti. Toliau pateikiami tyrimo rezultatai remiasi taikos meto NPPKT karių tarnybos motyvacija.

Tyrimo metodologija

Kiekybiniam tyrimui atlikti naudojama anketinė apklausa. Kiekybinio tyrimo metodai yra objektyvūs, validūs, nes padeda tiksliai išanalizuoti dinaminis ir statistinius dėsningumus bei vertinti ryšius tarp įvairių kintamųjų (Kardelis, 2017).

Išskirtina, kad kariuomenė yra uždara institucija civiliams, todėl pirmiausia tyrimui atlikti buvo gauti dviejų Lietuvos batalionų, Sausumos pajėgų vadų, leidimai. Batalione kariai pildė popierines anketas suplanuotu laisvu laiku, siekiant netrukdyti įprastai kario dienos rutinai ir mokymui bei buvo svarbu skirti pakankamai laiko kariams įsigilinti į jiems pateiktus anketų klausimus. Apklausos metu respondentams anketos buvo išdalintos straipsnio autorės. Respondentai pažymėdami jiems tinkantį atsakymą užpildė anketas. Užpildytos anketos buvo kruopščiai patikrintos, siekiant įsitikinti, ar atsakyta į visus klausimus taip, kaip buvo prašoma, ir ar suprato respondentai, ko jų klausama. Neužpildytos anketos iki galo arba klaidingai užpildytos buvo atmetos ir į tyrimo rezultatus nebuvo įtraukiamos.

Tyrimo duomenų statistiniai analizėi atlikti buvo naudojama SPSS (angl. *Statistical Package for Social Science*) programos 24.0 versija. Naudoti šie duomenų analizės būdai:

1. Aprašomoji statistika (dažnių lentelės, duomenų padėties charakteristikos). Dažnių lentelės naudotos, siekiant pamatyti respondentų atsakymų pasiskirstymą. Nominalūs kintamieji gauti procentais ir dažniais. Iš duomenų padėties charakteristikų naudotas vidurkis ir standartinis nuokrypis ($m \pm SD$), minimali ir maksimali reikšmė.
2. Lyginimai tarp populiacijos grupių (χ^2 testas). Metodas naudotas ieškant nominalių kintamųjų pasiskirstymo skirtumų tarp populiacijos grupių (χ^2 testas). Reikšmingumas $p \leq 0,05$.

Šauktinių apklausa buvo atliekama 2018 m. kovo mėn. ir 2023 m. vasario mėn. Skirtingų metų šauktinių grupės tyrimo metu tarnavo NPPKT daugiau nei 5 mėnesius. Remiantis mokslo informacijos šaltiniais (C. F. Rodrigues – Goulart, 2006; J. Palidauskienė, 2007; J. Griffith, 2008; E. Vileikienė et al., 2015; A. Petrauskaitė et al., 2016; Kasiliauskytė, D. 2017 et al.) autorės parengtas klausimynas NPPKT kariams. Tyrimo instrumentą sudarė 30 uždaro ir atviro tipo klausimų. Šiame straipsnyje analizuojama tik dalis pateikto klausimyno.

Tyrimo tikslui įgyvendinti imtis sudaryta taikant reprezentatyvią netikimybinę patogiąją atranką, kai pagrindinių požymių pasiskirstymas atitinka populiaciją. Imties dydžio nustatymas apskaičiuotas pagal I. Paniotto formulę.

Krašto apsaugos ministerijos duomenimis, 2018 m. iš viso NPPKT atliko 3638 asmenys, o 2023 m. planuojama buvo pakviesti 3800 asmenų. Remiantis I. Paniotto formule bei pritaikius 95 proc. patikimumo lygmenį ir 5 proc. paklaidą, apskaičiuota, jog reprezentatyvią imtį turėtų sudaryti 2018 m. – 348 respondentai, 2023 m. – 349 respondentai.

Tyrimo dalyvavo 901 respondentas, didžiąją daugumą respondentų (2018 m. – 95,46 proc., 2023 m. – 97,2 proc.) sudarė vyrai (V) (žr. 2 lentelę). Pagal atėjimo į tarnybą pabūdį respondentai sudarė 2 grupes, t. y. NPPKT kariai, tarnaujantys savanoriškai (SAV) (2018 m. 60,9 proc., 2023 m. 58,1 proc.) ir NPPKT kariai, tarnaujantys kaip prievolinkai (PRIE) (2018 m. 39,1 proc., 2023 m. 41,9 proc.). Pagal amžių 2018 m. daugiau nei pusę (54 proc.) sudarė 22–26 metų kariai, o 2023 m. daugiau nei pusę (51 proc.) sudarė kariai

2 lentelė. Demografiniai duomenys

	Imtis	Lytis		Šauktinis		Amžius			Išsilavinimas			
		V.	M.	SAV.	PRIE.	iki 21	22-26	nuo 27	Vid.	Prof.	Neun.	Univ.
2018	507	484	23	309	198	219	274	14	276	170	34	27
	100 %	95,46%	4,54%	60,9%	39,1%	43,2%	54,0%	2,8%	54,5%	33,5%	6,7%	5,3%
2023	394	384	10	229	165	201	187	6	260	91	20	23
	100 %	97,2%	2,8%	58,1%	41,9%	51,0%	47,5%	1,5%	66%	23,1%	5,1%	5,8%
Iš viso	901	868	33	538	363	420	461	20	536	261	54	50

Šaltinis: sudaryta autorės

iki 21 metų amžiaus. Skirstant respondentus pagal išsilavinimą, daugiausia (2018 m. 54,5 proc., 2023 m. 66 proc.) yra baigę vidurinę mokyklą.

Atliekant kiekybinį tyrimą, buvo laikomasi bendrųjų etikos principų, tokių kaip: anonimiškumas, savanoriškumas, konfidencialumas, sąžiningumas, informuoto asmens sutikimas, teisė į tikslios informacijos suteikimą.

2018 m. ir 2023 m. tyrimo rezultatai ir jų lyginamoji analizė

Taikliu ir sąmojingiu, bet ganėtinai rimtu B. Buzan (1997) pastebėjimu, grėsmių spektras nėra tik normalios valstybės opūs formavimosi iššūkiai, nes gali sukelti resursų švaistymą, tapti paranoja, agresyvia politika ar rimta deformacija šalies vidaus ir išorės politiniame gyvenime. Todėl pirmas žingsnis užtikrinant nacionalinį saugumą – atskleisti grėsmes, dėl kurių šiandieniniam nacionaliniam saugumui iškilęs pavojus. Sustiprėjus realios grėsmės pojūčiui dėl agresyvių Rusijos Federacijos veiksmų, Lietuva koregavo savo ginkluotąsias pajėgas (Ivanauskas, 2016). Todėl kyla klausimas, kokios NPPKT požiūriu grėsmės yra iškilusios nacionaliniam Lietuvos saugumui (respondentų prašyta pažymėti tris, jų požiūriu, svarbiausius atsakymus) (rezultatai matomi 3 lentelėje).

3 lentelė. Požiūrių pasiskirstymas dėl grėsmių Lietuvos nacionaliniam saugumui

Grėsmės	2018 Iš viso	2023 Iš viso	2018 SAV.	2023 SAV.	χ^2	p	2018 PRIE.	2023 PRIE.	χ^2	p
Karinės	36,9%	54,3%	40,1%	54,1%	10,403	0,002	31,8%	54,5%	19,065	0,000
Politinės	63,9%	43,9%	64,1%	45,4%	18,604	0,000	63,6%	41,8%	17,233	0,000
Ekonominės	75,7%	64,7%	71,5%	62,9%	9,301	0,003	76,8%	67,3%	4,065	0,046
Socialinės	51,1%	29,4%	46,9%	28,8%	18,085	0,000	57,6%	30,3%	27,028	0,000
Ekologinės	11,4%	17,3%	11,7%	17,9%	4,194	0,046	11,1%	16,4%	2,127	0,166
Energetinės	14,4%	19,5%	13,3%	18,3%	2,593	0,117	16,2%	21,2%	1,525	0,225
Informacinės	32,9%	22,1%	35,6%	20,5%	14,463	0,000	28,8%	24,2%	0,950	0,343
Nežino	4,3%	18,0%	4,2%	19,7%	32,614	0,000	4,5%	15,8%	12,986	0,001

Šaltinis: sudaryta autorės

Atliekant tyrimą nustatyta, kad 2018 m. NPPKT karių požiūriu, yra šios pagrindinės grėsmės: ekonominės (75,7 proc.), politinės (63,9 proc.), socialinės (51,1 proc.), 2023 m. išskiriamos šios: ekonominės (64,7 proc.), karinės (54,3 proc.), politinės (43,9 proc.). Ryškus skirtumas, kad 2018 m. karinę grėsmę pažymėjo daugiau nei trečdalis (36,9 proc.), o 2023 m. daugiau nei pusė (54,3 proc.) respondentų, tačiau dominuojanti grėsmė tiek 2018 m., tiek 2023 m. išlieka ekonominė grėsmė. Paradoksalu, kad NPPKT kariai buvo pakviesti pagal prievolinkų sąrašus arba atėjo į Lietuvos kariuomenę atlikti 9 mėnesių tarnybą savarankiškai tik todėl, kad buvo didinama ir stiprinama Lietuvos kariuomenė, mišriu principu, siekiant parengti aktyvųjį kariuomenės rezervą, nes Lietuvai iškilo konvencinė karinė grėsmė, tačiau tiek 2018 m., tiek 2023 m. kariai kaip didžiausią grėsmę išskyrė ekonominę.

O. G. Rakauskienė ir L. Volodzkienė monografijoje „Ekonominė nelygybė: normali ar perteklinė?“ (2021, p.10) teigia, kad „didėjanti visuomenės poliarizacija, kai nėra vidurinės klasės arba ji labai maža, – ypatinga Lietuvos ekonominio nuosmukio priežastis, reikalaujanti valstybės dėmesio. Šis reiškinys skatina socialinę įtampą visuomenėje, visuomenės kataklizmus – socialines grėsmes, emigraciją ir gali sutrikdyti

ekonomikos vystymąsi. <...> Pernetų didelę pajamų diferenciacija Lietuvoje – viena pačių opiausių šalies problemų“. Ekonominės grėsmės yra susipynusios su kitais saugumo aspektais, todėl šauktinių išskirta ekonominė grėsmė leidžia daryti prielaidą, kad nėra tinkamai užtikrinamas atskiros asmens ekonominis saugumas, o galbūt nėra užtikrinama ir valstybės mastu.

Toliau karių buvo klausama, ar eitų ginti Lietuvos, jeigu jai kiltų karinė grėsmė. Šį klausimą analizuojant išskirtina, kad 2018 m. dauguma NPPKT atliekančių karių teigė, kad gintų (59 proc.), beveik ketvirtadalis (23,5 proc.) neturi nuomonės ir beveik penktadalis (17,5 proc.) sakė, kad negintų; 2023 m. dauguma (62 proc.) teigė, kad gintų, ketvirtadalis (25 proc.) neturi nuomonės ir truputį daugiau nei dešimtadalis (13 proc.) pasisakė, kad negintų. Lyginant šio tyrimo metu apklaustus karius, kurie NPPKT atlieka privalomąją tvarką, ir tuos, kurie savanoriškai pasirinko atlikti NPPKT, rezultatai pasiskirstė taip: daugiau nei pusė (67,6 proc.) 2018 m. savanorių teigė, kad, iškilus karo grėsmei Lietuvą gintų, panašiai teigė ir 2023 m. savanoriai (73,8 proc.). Tačiau Lietuvą gintų kiek mažiau nei pusė (45,7 proc.) 2018 m. prievolinkų bei 2023 m. prievolinkų (47,3 proc.). Visa ši analizė atspindi tai, kad nuo 2018 iki 2023 metų karių pasirengimas ginti Lietuvą atitinkamai augo, ypač tarp savanorių, ir šis pokytis turi statistinę reikšmę.

Toliau prasminga tirti karių siekių ginti valstybę išlikimą, o ir kaitą, analizuojant tarnybos motyvaciją apskritai. Analizuojant NPPKT karių motyvus tarnauti, buvo paprašyta nurodyti priežastis, kodėl jie tarnauja (žr. 4 lentelė). Nustatyta, kad 2018 m. duomenimis, dažniausiai NPPKT atliekantys kariai tarnavo todėl, kad norėjo įgyti karinių žinių ir praktikos (35,9 proc.), o 2023 m. todėl, kad buvo pašaukti į NPPKT (39,3 proc.). Pažymėtina tai, kad 2018 m. beveik pusė (49,8 proc.) ir 2023 m. beveik pusė (44,5 proc.) savanorių tarnavo dėl noro įgyti karinių žinių ir praktikos (statistinio ryšio tarp skirtingų tarnybos metų ir savanorių nebuvo). 2018 m. dauguma (75,3 proc.) prievolinkų tarnavo, nes buvo pašaukti, taip pat ir 2023 m. didžioji dalis (85,5 proc.) prievolinkų tarnavo dėl tos pačios priežasties (pastebimas statistinis ryšys tarp skirtingų tarnybos metų ir prievolinkų).

Karių, atliekančių NPPKT, buvo klausama, ar jie yra patenkinti atėję tarnauti į Lietuvos kariuomenę. Didelė dalis 2018 m. savanorių teigė, kad yra patenkinti (43 proc.) arba nei patenkinti, nei nepatenkinti (41,4 proc.), ir tik daugiau nei dešimtadalis sakė, kad nepatenkinti (15,6 proc.). Beveik pusė 2023 m. savanorių (42,4 proc.) teigė, kad yra patenkinti arba nei patenkinti, nei nepatenkinti (42,8 proc.), ir tik daugiau nei dešimtadalis sakė, kad yra nepatenkinti (14,8 proc.) atėję tarnauti. Beveik pusė 2018 m. prievolinkų teigė esantys nei patenkinti, nei nepatenkinti (47,5 proc.) atėję tarnauti, daugiau nei trečdalis (39,4 proc.)

4 lentelė. Pasirinktos priežastys, kodėl tarnauja NPPKT

	2018 Viso	2023 Viso	2018 SAV.	2023 SAV.	χ^2	P	2018 PRIE.	2023 PRIE.	χ^2	P
Dėl noro ginti Tėvynę	6,7%	12,7%	9,4%	19,1%	12,557	0,001	2,5%	2,4%	0,004	1,000
Dėl karinių žinių, praktikos	35,9%	27,7%	49,8%	44,5%	3,692	0,066	15,7%	8,5%	4,262	0,054
Realizuoti save	13,4%	9,1%	19,4%	13,7%	1,546	0,253	4%	0,6%	4,390	0,044
Patriotizmas	6,1%	6,6%	9,4%	9,6%	0,008	1,000	1%	2,4%	1,107	0,417
Tinkamas užmokestis	3,2%	2,3%	4,5%	3,5%	0,361	0,662	1%	0,6%	0,179	1,000
Nedarbas	2%	2,3%	2,9%	3,9%	0,421	0,629	0,5%	0%	0,836	1,000
Pašauktas į NPPKT	32,7%	39,3%	4,6%	5,7%	0,145	0,856	75,3%	85,5%	7,465	0,007

nepatenkinti ir truputį daugiau nei dešimtdalis, kad patenkinti (13,1 proc.); 2023 m. didžioji dalis jų buvo nei patenkinti, nei nepatenkinti (40,9 proc.), trečdalis nepatenkinti (35,4 proc.) ir ketvirtadalis patenkinti (23,8 proc.). Kitaip tariant, tyrimo rezultatai leidžia teigti, kad 2018 m. ir 2023 m. didesnė dalis savanorių buvo patenkinti atėję tarnauti, o 2018 m. ir 2023 m. didesnė dalis prievolinkų buvo nei patenkinti, nei nepatenkinti, kad atėjo tarnauti, tačiau reikšmingas skirtumas yra tas, kad 2023 m. didesnis prievolinkų skaičius nurodė, kad yra patenkinti atėję į tarnybą.

Karių buvo paprašyta, kad jie prisimintų savo pirmąjį įspūdį apie tarnybą ir nurodytų, kaip ją vertina dabar. 2018 m. savanoriai tarnybą dažniausiai vertina blogiau nei tikėjosi (37,5 proc.), o 2023 m. savanorių požiūris keitėsi ir dauguma jų pažymėjo, kad tarnybą vertina taip gerai, kaip ir tikėjosi (37,1 proc.). Analizuojant prievolinkų atsakymus, matyti, kad 2018 m. daugiausia vertino blogiau nei tikėjosi (41,6 proc.), o 2023 m. geriau nei tikėjosi (33,9 proc.). Pokytis tarp 2018 m. ir 2023 m. respondentų tarnybos vertinimo yra, slinktis matyti 2023 m., nes karinė tarnyba tais metais buvo įvertinta geriau.

Be kario pastangų ir indėlio, karinėje sistemoje neįmanoma efektyviai įvykdyti užsibrėžtų tikslų, todėl tarnybos motyvacijos didinimas svarbus pačiai karinei struktūrai (Elder et al., 2010; Aydiner et al., 2019), nes įdarbinti arba savanoriškai pasirinkę tarnybą kariai ilgai be tinkamos tarnybos motyvacijos neišsilaiko tarnybos vietoje, o tai lemia tarnybos nestabilumą, fragmentiškumą, trumpalaikiškumą, neveiksmingumą (Eighmey, 2006). Šio tyrimo respondentai, t. y. dauguma savanorių 2018 m. (88,3 proc.) ir 2023 m. (87,3 proc.) bei didžioji dalis prievolinkų 2018 m. (76,3 proc.) ir 2023 m. (77,4 proc.) taip pat pabrėžia, kad kario motyvavimas yra būtinas ir tik gerai motyvuotas karys siekia ir pasiekia gerų rezultatų.

Palyginę 2018 m. ir 2023 m. respondentų atsakymus, matome, kad Lietuvos kariuomenės karių pasitenkinimas tarnybos motyvavimo sistema padidėjo. Statistiškai reikšmingai kito pasitenkinimas tarp savanorių (2018 m. patenkinti buvo 5,5 proc., 2023 m. – 11,4 proc.) ir prievolinkų (2018 m. patenkinti buvo 4,5 proc., 2023 m. – 13,3 proc.). Tiesa, pažymėtina, kad nors respondentų pasitenkinimas augo, visgi 2023 m. tik truputį daugiau nei dešimtdalis savanorių (11,4 proc.) ir prievolinkų (13,3 proc.) yra patenkinti esama dabartine motyvavimo sistema. Tokią situaciją galima lemti šios bendrai 2018 m. ir 2023 m. respondentų išskirtos priežastys: kartais skatinami ne tie kariai, kurie nusipelno (33,2 proc.), netobula skatinimo sistema (25,1 proc.), ne visada aišku, už ką skatinama (18 proc.), gaunami tik padėkos raštai, kurie nieko verti (15 proc.), kita (8,7 proc.).

NPPKT kariai, atsižvelgiant į jų tarnybos vertinimą, skatinami pinigėmis išmokomis, rezultatai vertinami labai gerai, gerai, arba patenkinamai (Karys.lt), tačiau toks vertinimas apriboja galimybes realiai įvertinti kario tarnybą dėl menko pasirinkimo, nes, kariui tik iš dalies dalyvaujant kariniuose mokymuose arba tarnybą vykdant atmetinai, jis bus įvertintas patenkinamai. Toks šiuo metu egzistuojantis skatinimo modelis gali neigiamai veikti karių motyvaciją bei daryti neigiamą įtaką NPPKT rezultatams, todėl aktuariai išsiaiškinti, ar NPPKT atliekantys kariai jaučiasi motyvuoti siekti gerų rezultatų.

Dėl motyvacijos siekti gerų rezultatų tarnyboje respondentų požiūriai išsiskyrė: 2018 m. pusė (49,8 proc.) savanorių nei jautėsi, nei nesijautė motyvuoti, trečdalis (32 proc.) jautėsi motyvuoti ir beveik penktadalis (18,2 proc.) nesijautė motyvuoti; 2023 m. pusė (50,2 proc.) savanorių jautėsi motyvuoti, trečdalis (36,2 proc.) jautėsi nei motyvuoti, nei nemotyvuoti ir truputį daugiau nei dešimtdalis (13,6 proc.) jautėsi nemotyvuoti; dauguma 2018 m. prievolinkų (42,9 proc.) jautėsi nei motyvuoti, nei nemotyvuoti, daugiau nei trečdalis (39,8 proc.) – nemotyvuoti, o motyvuoti buvo beveik penktadalis (17,3 proc.) prievolinkų; 2023 m. didžioji dalis prievolinkų (45,5 proc.) jautėsi nei motyvuoti, nei nemotyvuoti, beveik trečdalis (29,7 proc.) – motyvuoti ir ketvirtadalis (24,8 proc.) – nemotyvuoti. Vertinant šiuos rezultatus pastebima tendencija, kad tiek savanoriai, tiek prievolinkai 2023 m. jautėsi labiau motyvuoti siekti gerų tarnybos rezultatų nei 2018 m. apklausti kariai. Atliekantys NPPKT kariai (savanoriai ir prievolinkai) 2018 m. išskyrė, kad labiausiai tarnybos motyvaciją mažina neracionalus tarnybos organizavimas (27,4 proc.), tai, kad tarnyba neįdomi (17,1 proc.), per mažas užmokestis (17,2 proc.), o 2023 m. išskiria: per žemas užmokestis (26,4 proc.), tarnyba reikalauja didelės nervinės įtampos (16,5 proc.) ir nera-

cionalus tarnybos organizavimas (16,2 proc.). Be to, 2018 m. ir 2023 m. NPPKT atliekantys kariai teigė, kad tarnautų geriau, jei tarnyba teiktų malonumą (32,2 proc.) arba jei tarnybos krūvis atitiktų užmokestį (23,1 proc.). Kaip maloniausią nematerialių tarnybos skatinimo būdą kariai išskyrė laisvadienį (74,5 proc.).

Reikšmingai keitėsi NPPKT atliekančių karių Lietuvos krašto apsaugos pajėgų vertinimas: 2018 m. dažniausiai tiek savanoriai (46,6 proc.), tiek prievolinkai (44,9 proc.) krašto apsaugos pajėgas vertino patenkinamai, o 2023 m. dažniausiai tiek savanoriai (62 proc.), tiek prievolinkai (49,7 proc.) vertino gerai.

Lietuvos Krašto apsaugos ministerija (2022 m.) pažymi, kad 22 proc. NPPKT atlikusių karių pasirašo profesinės karo tarnybos sutartis. Šio tyrimo duomenys atskleidžia, kad 2018 m. tarnybą profesinėje karo tarnyboje planavo tęsti 28,8 proc. savanorių ir 7,1 proc. prievolinkų, o 2023 m. – 28,4 proc. savanorių ir 8,1 proc. prievolinkų.

Išvados

Nors moksliniuose tyrimuose vyrauja akcentas, kad sudėtinga standartizuoti visus karių poreikius tarnyboje, nes pati tarnyba yra susijusi su specifine paskirtimi ir veikla, nuosekliai siekiama: (a) pagrįsti 5 motyvų grupių (asmeniniai, kultūriniai, socialiniai, politiniai, kariniai) prieigą, atkreipiant dėmesį į tai, kad karinės institucijos ir politinė valdžia, atsižvelgdama į išskirtus motyvus ir juos „įgalindama“, gali daryti (ne)tiesioginį poveikį piliečių nuostatoms ir paskatinti arba atgrasyti piliečių aktyvumą tarnauti, (b) pabrėžti, kad šiuolaikiniam kariui aktuali individualistinė motyvacija (remiasi savirealizacijos poreikiu), kuri mokslinėje literatūroje identifikuojama kaip viena iš svarbiausių sąlygų norint motyvuotai išlaikyti karį tarnyboje.

Empiriniai duomenys leidžia teigti, kad hipotezė H1 – 2018 m. NPPKT karių išskirtą ekonominę grėsmę nacionaliniam saugumui 2023 m. pakeis karinės agresijos grėsmės nacionaliniam saugumui akcentavimas – nepasitvirtino. NPPKT atliekantys kariai 2018 m. ir 2021 m. kaip svarbiausią Lietuvos nacionaliniam saugumui iškilusią grėsmę įvardijo ekonominę grėsmę. Tačiau yra ir tam tikras skirtumas – 2023 m. didesnis (statistiškai reikšmingas) skaičius nei 2018 m. NPPKT atliekančių karių išskyrė karinę grėsmę. Taigi verta pabrėžti, kad nors tarnybos motyvacija taikos ir išaugusios karo grėsmės metu teoriniame modelyje skiriasi, tačiau tirtų NPPKT karių karo grėsmės realumo suvokimas savotiškai „vėluoja“.

Hipotezėje H2 tikėtasi, kad NPPKT savanorių ir privalomai pašauktų karių pasiryžimas 2023 m. ginti valstybę išaugusios karo grėsmės metu supanašės ir reikšmingai padidės, tačiau reikšmingų skirtumų, palyginti su 2018 m. gautais duomenimis, nėra. Išlieka tendencija, kad iškilus karinei grėsmei, tiek 2018 m., tiek ir 2023 m. duomenimis, savanoriai labiau nei prievolinkai pasiryžę ginti Lietuvą.

Pasitvirtino hipotezė H3: tiek savanoriai, tiek prievolinkai 2023 m. jaučiasi labiau motyvuoti siekti gerų tarnybos rezultatų nei 2018 m. apklausti kariai. Kokie veiksniai galėjo turėti įtakos tam, galime tik apsvaistinti kelis potencialius veiksnius: tarnybos sąlygų pagerėjimas, karinio rengimo pokyčiai, profesinės karo tarnybos karių lyderystė, visuomenės nuomonė ir pan. Tačiau siekiant tiksliai įvertinti, reikėtų papildomos analizės.

Kaip ir tikėtasi (H4), pagerėjo ir statistiškai reikšmingai keitėsi NPPKT karių Lietuvos krašto apsaugos pajėgų vertinimas: 2018 m. tiek savanoriai, tiek prievolinkai krašto apsaugos pajėgas vertino patenkinamai, o 2023 m. – gerai. Šio tyrimo duomenys taip pat atskleidžia, kad 2018 m. ir 2023 m. apie penktadalį savanorių galvoja tęsti tarnybą profesinėje karo tarnyboje. Visa tai galima sieti su didėjančiu Lietuvos kariuomenės jautrumu karių poreikiams siekiant didinti karių tarnybos motyvaciją.

Pabrėžtina, kad šiame straipsnyje buvo analizuojami tik keli NPPKT motyvacijos aspektai, tačiau, siekiant užtikrinti pakankamą NPPKT tarnybos motyvacijos ištyrimo lygį, būtinas conceptualus požiūris, kuriuo turėtų būti siekiama nustatyti piliečių dalyvavimo karo tarnyboje sąsajas su motyvacijos pokyčiais bei analizuoti motyvacijos pokyčių priežastis, ypač akcentuojant karo grėsmės nacionaliniam saugumui refleksiją. Visa tai gali padėti išplėsti tradicinį požiūrį į kario vaidmenį.

Literatūra

1. Akucevičiūtė, I., Kukulskienė, M., Arguskaitė - Zailskienė, G. 2020. „Su baziniu kario kursu susijusios psichologinės patirtys: savanoriškai nuolatinę privalomąją karo tarnybą atliekančių vyrų perspektyva.“ Visuomenės saugumas ir viešoji politika Nr. 24: 5-20. <https://ojs.mruni.eu/ojs/vsvt/article/view/5525>
2. Asch, B. J., Heaton, P., Hosek, J., Martorell, F., Simon, C., Warner, J. T. 2010. “Cash incentives and military enlistment, attrition and reenlistment.” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG950.pdf. <https://doi.org/10.7249/MG950>
3. Baltutytė, G. 2019. “Nuolatinės privalomosios pradinės karo tarnybos karių tarnybos motyvacija: subjektyvus dalyvių vertinimas.” Tiltai 82 (1): 48-66. <https://doi.org/10.15181/tbb.v82i1.1959>
4. Battistelli, F. 1997. “Peacekeeping and the postmodern soldier.” *Armed Forces & Society* 23(3): 467-484. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45347085>. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9702300308>
5. Battistelli, F., Ammendola, T., Galantino, M. G. 1999. “The fuzzy environment and postmodern soldiers: The motivations of the Italian contingent in Bosnia.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 10(2): 138-160. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592319908423244>
6. Brett, R. 2003. “Adolescens volunteering for armed forces or armed groups.” *Affaires courantes et commentaires. Current issues and comments* 85 (852): 857 - 866. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc_852_brett.pdf. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0035336100179961>
7. Buzan, B. 1997. Žmonės, valstybės ir baimė. Tarptautinio saugumo studijos po Šaltojo karo. Vilnius: Eugrimas.
8. Carroll, M. K. 2016. “Peacekeeping: Canada’s past, but not its present and future?” *International Journal* 71 (1): 167-176. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44631172>. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702015619857>
9. Elder, G. R., Wang, L., Spence, N. J., Adkins, D. E., Brown, T. H. 2010. “Pathways to the all-volunteer military.” *Social Science Quarterly*. 91 (2): 455-475. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3181144/>. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00702.x>
10. Ertür, B. 2019. “Conscription and Critique.” *Critical Times* 2 (2): 270-284. <https://doi.org/10.1215/26410478-7708347>
11. Fang, S., Li, X., Sun, F. 2018. “China’s evolving motivations and goals in UN peacekeeping participation.” *International Journal* 73 (3): 464 - 473. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018795898>
12. Flynn, G. Q. 2002. *Conscription and Democracy: The Draft in France, Great Britain, and the United States*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
13. Gal, R. 2016. „Motivation Levels for IDF Enlistment over the Years“. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17014.8.pdf>
14. Gibson, J. L., Griepentrog, B. K., Marsh, S. M. 2007. “Parental influence on youth propensity to join the military.” *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 70 (3): 525-541. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0001879107000309>. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvb.2007.03.002>
15. Grigorov, G., Spiridonov, S. 2018. “Research on the motivation for choosing the military career.” *International conference knowledge-based organization* 24(1): 302-307. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326651563_Research_on_the_Motivation_for_Choosing_the_Military_Career. <https://doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2018-0048>
16. Griffith, J. 2008. “Institutional Motives for Serving in the US Army National Guard Implications for Recruitment, Retention, and Readiness.” *Armed Forces & Society* 34 (2): 230-258. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X06293864>
17. Grėsmių nacionaliniam saugumui vertinimas 2022. https://www.vsd.lt/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/LT-el-_.pdf
18. Hedlund, E. 2011. “What Motivates Swedish Soldiers to Participate in Peacekeeping Missions.” *Armed Forces & Society* 37 (1): 180 - 190. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X10372597>
19. Helmus, T. C., Zimmerman, S. R. Posard, M. N. Wheeler, J. L., Ogletree, C., Stroud, Q., Harell, M. C. 2018. “Life as a Private. A study of the Motivation and Experiences of Junior Enlisted Personnel in the U.S. Army.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2252>

20. Horval, S. M. 2020. „Purpose, Direction, and Motivation.“ <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/ncojournal/images/2020/August/Motivation/Motivation.pdf>
21. Jelusič, L. 2007. “Motivation for peace operations.” *International Review of Sociology* 17(1): 35-42. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03906700601129632>
22. Juvan, J., Vuga, J. 2011. “What motivates Slovenia ‘peacekeepers?’” *International Peacekeeping* 18(1): 96-109. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263257991_What_Motivates_Slovenian_%27Peacekeepers%27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.527522>
23. KAM. 2015. „Pradedamas pasirengimas 2016 m. šaukimui į nuolatinę privalomąją pradinę karo tarnybą.“ https://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/pradedamas_pasirengimas_2016_m._saukimui_i_nuolatine_privalomaja_pradine_karo_tarnyba
24. Kardelis, K. 2017. *Mokslinių tyrimų metodologija ir metodai*. Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos centras.
25. Karys.lt. 2022. „Privalumai.“ <https://www.karys.lt/privalumai/17>
26. Kasiliauskytė, D. 2017. „Ar kario motyvacija - vado elgesio pasekmė?“ https://kariuomene.kam.lt/lt/tapk_kariu/12/naujienos_3292/ar_kario_motyvacija_vado_elgesio_pasekme.html?pbck=0
27. Kleykamp, M. 2006. “College, Jobs, or The Military? Enlistment During a Time of War.” *Social Science Quarterly*: 87 (2): 272 - 290. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42956123>. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2006.00380.x>
28. Kojala, L., Kulys, J., Prochorenko, A., Roževič, A. 2020. Geopolitikos ir tarptautinės politikos bei grėsmių suvokimo tyrimas. <https://www.eesc.lt/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RESC-tyrimas.pdf>
29. Laurėnas, V. 2017. *Spartėjančios visuomenės politinis režimas*. Klaipėda: Klaipėdos universitetas.
30. Lyk-Jensen, S. V., Glad, A. 2016. “Why Do They Serve? Changes and Differences in Motives of Danish Soldiers Deployed to Peace-Keeping and Peace-Enforcing Missions.” https://pure.vive.dk/ws/files/403201/WP_01_2016.pdf. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2016.1200220>
31. Lucassen, J., Zurcher, E. J. 1998. “Conscription as Military Labour: The Historical Context.” *International Review of Social History* 43: 405-419. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44583415>. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859098000224>
32. *Military Motivation: Special Challenges And Techniques*. 2022. <https://www.betterhelp.com/advice/motivation/military-motivation-special-challenges-and-techniques/>
33. Ministry of Defence Republic of Latvia. 2022. State defence service. <https://www.mod.gov.lv/en/state-defence-service>
34. Pawinski, M., Chami, G. 2019. “Why they fight? Reconsidering the role of motivation in <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2019.1632198> combat environments.” *Defence Studies* 19 (3): 297 - 317.
35. Pilietinės galios indeksas. 2022. <http://www.civitas.lt/time-line/pilietines-galios-indeksas-2022-m/>
36. Pocienė, A. 2018. “Lietuvos jaunuolių pritraukimo į nuolatinę privalomąją pradinę karo tarnybą galimybės.” *Lietuvos metinė strateginė apžvalga 2017-2018* 16: 367-392. file:///C:/Users/PC/Downloads/lmsa-16-1-12_pociene16-2.pdf. <https://doi.org/10.47459/lmsa.2018.16.12>
37. Rakauskienė, O. G., Volodzkienė, L. 2021. *Ekonominė nelygybė: normali ar perteklinė?* Vilnius: Mykolo. Romerio universitetas.
38. Ronge, J., Abrate, G. 2019. „Conscription in the European Union Armed Forces: national trends, benefits and EU modernised service.“ <https://finabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/FFT-The-EU-Conscription-Model-W.pdf>
39. Österberg, J., Nilsson, J., Hellum, N. 2020. „The motivation to serve in the military among Swedish and Norwegian soldiers. A comparative study.“ *Journal of Defense Resources Management* 11(20): 30-42. <https://www.proquest.com/openview/be018642db7f905fbb4bb27900688a70/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=1876336>
40. Trumpickienė, M., Kalvaitienė, G. 2019. “Motyvacinės sistemos tęsti ar rinktis profesinę karo tarnybą Lietuvos karinėse jūrų pajėgose tyrimas.” *Šiuolaikinės visuomenės ugdymo veiksniai* 4: 125-141. <https://journals.lka.lt/journal/svuv/article/474/info>. <https://doi.org/10.47459/svuv.2019.4.8>
41. Tomforde. M. 2005. “Motivation and self-image among German peacekeepers.” *International Peacekeeping*. 12(4): 576-585. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500201993>

42. Strand, S. 2021. The birth of the enterprising soldier: governing military recruitment and retention in post-Cold War Sweden. *Scandinavian Journal of History* 47 (2): 225- 247. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2021.1997797>
43. Šostakas, H., Guščinskienė, J. 2019. „Šauktinių motyvavimo priemonės ir jų taikymas Generolo Adolfo Ramanausko kovinio rengimo centre.“ *Viešojoji politika ir administravimas* 18 (1): 118-135. <https://cris.mruni.eu/cris/entities/publication/5c1e1a0e-bee7-4711-a6ff-5d85c2c6b283/details>
44. Žaptorius, J. 2007. Darbuotojų motyvavimo sistemos kūrimas ir jos teorinė analizė. *Filososfija. Sociologija* 18 (4): 105 - 117. <http://mokslozurnalai.lmaleidykla.lt/publ/0235-7186/2007/4/105-117.pdf>
45. Wish, B. E. 2014. „Individual motivational factors impacting united states air force reserve recruiting.“ <https://rc.library.uta.edu/uta-ir/handle/10106/24884>
46. Woodruff, T. D. 2017. “Who Should the Military Recruit? The Effects of Institutional, Occupational, and Self-Enhancement Enlistment Motives on Soldier Identification and Behavior.” *Armed Forces & Society* 43 (4): 579 -607. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X17695360>

Gerda Kazlauskienė

PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND SERVICE MOTIVATION OF SOLDIERS ENROLLED IN PERMANENT COMPULSORY INITIAL MILITARY SERVICE

Abstract. *The paper focuses on soldiers enrolled in permanent compulsory initial military service in Lithuania and analyses their service motivation and attitudes to threats to national security. The article identifies the motives for joining permanent compulsory initial military service and highlights the fact that young people's choice of permanent compulsory initial military service is most often driven by individual motives. In order to compare the results, representative surveys were conducted in 2018 and 2023. The empirical data suggest that the perception of the main threat to national security identified by troops as an economic threat remained unchanged between 2018 and 2023. However, in 2023, soldiers grew somewhat more aware of the threat of military aggression. In 2018, volunteers differed significantly from conscript forces in their determination to engage in national defense. The expected determination to engage in national defense at a time of an increased military threat did not significantly increase in 2023 compared to 2018; moreover, the attitudes of volunteers and conscripts failed to converge. However, 2023 saw a significant increase in conscripts' service motivation and an improvement in their assessment of the National Defence Volunteer Forces.*

Gerda Kazlauskienė, lektorė, Klaipėdos universitetas
El. paštas: gerda.kazlauskiene@ku.lt

Gerda Kazlauskienė, lecturer, Klaipėda University
E-mail: gerda.kazlauskiene@ku.lt



This article is an Open Access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

HANDLING WITH LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY: HOW IS THE PROMOTION OF CONFUCIANISM RELATED WITH THE LABOUR PROTEST LEVELS?

Ligita Šarkutė

Vytautas Magnus University,
V. Putvinskio st. 23, 44212 Kaunas, Lithuania

Jiabin Song

Vytautas Magnus University,
V. Putvinskio st. 23, 44212 Kaunas, Lithuania

<https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppa.23.1.34520>

Abstract. *This article aims to shed light on the problem of Confucianism's role in strengthening the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. After 40 years of economic reform, contemporary China is by and large functioning as a quasi-capitalist state, however, due to the lack of protection of the labour class, the conflicts between the workers and their employers have created a legitimacy crisis for China's authoritarian regime and forced it to seek alternative means to strengthening its legitimacy apart from its orthodox communism ideology and the coercive measures. In this article, the researchers try to answer the abovementioned question by examining the correlation between the coverage of Confucianism (the frequency of messages related to Confucian ideas) in the Chinese Communist Party's biggest state-owned newspaper People's Daily and how Chinese people acknowledge the regime as rightful, which is expressed via Chinese labour protest levels. The vector autoregressive (VAR) modelling results revealed that in the period between 2011 and 2019, the Chinese Communist Party used Confucianism as one of the instruments to build and strengthen the regime's legitimacy whereby it can pacify the dissatisfaction of the labour class. Further, considering that many authoritarian regimes shared a similar approach of using the dominant religion or culture to enhance their legitimacy during crises, the findings of this research could also open a new avenue for further comparative studies on these authoritarian regimes' discrepancies using the same approach.*

Keywords: *Confucianism, Chinese Communist Party, legitimacy, labour protests, China.*

Reikšminiai žodžiai: *konfucianizmas, Kinijos komunistų partija, legitimacija, darbuotojų protestai, Kinija.*

Introduction

The past studies of the relationship between the use of Confucianism as the instrument for the Chinese regime's legitimacy building and the Chinese labour class issue remain scarce, meanwhile, these two subjects are more often than not being studied separately. In a general retrospection, the scholars who study the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (hereinafter: CCP) are interested in the factors like the principles and ideas of Confucianism (Sung 1999; Yang 2007; Brady 2012; Chai, Chai 2013; Chu 2013; Wu 2014; Wu 2015; Ford 2015; Bruce, Shen, Yan 2017; Walton 2018; Wang, Nahm 2019; Li 2020; Gao 2022, Huang, 2022) but their studies are rarely related to the Chinese labour class issue without the political significance. As well, the scholars who concentrate their efforts on the Chinese labour class issue (Kim 2014; Lee 1996; Strudler 2008; Perry 2010; Woods, Lamond 2011) have adopted Confucianism into

their elaboration though, but they scarcely move beyond the economic-cultural sphere into the political domain, therefore, the question of the labour issue's implication for the CCP's legitimacy change is remaining unanswered.

After taking these precedent studies into account, the researchers reached two insights that need to be addressed: 1) The past studies on Confucianism mainly concentrate on political philosophy or political ideology aspects through different discursive approaches. They have proven many grounded conclusions, however, there is yet to generate solid systematic evidence to account for the argument that CCP has its rationale to promote Confucianism rather than pinning their arguments upon the discursive analytic results. 2) By now the study on the linkage between Confucianism as the instrument for the CCP's legitimization policy and the Chinese labour protests that reflect the decline of the CCP's legitimacy is still absent.

To fill this gap, in this article, the researchers intend to demonstrate a systematic connectedness between these two phenomena through modelling their dynamic correlation. The method used is the vector autoregressive (VAR) modelling. The main aim of this article was to analyse the correlation between the promotion of Confucian ideas by the CCP and the frequency of labour protest levels. The scientific problem lies in the main research question is whether the coverage of Confucianism in the state-owned media is related to the stronger legitimacy of the CCP. In reaching our aim, three tasks are accomplished by the researchers in this article: a) to uncover the dynamics of the Confucianism coverage changes in the CCP's propaganda system – this is accomplished by exhaustively sampling the past seven decades (1946-2019) the CCP's biggest state-owned media *People's Daily's* articles; b) to reveal the dynamics of the Chinese labour protest level changes as the negative proxy for the CCP's legitimacy during the period 2011-2019 – these data are extracted and processed from the *China Labour Bulletin* (中国劳工通信) dataset; c) to establish a VAR model so as to test their dynamic correlation. As a result, the researchers found that during the 2011 to 2019 period, there was a mutual impact at a significant level between the changes in Confucianism coverage in the CCP's *People's Daily* and the changes in the Chinese labour protest level. Considering that the continuous decline of the CCP's legitimacy indicated by its labour protest level's incessant increase in the recent decades while the increases of Confucianism promotion in its propaganda system during the same period, the connectedness between the two phenomena presented in this article reveals the necessity of the Confucianism for the CCP's legitimization as well as its effectiveness level in the pacification of the Chinese labour issue.

Theoretical background and research methodology

“You can do many things with bayonets, but it is rather uncomfortable to sit on them.”

Prince Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord

Every government requires a certain level of legitimacy to maintain their governance lest the opposition uses the social grudge sentiment to bog them down into domestic turmoil or even an eruption of civil war. In contemporary China, the CCP has been known for its notorious apparatuses' suppressive methods, nevertheless, it also has been incurring more and more difficulties in legitimizing its single-party system since the economic reform in 1978. The challenges for the authoritarian regime are multifaceted – some come from its intelligentsia in the political domain (i.e., from both the very ends of the political spectrum that the nostalgic Maoists on the left and the radical nationalists on the right, along with the fading voices of the political reformists in the middle between the two), some come from the entrepreneurs in the country economic system's private sector, as well as the grieved religious groups and the different ethnic minorities. However, as political crises emerge, the most severe issue for the CCP regime is always situated in the Chinese labour force issue. The reason is trifold:

1. As a politically important social class, the proletariat blue-collar workers in China are not just theoretically the “foundation” of the CCP's supporters, but due to the group *de facto* being the majority of the

Chinese population in the country thus occupying the lion's share in the Chinese society¹. Therefore, their attitude toward the CCP will politically determine the latter's survival as well. For instance, in 2019 there were 290.77 million Minggong (i.e., the migrant peasants whose occupations are different physical works) working in the urban area, in the same year the total number of Chinese laborers in the urban area was 442.47 million which denotes merely the blue-collar workers from the backward rural areas have already occupied 65.7% of the total labour force in the urban area, and if this figure plus the blue-collar workers originated from the urban population their percentage will be undoubtedly much bigger.²

2. As a social group, albeit there is a lack of agencies such as NGOs or labour unions for them to collectively express their voice, seemingly the Chinese labourers are socially atomic individuals distant from each other culturally. However, the homogeneous attributes shared by the Chinese labourers (e.g., high urban living pressure, low income, harsh working environment, etc.) are making the group as a whole susceptible to any injustice labour event incurred by its members, thereby transforming the group's sentimental grievance into a societal insecurity³.
3. As a cultural group, the Chinese labourers are *de jure* occupying the "moral high ground" according to the orthodox communism ideology⁴ when the issue comes to the treatment and struggle of labourers, it becomes a self-defeating effort for the CCP to subvert such political actions in the ideological and public discourse.

Therefore, the high political stake caused by the blue-collar workers as an unstable majority in the Chinese population, the imposition of discipline upon them cannot merely come from the repressive methods as the CCP has sophisticatedly used to enforce obedience upon other societal groups. An alternative to supplementing the coercive measures in tackling this issue is needed, and in this article, the researchers assume that the CCP has found it in the form of Confucianism, and this assumption is based upon four arguments:

- From the philosophical perspective, Confucianism *per se* is neatly fitting with the relationship between the governing CCP's functionaries and their governed subjects like the ordinary Chinese workers, because it matches the form of supervisor-subordinate relationship (i.e., the "Junzi (君子)" – "Baixing (百姓)" relationship) in accordance with Confucianism. Further, by distortedly replacing this power relationship with an ethic-relationship – namely, the loyalty here is sugar-coated with a moral rationale – the workers should be loyal to the CCP functionaries' command not because the latter has the force over them⁵, rather it is because the latter possesses some *a proiri* virtuous merits superior to them

¹ See: The State Information Center (Administration Center of China E-government Network), *A Study on The New Development of The Labor Market amid the Stabilization Policy*, February 24, 2022, <http://www.sic.gov.cn/News/455/11304.htm> (accessed: August 14, 2023).

² It is not saying that other Chinese societal groups like the middle class in the urban area are not important in terms of legitimacy of a Chinese regime like the CCP. The political significance of the labor class lies in their objective political energy and subjective recalcitrant characteristics that can affect the political system's stability. In comparison with them, the other Chinese societal groups like the middle class are not just small in number, but their "golden sheep" mindset – a metaphor used by Caligula on Julius Silanus – made these wealthy urban inhabitants become an object of contempt rather than of apprehension for the CCP. The aftermaths like the 2015 Tianjin Explosions and the 2021 Jingguang North Road Tunnel Floods, etc. have repeatedly proven the political effectness of the Chinese middle class regardless of what sorts of mismanagements or injustices imposed by the CCP, therefore they do live up to their reputation for being the "shitizen (屁民)" in the present-day Chinese satire.

³ An interesting analysis of this issue, see: Xie, H. "The Conflict without Vested Interest: The Analysis of The Motives and Logic behind The Chinese Collective Protest." *Academic Journal of Zhongzhou*, no. 2 (2014), <https://www.aisixiang.com/data/73444.html> (accessed: August 14, 2023).

⁴ The first sentence in the first paragraph of the CCP's Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party is "The Chinese Communist Party is the pioneer of the Chinese labor class (中国共产党是中国工人阶级的先锋队)". See: Communist Net. *The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party*, October 22, 2022, <https://www.12371.cn/special/zggcdzc/zggcdzcqw/> (accessed: August 14, 2023).

⁵ E.g., Mao's assertion that "Regime/political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." – Wang C., *The Studies of Maoism Regime*. (Beijing: History of Chinese Communist Party Publishing House, 1997), 15.

(or put differently, the CCP's trick here regarding the loyalty (忠誠) of the governed ones is using an argument derived from the Confucianism's "benevolence (仁)"⁶ as one of a person's four inner will (四端)⁷ instead of the ancient Chinese Legalism's "power/status (勢位)"⁸ as the external restraint on the person). Further, by adding some fiery pictures of the future paradise such as the CCP's manipulation of some Confucianism concepts like the "Great Community (大同社會)" which is derived from the *Book of Rites*' "great path (大道)" idea⁹, these simple-minded Chinese plebeians are expected to take the bait¹⁰.

- From a political perspective, Confucianism also could be regarded as one of the relevant instruments of political socialization helping to strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP. After the 1997 promulgation of the new law on Inciting Subversion of State Power (煽動顛覆國家政權罪) and then one year later the establishment of the Great Firewall (GFW)¹¹ on the Chinese Internet, by the end of the 20th century the CCP has already thenceforth turned China's cyberspace¹² into a panopticon (Foucault 1977: 195-308; Gordon 1980: 146-165). However, in order to have a political stabilization effect or a ubiquitous discipline, mere punishment is not working but must be complemented with gratification as a two-way system. This political end necessitates the socialization that uses Confucian ideas to cultivate a social normalization process and results in an internalization of the Chinese individuals who are targeted by such a policy. By applying Foucault's interpretation of strategy (Foucault 1982: 793) it could be stated that the behavioural pattern of the CCP designates for the insubordinate subject (i.e. the labour class) and the selected Confucian norms are used as the means to attain the desired level of political socialization. In this process, the CCP widely uses the state-owned media for these tasks, as aforementioned that the deprivation of the free and open political discourse on the cyber public space has already been completed in advance through localization of the internet (i.e., the result of information filtering by the GFW), and coercive punishment of opposite discourses under the well-designed new law.
- From a historical perspective, since 1949 the CCP took power in mainland China the status of Confucianism has been gradually changing in the past seven decades. The researchers divide these changes into four different periods according to the CCP's official narratives in its controlled media: 1) the first stage started in 1949 when the CCP took over the sovereignty of mainland China, Confucianism was

⁶ See: Confucius, *The Analects (5th Century BC)*, Chapter XXII: Yan Yuan.

⁷ "The feeling of commiseration is the origin of benevolence; the feeling of shame and dislike is the origin of righteousness; the feeling of modesty and complaisance is the origin of propriety; the feeling of approving and disapproving is the origin of wisdom (惻隱之心，仁之端也；羞惡之心，義之端也；辭讓之心，禮之端也；是非之心，智之端也)" - Meng Ke, *Mengzi (3rd Century BC)*, Chapter: Gong Sun Chou I.

⁸ "Thus, being a saint or a sage is not enough to subdue the masses, whereas the power/status is enough to subdue the saints and the sages (由此觀之，賢智未足以服眾，而勢位足以誦賢者也)" - Han Fei, *The Critique of Power (3rd Century BC)*.

⁹ "When the Great Path is prevalent in the world, everyone is adhering to justice, the merit ones are supported to lead, the society is decent and harmonious, <...> such a situation is called 'Great Unity' (大道之行也，天下為公。選賢與能，講信修睦，<...> 是謂大同)" - Dai Sheng (ed.), *Book of Rites (1st Century BC)*, Chapter IX: The Conveyance of Rites.

¹⁰ Or, in a still blatant way, like the argument from the New Confucianism (新儒家) works advocate that "He (i.e., Confucius) also suggests that common people have intellectual limitations" (Bell 2010: 167). However, since the classical era – even long before the advent of representative democracy – people in the West know there is a principal-agent problem in their relationship with the government (or, "moral hazard", as the film character Gordon Gekko explains to the old lady in the 2010 Hollywood movie *Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps* that "Moral hazard means somebody takes your money and he is not responsible for it."), therefore, doesn't it to be a more logical option for the "intellectual deficit people/public" to prefer a stupid supervisor to a smart one for their leadership in case there is an interests conflict between them in the distribution of the country's public goods originating from their own hard-working taxes?

¹¹ Designed to block Chinese citizens' access to the uncensored internet information via technical censorship measures.

¹² Before that the public space had long been constantly under surveillance while the mass media were all controlled by the regime, therefore the news outlets on cyberspace, like social media, were the only possible discourse field for Chinese public opinion. Hence, for attaining the panopticon effect (or, to create the information island) the CCP needs the GFW to control the external inflow of information from international cyberspace, meanwhile, the new *Inciting Subversion of State Power Law to curb the internal spontaneous information from the domestic cyberspace*.

initiatively being severely suppressed among other “reactionary cultures (反动文化)” during Mao’s era and had been perceived as antagonistic ideology towards the new regime¹³; 2) the second stage is marked by a period of cultural neglect, Confucianism was largely being ignored by the Chinese society amid the early economic reform period’s *laissez-faire* milieu (i.e. approximately from 1980s till the beginning of 1990s); 3) then the third stage, when the Confucianism as a cultural phenomenon had been gradually becoming a salient subject in the Chinese society’s public discourse as well as been discussed in the official media during Jiang and Hu’s era (i.e. 1993 - 2012)¹⁴; 4) and the final stage which began from Xi’s success ascending to power in 2013 whose policy made the Confucianism become national culture once again, thenceforth it has been officially promoted and playing a major role in his national rejuvenation narrative.

- From a comparative perspective, there are pronounced evidences that many authoritarian regimes apply a similar approach banking themselves on a once dominant religion or culture during their legitimacy crisis as the CCP does with Confucianism. Such similarity can observe in Putin’s kleptocratic regime revitalized the Russian Orthodox Church after the democracy-inclined Patriarch Aleksii II’s death for underpinning its declining domestic support (Robinson 2019: 183-214), or the charades like Saddam Hussein’s out-of-the-blue religious zeal for the Sunni Islam after his secular Ba’ath regime military venture on Kuwait went south and the Shi’a intifada ensued (Rohde 2003: 715), etc. Apart from horizontal comparison, vertically in Chinese history, the barbarian regimes like the Jurchen after they conquered China had also tried to use the Han nation’s Confucianism to legitimize their occupation, which to some degree did work¹⁵, many renowned Han intellectuals refused to serve the heterogeneous sovereign nevertheless¹⁶. Taking into account that the communist ideology *per se* is heterogeneous to the Han people’s political culture, hence, under the auspices of the historical lesson, the recourse to Confucianism is undoubtedly a feasible approach for the CCP to adopt in enhancing its legitimacy.

Therefore, as the *Mos Maiorum* for the ancient Romans, Confucianism as the set of ancient Chinese social norms derived from numerous records and studies of Confucian ideology also retain its socialization potential in Chinese society¹⁷. The key issue or inquiry here is about how to measure this Confucianism promotion’s effectiveness in changing the Chinese people’s attitude towards the CCP’s regime, namely, to examine how and to what degree the relevant CCP’s legitimation policies are affecting its legitimacy.

Apparently, the operationalization for answering this inquiry requires two phenomena as empirical evidences that can be observed and refined for the two key concepts/variables: the CCP’s Confucianism promotion policy and the CCP’s legitimacy. In this article, the researchers will use the tendency change of articles related to Confucianism in the CCP’s biggest state-owned media *People’s Daily’s* coverage as a

¹³ Such as “Destroy the Four Old (破四旧)” in 1966 and “The Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign (批林批孔运动)” in 1974. For a more comprehensive analysis see: Wang, H., *Legalism and Anti-Confucianism in Maoist Politics* (Institute of International Relations, 1975).

¹⁴ The most significant event which implied the official attitude changes towards Confucianism was a huge Confucius statue placed in Tiananmen Square before it was removed on April 20th 2011 (the statue had been presented in the Square around 100 days period). See: “The 9.5 Meter High Confucius Statue Is Placed in The Front of The National Museum as A New Cultural Landmark in Tiananmen Square,” China News Service, January 11, 2011, <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/131781.html> (accessed: 2023 06 28).

¹⁵ Accompanied by economic entices as well as social privilege conferrals – similar to the buy-off policy as the “Honorary Citizen” adopted by Tsar Nicholas I’s occupation regime in Eastern Europe after the fall of the November Uprising. See: Zasztowt L., *Melting Puzzle: The Nobility, Society, Education and Scholarly Life in East-Central Europe (1800s-1900s)* (Warszawa: Studium Europy Wschodniej, 2018), 71-82.

¹⁶ For example, the Late Ming Dynasty’s “Three Masters of Confucianism (明末三大儒)” - Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲), Gu Yanwu (顧炎武), and Wang Fuzhi (王夫之) were all against the Jurchen alien occupation throughout their rest lives after the fall of Ming Dynasty.

¹⁷ According to O. Yang Ray’s 2018 article that traditional values, as well as the state-controlled media and striking economic records, are often expected to drive the attitudes, and these values usually refer to the sense of guardianship stemming from Confucianism. Such philosophy implies that people define the relationship with authority as hierarchical in China, obligating them to respect and follow authority.

proxy for the former, and use the tendency change of the Chinese labour protest levels from the *China Labour Bulletin* dataset for the latter. Then the above inquiry will be divided into two interconnected research questions: 1) how does the CCP use Confucianism as the instrument for legitimacy building through its propaganda system's media as a socialization means to manage its legitimacy crisis embodied in the form of labour protest; and 2) in turn, to check its effectiveness degree, *ceteris paribus*, of doing that. The approach the researchers choose to answer these two questions is to establish a VAR model to test the two variables' correlation in the nine-year period between 2011 and 2019.

As to the research resources the two variables: the chronological changes of the articles related to Confucian ideas that appeared in *People's Daily* are presented in *Figure 1* and the frequency of Chinese labour protests from the *China Labour Bulletin* is presented in *Figure 2*.

The "adjusted" frequency denotes that bases on the benchmark of the 1946-1956.6.31 edition, the sum of articles related with Confucian ideas in the later editions' will be multiplied by a modifier (i.e., the modifier = the total pages of 1946-1956.6.31 edition / the total pages of the new edition) to reflect their proper weight in the media coverage during the same unit of time (i.e., the chronological edition changes in *People's Daily* see: Annex 3).




Figure 1. Total annual frequency of the articles related with Confucian ideas in *People's Daily* in 1946–2019

Source: *People's Daily*.



Figure 2. The frequency of Chinese labour protests in 2011–2019

Source: *China Labour Bulletin*.

Data and model

To explain the spread of Confucian ideas and principles by the CCP to curb the increasingly tense situation in the domestic labour environment that has been jeopardizing its legitimacy, the researchers use two research sources: the *People's Daily* (人民日报) newspaper and the *China Labour Bulletin* (中国劳工通讯) dataset. The correlation between the coverage of Confucianism (the frequency of messages related to Confucian ideas) in the CCP's biggest state-owned Chinese newspaper and how Chinese people acknowledge the regime as rightful, which is expressed via Chinese labour protest levels in the period between 2011 and 2019 (i.e., before the pandemic started, since 2020 that all the public gathering/protests were prohibited), is analysed using the VAR modelling.

The sampling of the coverage of Confucian ideas, principles and other related attributes was done by calculating the total number of articles in the *People's Daily* mentioning Confucian ideas each month, the total monthly data sample pool contains 108 cases in the period 2011-2019. This monthly frequency of the coverage of Confucian ideas in the biggest state-owned newspaper, used for the CCP propaganda, is the proxy for measuring how the Confucian ideas are used as an instrument of political socialization helping to strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP.

The labour protest levels are identified from the *China Labour Bulletin* dataset. Because of the severe censorship of Chinese social media and the coercive measures of the CCP regime's Social Stabilization System (维稳系统) as well as the lack of NGOs activities, the public opinion in China is largely suppressed and thus remains obscure for its observers. As well, as a rational choice outcome from the individual calculation, for the ordinary Chinese who want to express their grievance against the party's governance through either protesting in public or writing a censure post on social media, the costs for the person are quite the same. However, due to political protest in China is absolutely resulted in iron-fist suppression, labour protest has thus become the only possible civil resistance form in China. Therefore, in this article, the researchers use political behaviour to be the proxy of political preferences (namely, the higher protest level in a period denotes the lower CCP's legitimacy in the same period).

These data available in the *China Labour Bulletin* dataset are protest case data arranged in chronological order with rich attributes (such as "actor type", "settlement type" etc.). There are 12,384 labour protest cases in total that took place in China between 2011 and 2019 period, for transforming these data into the monthly protest level time-series data as a unified variable (i.e., the main purpose here is to make the protest time-series data have the same unit of time with the *People's Daily's* monthly data for following VAR model test), the following procedure, described below, was adopted by the researchers:

- Each labour protest case in the daily data is assigned a value from 4-point scale: the case with 1-100 protestors (coded as "protest level 1"), the case with 100-1000 protestors (coded as "protest level 1 multiplied by a 10 modifier"), the case with 1000-10000 protestors (coded as "protest level 1 multiplied by a 100 modifier"), and case with 10000+ protestors (coded as "protest level 1 multiplied by a 1000 modifier"). A few "unknown" cases are subsumed into the 1-100 value scale. The sum of these cases' values is the proxy of the daily data's protest level.
- The sum of these daily data's total protest level in the same month is assigned as that month's monthly protest level. For example, on June 1st, 2019 5 labour protests happened in China (i.e., from case no. 11611 to case no. 11615), four of them with a scale between 1-100 protestors participating and one case with a scale between 100-1000 participants. Then, the calculation of this day's daily protest level is $(4 * 1) + (1 * 10) = 14$, and the sum of June 1st and the rest 29 days' protest level in the same month is June 2019's monthly protest level.

The intention of the researchers to establish the VAR model of the correlation between the monthly labour protest levels in China and the monthly frequency of the coverage of Confucian ideas in the biggest state-owned newspaper raised two questions: 1) whether and to what degree the increasing of domestic labour protest levels will lead to the CCP's propaganda system to broadcast more messages related with

Confucian ideas in its biggest state-owned newspaper the *People's Daily*, and 2) in turn, whether and to what degree these messages in *People's Daily* works in terms of pacifying the Chinese labour protests?

After data processing and analyses using the VAR modelling two autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) equations are formulated:

1. $\text{pdfad1}_t = \text{constant} + a_{11} * \text{pdfad1}_{t-1} + a_{12} * \text{pdfad1}_{t-2} + a_{13} * \text{pdfad1}_{t-3} + a_{14} * \text{pdfad1}_{t-4} + a_{15} * \text{pdfad1}_{t-5} + b_{11} * \text{protestlvd1}_{t-1} + b_{12} * \text{protestlvd1}_{t-2} + b_{13} * \text{protestlvd1}_{t-3} + b_{14} * \text{protestlvd1}_{t-4} + b_{15} * \text{protestlvd1}_{t-5} + \varepsilon_{1t}$
2. $\text{protestlvd1}_t = \text{constant} + a_{21} * \text{pdfad1}_{t-1} + a_{22} * \text{pdfad1}_{t-2} + a_{23} * \text{pdfad1}_{t-3} + a_{24} * \text{pdfad1}_{t-4} + a_{25} * \text{pdfad1}_{t-5} + b_{21} * \text{protestlvd1}_{t-1} + b_{22} * \text{protestlvd1}_{t-2} + b_{23} * \text{protestlvd1}_{t-3} + b_{24} * \text{protestlvd1}_{t-4} + b_{25} * \text{protestlvd1}_{t-5} + \varepsilon_{2t}$

Description of the variables used in VAR modelling are presented in table 1 and the test result of the ADL equations of VAR modelling using *Gretl* software's output are presented in appendix 1 and appendix 2.

Table 1. Description of the variables used in VAR modelling

Variable	Description
<i>pdfa</i>	Monthly frequency of articles related with Confucian ideas in the <i>People's Daily's</i> (due to the edition changes since the beginning of 2019, the page size of the <i>People's Daily</i> has been reduced from 24 pages to 20 pages (the monthly frequency value for 2019 period was multiplied a modifier 1.2 to reflect its weight commensurate with the 2011-2018 period). The values of this variable reflect the immediate changes in the coverage of Confucianism in the biggest state-owned Chinese newspaper.
<i>pdfad1</i>	The first difference of the "pdfa" variable which is the monthly change from the previous month's value ($\text{pdfad1}_t = \text{pdfa}_t - \text{pdfa}_{t-1}$). The values of this variable reflect the changes in the tendency and dynamics of the coverage of Confucianism in the biggest state-owned Chinese newspaper.
<i>protestlv</i>	Monthly labour protest level in China identified from the <i>China Labour Bulletin</i> database. The values of this variable reflect the immediate changes in the Chinese labour protest levels.
<i>protestlvd1</i>	The first difference of the "protestlv" variable which is the monthly change from the previous month's value (i.e. $\text{protestlvd1}_t = \text{protestlv}_t - \text{protestlv}_{t-1}$). The values of this variable reflect the changes in the tendency and dynamics of Chinese labour protest levels.

Interpretation and implications of the VAR modelling results

The first ADL test result from the VAR modelling shows that every 1 unit's increase in the 5 lags' variable "protestlvd1" has a 0.00414879 unit's positive impact on the variable pdfad1 at a statistically significant level (p-value = 0.0246). That means during the nine-year period of analysis, if the Chinese labour protest levels' monthly change (i.e., its tendency) increases by 1, then 5 months later the monthly change in the number of articles related to Confucian ideas in the *People's Daily* will be increased by approximately 0.004. For example, the labour protest level in October of 2011 (i.e. 1248) had increased by 1,524 levels from the previous month January of 2013 (i.e. -276), then 5 months later apart from other effects, it will add roughly six articles related with the Confucian ideas (i.e. $1524 * 0.00414879 = 6.32275596$) in March of 2012 *People's Daily* coverage's total eight articles related with the Confucian ideas monthly change from the previous month (i.e. from decreasing 2 articles in February of 2012 to increase 6 articles in March of 2012).

The second ADL test result from the VAR modelling shows that every 1 unit's increase in the 5 lags' variable "pdfad1" has a -11.6049 unit's negative impact on the variable "protestlvd1" at a statistically significant level (p-value = 0.0342). That means during the nine-year analytic period if one article related to

Confucian ideas increases in the monthly change in the number of articles in the *People's Daily* will roughly pacify or deescalate the Chinese labour protest levels' monthly development with an 11.6 level decrease after 5 months. For instance, there were 19 articles related to Confucian ideas increasing in August of 2013 *People's Daily* monthly coverage (i.e., a monthly increase of 10 articles) from the previous month (i.e. 9 articles decreased monthly in July 2013), then 5 months later apart from other effects, it will lower roughly 220 level's labour protest level monthly change (i.e. $19 * - 11.6049 = -220.4931$) in the January of 2014 (i.e. -468) from the previous month's value (i.e. +323).

In summary, the VAR model test outcome indicates that during the period between 2011 and 2019, the legitimacy crisis caused by the Chinese domestic labour protests increase did prompt the CCP regime to promote Confucian ideas and principles through its controlled media as an instrument to pacify the labour class and strengthen the regime's legitimacy. In turn, the promotion of Confucian ideas in the biggest state-owned newspaper *People's Daily* did have some effects on deescalating the tension caused by labour protests in China. The endogeneity here can be largely ascribed to the omitted factors such as coercive apparatuses' functioning regarding the law enforcement or the Party's suppression agencies like the Armed Police Force (武警部队) (i.e., this unit does not under the purview of the Chinese government Ministry of Public Security's law enforcement department, but it is a hybrid military institution directly controlled by the CCP's Central Military Commission (CMC) whose main task is to secure the regime domestically), or the possible synergetic effects of the other media actors like *Xinhua News Agency*, or the public schools' curriculum¹⁸ controlled by the regime.

Further, the legitimacy of a regime shows how it is accepted by people as rightful and is a very important issue in democratic states. Therefore, free and fair elections and frequent public opinion polls that provide a constant measurement to reflect the government support level are indispensable in a democracy. However, none of these legitimate means of measuring the government' legitimacy are being used in authoritarian regimes like China and that leads to the fact that many of the political analysts use speculative arguments on the CCP's regime's legitimacy level, which by and large remain only conjectures. For resolving this conundrum, given that the direct extraction of the genuine public opinion of the Chinese society is hardly possible or at least hardly unbiased¹⁹, the model we proposed uses the data of the Chinese labour protests as a negative proxy to reflect the CCP's legitimacy level in the analytic period. Such a conversion of the political behaviour of the Chinese people into their political preferences allowed us to quantitatively measure the dynamics of the CCP's legitimacy level change in the nine-year period of analysis.

According to the data presented in this article, it can be assumed that the official image of Confucianism has been risen from the bottom up to a salient positive position among the official narratives. Nevertheless, it is needed to point out that Confucianism is still remaining the opposite of the communism in

¹⁸ Generally speaking, the contemporary Confucianism education in public school's courses is like other "patriotic education" which mainly serves as an alternative form of loyalty indoctrination for the CCP regime, however, simultaneously the private schools in China are inadvertently aligning themselves with the CCP's policy in this regards whose curricula are mostly for the sake of promoting Confucianism. For a more comprehensive analysis see: Wang, 2023.

¹⁹ For instance, foreign institutions are prohibited from directly conducting political surveys in China, and even the recent Chinese Public Opinion survey conducted by Harvard Ash Center has to cooperate with "a leading private research and polling company in China" – however, is there any private political related survey company can be really free from the CCP's Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China (MSS)'s constant monitoring or the threats of the CCP's ambiguous laws like the *Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China*'s Article 398 and *Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets*'s Article 9, Clause 7? The rule of lenity hasn't ever existed in the CCP's lexicon after all. See: Cunningham E., Saich T. & Turiel J., "Understanding CCP Resilience: Surveying Chinese Public Opinion Through Time," *The Roy and Lila Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation*, July 2020, https://ash.harvard.edu/files/ash/files/final_policy_brief_7.6.2020.pdf (accessed: August 18, 2023). & Crimes of Dereliction of Duty, *Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China* § Article 398 (1997). Access via Internet: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm (accessed: August 18, 2023) & "Other matters that are classified as State secrets by the State secret-guarding department. Secrets of political parties that conform with the provisions of the preceding clause of this Law shall be State secrets. (经国家保密行政管理部门确定的其他秘密事项。政党的秘密事项中符合前款规定的, 属于国家秘密。)" - Scopes and Categories of State Secrets, *Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets* § Article 9, Clause 7 (2010) Access via Internet: https://www.gov.cn/jfjfg/2010-04/30/content_1596420.htm (accessed: August 18, 2023).

terms of ideology. As well, the CCP *per se* is only interested in those Confucian attributes which can be pragmatically served as instruments to socialize and internalize the regime's subjects with loyalty so as to get through the legitimacy crises it is confronting. The rationale behind this pragmatic attribute of Confucianism in the CCP's actions to maintain its legitimacy is fourfold:

1. In the ideological domain, the demise of the regime's charismatic authority following Mao's death has created an ideological vacuum in Chinese society that there is no other political leader in the Party who can once again establish a cult of personality and evoke the public's enthusiasm to support the regime;
2. Because Mao hasn't ever tried to have a routinization of his charisma (Weber 1947: 334-342) into a rational-legal authority as his legacy, meanwhile, his son died in the Korean War that ended the possibility of transforming his charismatic authority into a traditional one like the Kim Il-sung did in North Korea;
3. The coercive suppression policies in China are not just expensive in terms of public finance²⁰ but also harm the economic development due to lack of public support for the suppression – repression can impose obedience but it jeopardises productivity at the same time after all;
4. Confucianism as a belief system, as presented in the previous discussions in this article, we can find elements which can be interpreted and successfully used to internalize the Chinese people to become loyal to the ruling party²¹.

Therefore, based on the VAR model test presented in this article, it can be assumed that all (or at least one of these) four reasons mentioned above prompted the CCP which lacks the patrimony of legitimacy from its first-generation leadership, to use Confucianism as an instrument to underpin its fading legitimacy.

Conclusions

The correlation between the tendency of Chinese labour protest levels and the tendency of the Confucian ideas and principles promotion in the CCP regime's owned media, identified by the vector autoregressive modelling in this article, revealed that the CCP uses Confucianism as one of the instruments to build the regime's legitimacy and to pacify the dissatisfaction of Chinese people. The analysis also showed that the legitimacy crisis faced by the CCP regime is being tackled using the promotion of Confucian ideas when trying to pacify the increasing labour protests. This is how the CCP is essentially trying to alter the Chinese people's cognitive structure by employing propagandistic means, whereby the Party can change its subjects' moral reasoning even in the case that the content *per se* – the unjust treatment of the labour class – has not changed. However, the question of whether the CCP is moving to a promotion of a Confucian-nationalist narrative, thereby seeking to marginalize or even replace its communist stance in the public media which till today it remains a public consciousness among its 96 million Party members – either as continuous disciplining effects or as an internalized belief – indeed needs further studies.

²⁰ For instance, in the year 2020, the annual Public Security Budget (公共安全支出) was 1 412 billion Yuan which was even bigger than that year's National Defense Budget (国防支出) consisting of 1 291 billion Yuan. See: Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China, September 17, 2021.

²¹ For example, some tenets of Confucianism such as Three Fundamental Bonds: the lord is his retainer's paragon, the husband is his wife's paragon, the father is his son's paragon (三綱 - 君為臣綱、夫為妻綱、父為子綱。) is a social norm to cultivate a political culture regulating the people's behavior in their life. From a perspective of political ideology, its implication can be theoretically interpreted as due to the ethical merits possessed by the supervisors (e.g. such as the CCP regime's functionaries be depicted as Confucianism theory's "Junzi (君子)" – a sort of erudite, self-discipline intellectual) the subordinates (e.g. the ordinary Chinese people like those in the labour class be depicted as Confucianism's "Baixing (百姓)" – the commoners, plebeians who are thought to be lacking proper knowledge of their country and thus with little sense of responsibility for the country) ought to follow their commands.

Furthermore, from a comparative perspective, the CCP's Confucianism promotion *per se* as a legitimation policy there are perceivable similarities in using the dominant religion or culture as a strategy to salvage the government's legitimacy shared by other authoritarian regimes (e.g., such as Saddam Hussein started frequently visiting the Sunni Islam mosques after his secular Ba'ath regime suffered the military fiasco in the Gulf War, or Putin's kleptocratic regime revitalized the Russian Orthodox Church after Patriarch Aleksii II's death for underpinning its declining domestic supports, etc.). Therefore, apart from this article's findings, a comparison study between these authoritarian regimes' similar legitimation policies thereof could be a fruitful development that will complement the discipline's scholarship concerning these authoritarian regimes' legitimacy studies.

Acknowledgement

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the three anonymous reviewers who dedicated their time to review our manuscript, the comments and suggestions from their different perspectives (especially the profound knowledge regarding Confucianism in one of the reviewers' comments). helped us to significantly improve this article.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1. The test result of the VAR modelling: ADL equation (1)

```

VAR system, lag order 5
OLS estimates, observations 2011:07-2019:12 (T = 102)
Log-likelihood = -1126.0729
Determinant of covariance matrix = 13311074
AIC = 22.5112
BIC = 23.0774
HQC = 22.7405
Portmanteau test: LB(25) = 90.5383, df = 80 [0.1973]

Equation 1: pdfadl

      coefficient      std. error    t-ratio    p-value
-----
const          0.0485396      0.859800     0.05645    0.9551
pdfadl_1       -0.530957          0.102640    -5.173     1.36e-06 ***
pdfadl_2       -0.554904          0.108570    -5.111     1.76e-06 ***
pdfadl_3       -0.541914          0.111776    -4.848     5.11e-06 ***
pdfadl_4       -0.327659          0.110263    -2.972     0.0038 ***
pdfadl_5       -0.0965262         0.0990257   -0.9748    0.3323
protestlvd1_1  0.000835985        0.00185793   0.4500     0.6538
protestlvd1_2  0.00263802         0.00191827   1.375     0.1724
protestlvd1_3  0.000404254        0.00183506   0.2203     0.8261
protestlvd1_4 -0.00173563         0.00190538   -0.9109    0.3647
protestlvd1_5  0.00414879         0.00181454   2.286     0.0246 **

Mean dependent var -0.009804    S.D. dependent var 10.77262
Sum squared resid  6852.684    S.E. of regression  8.677800
R-squared          0.415349    Adjusted R-squared 0.351102
F(10, 91)         6.464853    P-value(F)         1.84e-07
rho               -0.041699    Durbin-Watson      2.058231

F-tests of zero restrictions:

All lags of pdfadl      F(5, 91) = 8.6287 [0.0000]
All lags of protestlvd1 F(5, 91) = 2.4545 [0.0392]
All vars, lag 5         F(2, 91) = 2.9835 [0.0556]

```

ANNEX 2. The test result of the VAR modelling: ADL equation (2)

Equation 2: protestlvd1

	coefficient	std. error	t-ratio	p-value
const	-4.45917	46.8600	-0.09516	0.9244
pdfadl_1	-6.64113	5.59400	-1.187	0.2382
pdfadl_2	-1.53070	5.91719	-0.2587	0.7965
pdfadl_3	-8.40160	6.09189	-1.379	0.1712
pdfadl_4	-5.59462	6.00944	-0.9310	0.3543
pdfadl_5	-11.6049	5.39700	-2.150	0.0342 **
protestlvd1_1	-0.536677	0.101259	-5.300	8.03e-07 ***
protestlvd1_2	-0.335403	0.104548	-3.208	0.0018 ***
protestlvd1_3	-0.412819	0.100012	-4.128	8.11e-05 ***
protestlvd1_4	-0.426481	0.103845	-4.107	8.75e-05 ***
protestlvd1_5	-0.118621	0.0988943	-1.199	0.2335
Mean dependent var	1.715686	S.D. dependent var	565.3564	
Sum squared resid	20354955	S.E. of regression	472.9491	
R-squared	0.369472	Adjusted R-squared	0.300184	
F(10, 91)	5.332358	P-value(F)	3.69e-06	
rho	-0.010038	Durbin-Watson	2.012200	

F-tests of zero restrictions:

All lags of pdfadl	F(5, 91) =	1.3280 [0.2594]
All lags of protestlvd1	F(5, 91) =	8.0567 [0.0000]
All vars, lag 5	F(2, 91) =	3.1702 [0.0467]

ANNEX 3. The People's Daily chronological edition changes

人民日报各时期的版次对照表:

时期	版数
创刊 - 1956.6.31	4版
1956.7.1 - 1979	4或6版
1980 - 1994	8版
1995 - 2002	12版
2003 - 2009.6.30	16版
2009.7.1 - 2009.12.31	20版
2010 - 2018	24版
2019 - 至今	20版

Source: People's Daily.

References

1. Beetham, D. 2011. "Legitimacy." In *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, edited by B. Badie, D. Berg-Schlosser and L. Morlino, 1415-26. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412994163>
2. Bell, D. 2010. *China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741009000447>
3. Brady, A. 2012. "State Confucianism, Chineseness, and tradition in CCP propaganda." In *China's Thought Management*, edited by A. Brady, 57-75. Oxford: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203803455>
4. Bruce, J. D.; Shen M.; Yan J. 2017. "Generating Regime Support in Contemporary China: Legitimation and the Local Legitimacy Deficit," *Modern China* 43(2): 123-155. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0097700416672419>
5. Chai, W.; Chai M. 2013. „The Meaning of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream,“ *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 20(2): 95-97.
6. China Labour Bulletin (中国劳工通信). „Strike Map.“ Accessed June 28, 2023. <https://clb.org.hk/>
7. China News Service. January 11, 2011. "The 9.5 Meter High Confucius Statue Is Placed in The Front of The National Museum as A New Cultural Landmark in The Tiananmen Square (米高孔子像落户国博 天安门地区新添文化地标)." Accessed June 28, 2023. <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/131781.htm>
8. Chu, Y. 2013. "Sources of Regime Legitimacy and the Debate over the Chinese Model," *China Review* 13(1): 1-42. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.861141>
9. Confucius. 5th Century BC. *The Analects*.
10. Crimes of Dereliction of Duty, Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China § Article 398 (1997). Accessed August 18, 2023. http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm
11. Cunningham, E.; Saich T; Turiel J. 2020. „Understanding CCP Resilience: Surveying Chinese Public Opinion Through Time.“ Cambridge, MA: The Roy and Lila Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation. Accessed August 18. https://ash.harvard.edu/files/ash/files/final_policy_brief_7.6.2020.pdf
12. Dai Sheng (ed.). 1st Century BC. *Book of Rites*.
13. Ford, C. A. 2015. "The Party and the Sage: Communist China's Use of Quasi-Confucian Rationalizations for One-Party Dictatorship and Imperial Ambition," *Journal of Contemporary China* 24(96): 1032-1047. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1030954>
14. Foucault, M. 1977. *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage Books.
15. Foucault, M. 1982. "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8(4): 777-795. <https://doi.org/10.1086/448181>
16. Gao, G. 2022. "Post-Tiananmen Chinese Liberal Intellectuals' Political Uses of Confucian Tradition and Chinese History," *Journal of Contemporary China* 31(137): 709-725. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2021.2010866>
17. Gordon, C. (ed.) 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977* By Michel Foucault. New York: Pantheon Books.
18. Han Feizi. 3rd Century BC. *The Critique of Power*.
19. Hu, S. 2007. "Confucianism and Contemporary Chinese Politics," *Politics & Policy* 35(1): 136-153. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00051.x>
20. Huang, G. 2022. "How a Non-Democratic Regime Maintains its Legitimacy over Time: A Study of Changes in Chinese Communist Party Legitimacy after 1949," *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 7(4): 971-987. <https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911221078030>
21. Kim, T. W. 2014. "Confucian Ethics and Labor Rights," *Business Ethics Quarterly* 24(4): 565-594. <https://doi.org/10.5840/beq201492617>
22. Lee, S. 1996. "Liberal Rights or/and Confucian Virtues?" *Philosophy East and West* 46(3): 367-379. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1399529>
23. Li, Z. 2020. "Confucian Meritocracy, Political Legitimacy and Constitutional Democracy," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 46(9): 1076-1092. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453720948403>

24. Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China. September 17, 2021. „2020 National General Public Budget Expenditure.“ Accessed June 28, 2023. http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2020zyjs/202109/t20210917_3753571.htm
25. People's Daily (人民日报). „People's Daily Graph Database (1946-2023).“ Accessed June 28, 2023. http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2023-02/19/nbs.D110000renmrb_01.htm
26. Perry, E. J. 2010. „Popular Protest in China: Playing by the Rules,“ In *China Today, China Tomorrow: Domestic Politics, Economy and Society*, edited by J. Fewsmith. Lanham, 11-28. MD: Rowman & Littlefield. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911811002397>
27. Robinson, P. 2019. *Russian Conservatism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501747366>
28. Rohde, A. 2013. „Change and Continuity in Arab Iraqi Education: Sunni and Shi'i Discourses in Iraqi Textbooks Before and After 2003,“ *Comparative Education Review*, 57(4): 711-734. <https://doi.org/10.1086/671561>
29. Scopes and Categories of State secrets, Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets § Article 9, Clause 7 (2010). Accessed August 18, 2023. https://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-04/30/content_1596420.htm
30. Strudler, A. 2008. „Confucian Skepticism about Workplace Rights,“ *Business Ethics Quarterly* 18(1): 67-83. <https://doi.org/10.5840/beq20081817>
31. Sung, B. 1999. „Confucian Leninist State: The People's Republic of China,“ *Asian Perspective* 23(2): 225-244. <https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.1999.0031>
32. Walton, L. 2018. „The „Spirit“ of Confucian Education in Contemporary China,“ *Modern China* 44(3): 313-342. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0097700417744165>
33. Wang, C. 1997. *The Studies of Maoism Regime*. Beijing: History of Chinese Communist Party Publishing House.
34. Wang, H. 1975. *Legalism and Anti-Confucianism in Maoist Politics*. Institute of International Relations. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000022098>
35. Wang, J.; Nahm, K. 2019. „From Confucianism to Communism and Back,“ *Journal of Asian Sociology* 48(1): 91-114. <https://doi.org/10.21588/jas/2019.48.1.006>
36. Wang, C. 2023. „Resurgence of Confucian education in contemporary China: Parental involvement, moral anxiety, and the pedagogy of memorisation,“ *Journal of Moral Education* 52(3): 325-342. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2022.2066639>
37. Weer, M. 1947. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. London: William Hodge and Company Limited.
38. Woods, P. R.; Lamond, D. A. 2011. „What Would Confucius Do? - Confucian Ethics and Self-Regulation in Management,“ *Journal of Business Ethics* 102(4): 669-683. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0838-5>
39. Wu, S. 2014. „The Revival of Confucianism and the CCP's Struggle for Cultural Leadership: A Content Analysis of the People's Daily, 2000-2009,“ *Journal of Contemporary China* 23(89): 971-991. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.882624>
40. Wu, S. 2015. „„Modernizing“ Confucianism in China: A Repackaging of Institutionalization to Consolidate Party Leadership,“ *Asian Perspective* 39(2): 301-324. <https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2015.0005>
41. Xie, H. 2014. „The Conflict without Vested Interest: The Analysis of The Motives and Logic behind The Chinese Collective Protest,“ *Academic Journal of Zhongzhou*, no. 2.
42. Yang Ray, O. 2018. „Political Process and Widespread Protests in China: The 2010 Labour Protest,“ In *Debating Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China*. 1st ed, edited by X-Z. Suisheng. Taylor and Francis. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.918395>
43. Yang, F. 2007. „Cultural Dynamics in China: Today and in 2020,“ *Asia Policy* 4: 41-52. <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2007.0012>
44. Zasztowt L. 2018. *Melting Puzzle: The Nobility, Society, Education and Scholarly Life in East-Central Europe (1800s-1900s)*. Warszawa: Studium Europy Wschodniej.

Ligita Šarkutė, Jiabin Song

KAIP KINIJOS KOMUNISTŲ PARTIJA TVARKOSI SU LEGITIMACIJOS KRIZE: KONFUCIANIZMO PROPAGAVIMO SĄSAJA SU DARBUOTOJŲ PROTESTO LYGIU

Anotacija. Straipsnyje siekiama išsiaiškinti konfucianizmo vaidmenų stiprinant Kinijos komunistų partijos legitimaciją. Po keturiasdešimt metų trukusios ekonominės reformos šiuolaikinė Kinija iš esmės funkcionuoja kaip pusiau kapitalistinė valstybė, tačiau dėl darbo klasės apsaugos stygiaus kyla nemažai konfliktų tarp darbuotojų ir jų darbdavių, o tai gilina autoritarinio Kinijos režimo legitimacijos krizę ir verčia jį ieškoti alternatyvių priemonių ortodoksinei ideologijai ir prievartos mechanizms savo legitimacijai stiprinti. Šiame straipsnyje ieškoma atsakymo į minėtų klausimų nagrinėjant koreliaciją tarp konfucianizmo nušvietimo (su konfucianizmo idėjomis susijusių pranešimų dažnio) didžiausiame režimo kontroliuojamame Kinijos laikraštyje „People’s Daily“ ir to, koku mastu kinai pripažįsta režimą teisėtu, ką rodo darbuotojų protestų Kinijoje lygis. Koreliacija tarp konfucianizmo idėjų, principų ir kitų atributų, straipsnyje bendrai vadinamų konfucianizmu, nušvietimo leikraštyje „People’s Daily“ ir darbuotojų protestų lygio 2011–2019 m. laikotarpiu, buvo nustatyta naudojant vektorinės autoregresijos (VAR) modelį. Analizės rezultatai atskleidė, kad 2011–2019 metais Kinijos komunistų partija naudojo konfucianizmą kaip vieną iš priemonių režimo legitimacijai stiprinti ir darbo klasės nepasitenkinimui mažinti. Be to, atsižvelgiant į tai, kad daugelis autoritarinių režimų laikosi panašios strategijos dėl dominuojančios religijos ar kultūros pasitelkimo stiprinant savo legitimaciją krizių metu, straipsnyje aptariamo tyrimo išvalgos gali būti naudingos tolesniems lyginamiesiems autoritarinių režimų specifikos tyrimams.

Ligita Šarkutė, associate professor and senior research fellow, Vytautas Magnus University, Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy, Department of Public Administration, Kaunas, Lithuania

E-mail: ligita.sarkute@vdu.lt

Jiabin Song, master of political science, Vytautas Magnus University, Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy, Kaunas, Lithuania

E-mail: jiabin.song@alumni.vdu.lt

Ligita Šarkutė, docentė ir vyriausioji mokslo darbuotoja, Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas, Politikos mokslų ir diplomatijos fakultetas, Viešojo administravimo katedra, Kaunas, Lietuva

El. paštas: ligita.sarkute@vdu.lt

Jiabin Song, politikos mokslų magistras, Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas, Politikos mokslų ir diplomatijos fakultetas, Kaunas, Lietuva

El. paštas: jiabin.song@alumni.vdu.lt



PIRMOSIOS 1000 VAIKO GYVENIMO DIENŲ KAIP VIEŠOSIOS POLITIKOS PROBLEMOS PATEIKTIS

Ilona Tamutienė

Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas
V. Putvinskio g. 23-514, 44212 Kaunas

Vaida Auglytė

Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas,
V. Putvinskio g. 23-514, 44212 Kaunas

<https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppa.23.1.34281>

Anotacija. Šio straipsnio tikslas – atskleisti mokslu grįstų pirmųjų 1000 vaiko gyvenimo dienų problemų pateiktis ir jų pozicionavimą Lietuvoje. Straipsnis remiasi naratyvine literatūros apžvalga. Duomenys analizuojami taikant viešosios politikos rėminimo priegią, apsiribojant skirtingų problemos pateikčių (rėminimų) identifikavimu. Atliktas tyrimas leido išskirti šias pagrindines pirmųjų 1000 vaiko gyvenimo dienų problemų pateiktis: 1) biomedicininę (pabrėžia aplinkos poveikį vaiko raidai bei jo sveikatos rezultatams ateityje); 2) socioekonominę (pabrėžia skurdo įtaką vaiko raidai, investicijų į ankstyvąją vaikystę atsiperkamumą, būsimo žmogiškojo kapitalo stiprinimą); 3) puoselėjančios globos (pabrėžia sveikatos priežiūros, socialinės apsaugos, mitybos, atliepiančio santykio elementų svarbą). 4) tvaraus vystymosi (pabrėžia rūpestį ankstyvąją vaikystę, būtinybę spręsti sveikatos, skurdo, aplinkos apsaugos problemas bei taikos ir solidarumo stiprinimo poreikį. Visos pateiktys sutelkia dėmesį į vaiko gyvenimo kelio perspektyvą bei tarpgeneracinę problemų prigimtį. Skirtingų disciplinų problemų pateiktys nekonkuruoja tarpusavyje, o sudaro pagrindą ankstyvosios vaikystės vystymo politikos darbotvarkei.

Tyrimas atskleidė, kad Lietuvoje vyrauja išskirtinai biomedicininė problemos pateiktis. Nors Lietuvos švietimo sistemoje ankstyvasis ugdymas apibrėžiamas kaip ikimokyklinis (traktuojamas nuo vaiko gimimo), tačiau pirmųjų 1000 vaiko gyvenimo dienų ugdymo sprendiniai paliekami išskirtinai tėvų atsakomybei. Socialiniame sektoriuje pirmosios 1000 dienų labiau siejamos su apsauga nuo smurto gimus vaikui. Nėščiujų ir vaikų preventcinė sveikatos priežiūra Lietuvoje vykdoma nusistovėjusia bendra tvarka, neišskiriant pažeidžiamų grupių ir neteikiant prioriteto pirmosioms 1000 vaiko gyvenimo dienų. Šiame lauke stokojama sisteminių tyrimų, advokataujančių koalicijų bei problemos įtraukimo į politinę darbotvarkę. Rekomenduojama finansuoti pirmųjų 1000 vaiko gyvenimo dienų tarpdisciplininius tyrimus, kurti advokataujančias koalicijas ir valstybinę pirmųjų 1000 vaiko gyvenimo dienų programą Lietuvoje.

Keywords: *the first 1000 days, early childhood development, policy framing, public policy.*

Reikšminiai žodžiai: *pirmosios 1000 gyvenimo dienų, ankstyvasis vaikystės vystymas, politikos problemų pateiktys, viešoji politika.*

Įvadas

Pirmųjų 1000 vaiko gyvenimo dienų (toliau – P1000D) politikos koncepcija yra holistinis požiūris į vaiko vystymąsi ir į ankstyvas intervencijas, atkreipianti dėmesį į kritinį laikotarpį nuo motinos pastojimo momento iki vaiko antrojo gimtadienio. Rečiau, ypač Jungtinėje Karalystėje, galima sutikti 1001 pirmųjų vaiko gyvenimo dienų sąvoką (Loughton, 2017, p. 70), tačiau ji susilaukia mažiau dėmesio, nors pabrėžia tuos pačius elementus kaip ir P1000D konceptas. Toliau bus naudojama P1000D sąvoka. Ši koncepcija

apibrėžia, kad šis laikotarpis yra itin reikšmingas vaiko fiziniam, kognityviniam, emociniam ir socialiniam vystymuisi, o ankstyvos intervencijos šiuo metu gali turėti ilgalaikį teigiamą poveikį vaiko bendrajai gerovei bei visam jo gyvenimo keliui (Draper et al., 2022). Kaip tyrimo objektas, P1000D yra tyrinėjamos atskirai arba kaip integrali ankstyvosios vaikystės vystymo (toliau – AVV) dalis.

Per pastaruosius dešimtmečius galima stebėti išaugusį susidomėjimą AVV lauku. Pasitelkdamas mokslu grįstus įrodymus (Black et al., 2017; Anderson et al., 2003), P1000D periodo svarbą pasauliniu mastu išryškino tokios tarptautinės organizacijos kaip Jungtinių Tautų vaikų fondas (Cusick & Georgieff, 2016), Pasaulinė sveikatos organizacija (World Health Organization, 2020), Pasaulio bankas (World Bank, 2019). Reaguodami į situaciją, kad beveik ketvirtadaliui Europos Sąjungoje (toliau – ES) gyvenančių vaikų gresia skurdas arba socialinė atskirtis, Europos Parlamentas ir Europos Komisija AVV lauke taip pat priėmė ryžtingus sprendimus. 2021 m. politinė ES darbotvarkė buvo papildyta Vaiko garantijomis, kuriomis siekiama užtikrinti, kad kiekvienas vaikas turėtų galimybę gauti nemokamą sveikatos ir socialinę priežiūrą, švietimo paslaugas, galimybę kurti socialinius santykius, pilnavertiškai maitintis bei gyventi jų poreikius atitinkančiame būste (Guio et al., 2021; Council of the European Union, 2021).

Klausimų, susijusių su P1000D laikotarpiu įtraukimas į tarptautinio lygmens darbotvarkes iš *viršaus į apačią* principu, paskatino ankstyvosios vaikystės, tame tarpe ir P1000D, politiką. Vis daugiau valstybių, pavyzdžiui Šiaurės šalys (Danielsdóttir & Ingudóttir, 2022), Naujoji Zelandija (Te Hiringa Hauora, 2022), Australija (The Centre for Community Child Health, 2021), JAV (Hamner et al., 2022) įgyvendina P1000D apsaugos politiką ir iniciatyvas.

Siekiant globalaus prioriteto susiduriama su problemos apibrėžimo pateikčių ir vieningo susitarimo, kuris padėtų atrasti bendrą viešą problemos poziciją bei susilauktų politinės paramos, iššūkiu (Shawar ir Shiffman, 2017). Išaugęs skirtingų sričių mokslininkų, tarptautinių organizacijų ir įvairių disciplinų atstovų susidomėjimas AVV lauku suponavo poreikį iširti, kaip mokslu grįsti P1000D įrodymai yra pristatomi viešosios politikos lauke. Šio straipsnio tikslas – atskleisti mokslu grįstų pirmųjų 1000 vaiko gyvenimo dienų problemų pateiktis ir jų pozicionavimą Lietuvoje. Tam iškelti šie uždaviniai: 1) apibrėžti P1000D politikos objektą; 2) identifikuoti P1000D problemų pateiktis; 3) apžvelgti P1000D pozicionavimą Lietuvos mokslo ir viešosios politikos lauke.

Tyrimo metodai

Tyrimas atliktas pasitelkiant viešosios politikos *reminimo* (angl. framing) priegią, apsiribojant skirtingų problemos pateikčių (reminimų) identifikavimu. Remiantis šiuo teoriniu požiūriu, problema gali būti vertinama iš įvairių perspektyvų ir suvokiama kaip turinti pasekmes daugeliui vertybių ir pasirinkimų. Priega padeda atskleisti procesą, kurio metu susiformuoja tam tikras suvokimas, kitaip tariant, perorientuojamas mąstymas apie problemą (Chong ir Druckman 2007). Šiame procese vieną iš esminių vaidmenų atlieka mokslininkai, nustatantys problemos apibrėžimų tendencijas. Pagal *reminimo* teoriją, pirmiausia yra identifikuojama problema (arba įvykis) ir konkretus požiūris(-iai) į ją. Kai nustatomas pradinis *reminimų* rinkinys, kitas žingsnis – pasirinkti turinio analizės šaltinius. *Reminimas* gali vykti trimis lygiais: 1) pateikti naujus įsitikinimus apie problemą; 2) naujus įsitikinimus padaryti prieinamus kitiems; 3) naujus įsitikinimus pritaikyti politikoje (Chong ir Druckman 2007). Kai į viešąją erdvę patenka ankstyvosios vaikystės tyrimų idėja, pvz., kritinė ankstyvosios intervencijos svarba, ir apie ją pradeda diskutuoti skirtingi viešosios politikos veikėjai ir ja patiki politikai, – tuomet atsiranda mokslu grįsta politika (Gormley 2011). Taigi, P1000D problemos pateiktis, ypač tarp skirtingų mokslo disciplinų, turi esminį poveikį šios politikos vystymui.

Siekiant identifikuoti kaip pirmosios 1000 dienų yra apibrėžiamos ir pateikiamos viešojoje politikoje (mokslininkai dažniausiai tai daro per rekomendacijas), bus pasitelkiamas naratyvinės literatūros apžvalgos metodas (Baumeister ir Leary 1997). Vedant raktinius žodžius, tokius kaip „early childhood development“, „first 1000 days“, „public policy framing“, „1000 gyvenimo dienų“, „ankstyvasis vaikystės ugdymas“,

„ankstyvoji vaikystės priežiūra“, „nėščiųjų priežiūra“, „kūdikių maitinimas“, Google mokslinčiaus duomenų bazėje buvo atlikta paieška. Tyrimas vykdytas 2023 sausio–birželio mėn. Straipsnių atrankai buvo taikyti šie kriterijai: turinys tiesiogiai susietas su P1000D problemos charakterizavimu, yra pateikiama rekomendacija politikams, praktikams. Identifikavus pirminius problemos rėminimo kodus, papildomai ir tikslingai ieškota šiuos rėminimus patvirtinančios ar atmetančios literatūros šaltinių.

Siekiant atskleisti pirmųjų 1000 gyvenimo dienų pozicionavimą Lietuvos viešosios politikos lauke, greta literatūros apžvalgos, pasitiekiami dokumentų bei žiniasklaidos straipsnių turinio analizė.

P1000D apibrėžtis

Tiek kaip sąvoka, tiek kaip politinė problema ankstyvosios vaikystės vystymo, tarp jų ir P1000D laukas, yra pristatomi gana įvairiai. „Lancet“ žurnalo straipsnių serijoje, skirtingų autorių išryškinamas AVV terminas pabrėžia holistinį požiūrį į vaiko fizinį, emocinį, socialinį ir pažintinį vystymąsi bei yra plačiai naudojamas sveikatos srityje ar tarptautinių organizacijų veiklos lauke (Anderson et al. 2003; Britto et al. 2017). AVV sąvoka savyje talpina ir modifikuotus sektorinius apibrėžimus, pavyzdžiui, švietimo sektoriuje vartojama sąvoka *ankstyvasis ugdymas* (angl. early childhood education) arba *ankstyvoji vaikų priežiūra ir švietimas* (angl. early childhood care and education) (Marope ir Kaga 2015). ES bei Ekonominio bendradarbiavimo ir plėtros organizacija dažniau naudoja sąvoką *ankstyvasis vaikystės ugdymas ir priežiūra* (angl. early childhood education and care) (OECD 2022; Shawar ir Shiffman 2017). Pastaraisiais metais vis didesnis dėmesys sutelkiamas ties P1000D (angl. the first 1000 days), pripažįstant jas pačiomis svarbiausiomis: tai yra maksimalaus vystymosi, plastiškumo laikotarpis, kuris padeda optimalios sveikatos, augimo ir neurologinio vystymosi pagrindus visam gyvenimo keliui (Malave et al. 2022). Nors nėra nuneigiama kitų amžiaus tarpinių svarba, tačiau pripažįstama, kad puoselėjanti aplinka per P1000D teigiamai veikia vaiko raidą, o tai lemia geresnius vystymosi rezultatus ateityje. Taigi, pirmąsias 1000 dienų galima išskirti kaip vieną iš AVV sąvokos dalių, kuri apibrėžia patį jautriausią vaiko gyvenimo tarpinį.

P1000D kaip biomedicininė problemos pateiktis

Argumentai, raginantys imtis neatidėliotinių vaikystės apsaugos priemonių, slypi žalojančios vaikystės tyrimuose (Felitti ir Anda 2010), paskatinusiuose biomedicininę problemos pateiktį, ypatingai visuomenės sveikatos politikos srityje (žr. 1 lent.). Nepalanki vaikystės patirtis, pvz., smurtas, piktnaudžiavimas alkoholiu ar narkotinėmis medžiagomis, intymių partnerių smurto liudijimas yra siejami su pagrindinėmis suaugusiųjų sergamumo ir mirtingumo priežastimis (Merrick et al. 2019). Finlay et al. identifikavo 25 tyrimus, patvirtinančius, kad žalojanti vaikystės patirtis (toliau – ŽVP) yra traumuojanti ir susijusi su padidėjusia neigiamų pasekmių sveikatai rizika per visą gyvenimą (Finlay et al. 2022).

Remiantis 2017 m. atlikta Hughes et al. (2017) sistemine literatūros apžvalga ir metaanalize, patvirtinta, kad ŽVP yra daugelio sveikatos būklių rizikos veiksnys, ypač stipriai koreliuojantis su žalingų patirčių perdavimu ateities kartoms per smurtą, psichinius sutrikimus bei priklausomybes. Pabrėžiama, kad norint gerinti visuomenės sveikatą, svarbu sutelkti dėmesį į žalojančios vaikystės prevenciją, atsparumo didinimą, plečiant paslaugų teikimo tinklą, įskaitant ir motinų sveikatos stiprinimą (Gaillard ir Jaddoe 2023). Visuomenės sveikatos perspektyvoje pateikiama problema yra sufokusuota į ankstyvosios vaikystės puoselėjimą kaip į pagrindinę priemonę, siekiant įvairių ligų prevencijos visuose žmogaus gyvenimo tarpsniuose.

Nors ŽVP problemos pateiktyje P1000D nebuvo išskirtos, kadangi moksliniai darbai rėmėsi retrospektyviais duomenimis, tačiau tai paskatino tyrimų bangą, stengiantis patvirtinti arba paneigti pagrindinę Felitti ir Anda tezę apie žalojančios vaikystės pasekmes ir poveikio visuomenės sveikatai priežastinius mechanizmus (Finlay et al. 2022). Galima daryti prielaidą, kad tai lėmė P1000D išskyrimą kaip svarbiausią vystymosi tarpinį, nes pastaruoju dešimtmečiu vis daugiau įrodymų iš AVV tyrimų išryškina P1000D periodo svarumą (Malave et al. 2022). P1000D paveikia visus vaiko formavimosi ir veikimo aspektus,

1 lentelė. Pirmųjų 1000 vaiko gyvenimo dienų, kaip viešosios politikos problemas pateiktys

BIOMEDICININĖ
<p><i>Žalojančios vaikystės patirties koncepcija:</i> traumuojantys ankstyvos vaikystės įvykiai lemia įvairias ligas suaugus, ypač psichinės sveikatos, tokias kaip depresija, savižudybės, priklausomybės. Išryškinama našta sveikatos priežiūros sistemai, kurią siūloma mažinti per rūpestį vaikystėje: puoselėti vaikystę; diegti klinikinių praktikų standartus; diagnozuoti trauminius įvykius; saugoti vaikus nuo smurto šeimose ir kitos žalojančios aplinkos. Dominuoja visuomenės sveikatos politikos sprendiniai, siekiantys sumažinti motinų ir vaikų sergamumo ir mirtingumo rodiklius.</p>
<p><i>Vaiko vystymosi problemas pateiktis, akcentuojanti aplinkos vaidmenį:</i> nepalanki aplinka, ypač toksinis stresas, neigiamai paveikia vaikų nervinės, imuninės ir kitų sistemų vystymąsi viso gyvenimo kelio perspektyvoje. Pabrėžiamas tarpgeneracinis problemos perdavimas, akcentuojama pagalba tiek kompleksines, tiek socialines problemas patiriančioms šeimoms ir jų vaikams. Teigiama, kad ŽVP palikti biologiniai randai gali būti slopinami ir atstatyti naudojant aplinkos ir psichosocialinę paramą bei intervencijas. Dominuoja neurovystymosi problemas pateiktis bei visuomenės sveikatos sprendiniai tuo pačiu pabrėžiant ir socialinį aspektą.</p>
SOCIOEKONOMINĖ
<p><i>Ekonominė problemas pateiktis:</i> neigiami padariniai siejami ne tik su našta asmens ir visuomenės sveikatai, bet ir su prastais švietimo (nepasirengimu mokyklai, menkesniais pasiekimais, ypač matematikos) ir socialiniais padariniais. Pabrėžiama, kad investuoti į P1000D valstybėms finansiškai naudingiau nei taisyti traumų paliktus padarinius visą likusį žmogaus gyvenimą. Išryškinama investicijų į ankstyvąją vaikystę svarba: į motinos mitybą ir saugumą, savalaikį aprūpinimą vitaminais ir mikroelementais, gimdymo ir pogimdyvinio periodo priežiūrą ir socialinius ryšius bei ugdymą. Tai sustiprina ne tik vaiko raidą, bet ir jo socialinį kapitalą ateityje. Problemos sprendimui šalis turi skirti finansavimą, kuris traktuojamas kaip investicija ir yra argumentuojamas Heckman'o kreive.</p>
<p><i>Bendruomeninė / visuomeninė problemas pateiktis:</i> pabrėžiamas šeimos ir vietos bendruomenių vaidmuo, saugios aplinkos, parkų, žindymo kambarių poreikis, akcentuojama lankomosios priežiūros ir kitų bendruomenės lygyje vykdomų intervencijų bei programų reikšmė, jų veiksmingumas. Siūlomos daugiasektorinės skurdo mažinimo programos ir priemonės, kurios papildytų specifines sveikatos priežiūros ir mitybos intervencijas.</p>
PUOSELĖJANČIOS GLOBOS
<p><i>Puoselėjančios globos problemas pateiktis:</i> pasitelkia įvairių mokslo disciplinų įrodymus ir pabrėžia, kad vaikų vidinės ir išorinės aplinkos sistemos sąveikauja tarpusavyje bei daro esminę įtaką jų augimui. Palanki vystymuisi aplinka padeda išvengti socialinių, asmens ir visuomenės sveikatos problemų, įskaitant skurdo rato sustabdymą bei sveikatos nelygybių pašalinimą. Pažymima, kad šalia mylinčių globėjų, vaikams reikia ir saugių bendruomenių, tinkamo būsto, prieigos prie žaliųjų parkų, aplinkos, kurioje nėra toksinų bei galimybės gauti įperkamo, pilnaverčio maisto.</p>
TVARAUS VYSTYMOŠI
<p><i>Tvaraus vystymosi ir taikos užtikrinimo problemas pateiktis:</i> rūpestis ankstyvąja vaikystėje traktuojamas kaip raktas į darnų vystymąsi, sveikatos problemų, skurdo, aplinkos apsaugos, taikos ir solidarumo srityse. Jis yra įtrauktas į darnaus vystymosi tikslus, kurie apima nėščiąjų sveikatos priežiūrą ir mitybą, kūdikių mirtingumo mažinimą, bado ir pilnavertės mitybos klausimus, aplinkos gerinimą, priklausomybių ir smurto prevenciją. Priešingai – nesirūpinimas motinyste ir ankstyvąja vaikystėje yra pateikiamas kaip tarpgeneracinė problema, ypač socialinių konfliktų, fizinės ir psichinės sveikatos, kitų sveikatos sutrikimų, skurdo perdavimo iš kartos į kartą bei kitais atvejais.</p>

Šaltinis: sudaryta autorių, remiantis literatūros sąrašo pateiktais šaltiniais.

įskaitant sveikatą ir gerovę, psichinę būklę, socialinį funkcionavimą bei pažinimo vystymąsi. Besivystantis vaikas nuolat prisitaiko prie aplinkos. Šis prisitaikymas gali būti naudingas arba žalingas, priklausomai nuo aplinkos charakteristikų ir vaiko sąveikų su ja (McEwen 2022). Tai reiškia, kad vaikai gali vystytis tik taip, kaip juos įgalina šeima, bendruomenė ir platesnė visuomenė. Prasta motinos ir vaikų sveikata bei ilgalaikis (toksinis) stresas per P1000D, gali sukurti pagrindą, kuris lems sveikatos netolygumus visą jo gyvenimą (Agarwal ir Scher 2022; Magalhães-Barbosa et al. 2022). Tokia problemos pateiktis skatina imtis neatidėliotinių veiksnių bei skirti prioritetinį dėmesį šiam ankstyvajam amžiaus tarpšniui.

Taigi, biomedicininė pateiktis į P1000D periodą žvelgia per sveikatos priežiūros sistemos lauką, orientaciją nukreipdama į traumuojančių patirčių, prastos mitybos, žalingų tėvų įpročių ir kitų problemų keliama grėsmę vaikų sveikatos rezultatams.

Pirmosios 1000 dienų kaip socioekonominė problemos pateiktis

P1000D kaip bendruomeninė / visuomeninė problemos pateiktis išryškina būtinybę sutelkti dėmesį į sveikatą lemiančius veiksnius, ypač sprendžiant su nelygybe susijusias problemas (Okeyo et al. 2020) (žr. 1 lent.). Skirtingo amžiaus kohortų tyrimai, atlikti 95 pasaulio šalyse, patvirtino, kad skurdas ankstyvoje vaikystėje turi esminį poveikį ne tik sveikatai, bet ir žmogiškajam kapitalui.. Pabrėžiama daugiasektorinių skurdo mažinimo programų ir priemonių įgyvendinimo būtinybę, siekiant sustiprinti specifines, su sveikatos priežiūra ir mityba susijusias intervencijas (Victoria et al. 2022). Ankstyvosios vaikystės puoselėjimas laikomas kaip vienas iš būdų sustabdyti skurdo ir socialinės atskirties ratą tarp kartų (Tamutienė et al. 2020).

Argumentuojama, kad Išlaidų subalansavimas siekiant užtikrinti saugią ir puoselėjančią vaikystę būtų ekonomiškai naudingas ir sumažintų apkrovas, tenkančias sveikatos priežiūros sistemoms (Bellis et al. 2019). Jis taip pat padėtų spręsti ne tik skurdo problemas, bet ir sunkumus, kylančius dėl silpno žmogiškojo kapitalo (Attanasio et al. 2022). Žmogiškojo kapitalo perspektyvos rėmuose, P1000D pateikiamos kaip esminis laikotarpis, kuomet investicijos atneša didžiausią grąžą ir sustiprina ateities darbo jėgą (Rea ir Burton 2020). Žymioji Heckmano kreivė iliustruoja investicijų į vaikystę atsiperkamumą, kurios pagrįstumą patvirtino metaanalizė paremtas Rosholm et al. (2021) atliktas tyrimas. Taigi, socioekonominė problemos pateiktis implikuoja veiksmingą problemų sprendimą per investicijas į ankstyvąją vaikystę, ypač P1000D.

Pirmosios 1000 dienų kaip puoselėjančios globos ir tvaraus vystymosi pateiktis

Pirmosios 1000 dienų per puoselėjančios globos ir tvaraus vystymosi perspektyvą yra pateikiamos iš *viršaus į apačią* principu. Puoselėjanti globa laikoma klestinčio individo, bendruomenių ir visuomenių pagrindu (World Health Organization 2018) (žr. 1 lent.). Puoselėjanti globa apibrėžiama kaip sąlygos, kurias sukuria viešoji politika, programos ir paslaugos, įgalinančios bendruomenes, tėvus ir globėjus užtikrinti gerą vaikų sveikatą ir mitybą, apsaugoti juos nuo grėsmių bei suteikti galimybes ankstyvajam mokymuisi per atliepančią priežiūrą. Greta to, rūpestis ankstyvąja vaikyste yra matomas kaip konfliktų prevencijos ir taikos užtikrinimo priemonė (Dunne et al. 2021; Ntini ir Omona 2022) bei tvaraus vystymosi pagrindas (Daelmans et al. 2017). Akcentuojama tvaraus vystymosi tikslų (angl. sustainable development goals) įgyvendinimo siekis (Hughe et al. 2017). Skirtingų sričių ekspertai susivienijo į puoselėjančios globos tinklą (Seventy-first World 2018), kurio užduotis yra siekti tvaraus vystymosi tikslų per naujaisiu mokslo rezultatų apie vaiko vystymąsi, veiksmingų strategijų ir intervencijų sklaidą bei metodinę pagalbą. 2021 m. prie tinklo buvo prisijungusios 197 šalys, tame tarpe ir Lietuva. Informacija pateikta šalių profiliuose atskleidžia, kad reikia dar daug nuveikti, nes apie ankstyvąją vaikystę, o ypač pirmąsias 1000 dienų, duomenų trūksta daugelyje šalių (Nurturing Care Framework 2018). Taigi, puoselėjančios globos ir tvaraus vystymosi perspektyva P1000D apsaugą traktuoja kaip priemonę, padedančią išvengti daugybės problemų, prisidedančią prie asmens bei visos visuomenės potencialo augimo ir klestėjimo.

P1000D problemos pateiktis Lietuvoje

Analizuojant P1000D pateiktis Lietuvoje, nustatyta, kad tyrimuose vyrauja Lietuvos sveikatos mokslų ir Vilniaus universitetų tyrėjų darbai, kurie grindžiami biomedicininio požiūriu. Plačiau nagrinėjama neišnešiotų naujagimių ir jų motinų sveikata (Paulavičienė et al. 2012; Dmitrijevaitė ir Šmigelskas 2013), baudžiamoji atsakomybė už naujagimių sveikatos sutrikdymą (Gutauskas 2021), motinų mityba ir savi-jauta gimdymo metu (Sakalauskienė ir Radišauskas 2022), žindymo ypatumai (Vaitkevičiūtė et al. 2021; Zitkute et al. 2020), natūralus vaikų maitinimas (Kudzytė 2022), imunizacija (Šeškutė et al. 2018), motinos ir vaiko prierašumas (Kalinauskienė et al. 2009).

Tamutienė et al. (2020) aprašo puoselėjančios globos koncepciją. Remiantis dokumentų ir kokybinio tyrimo rezultatais, Tamutienė ir Auglytė (2022) tyrinėjo P1000D ir atskleidė, jog tyrimo dalyviai teigiamai vertino sveikatos priežiūrą nėštumo metu bei profilaktinius vaikų sveikatos patikrinimus. Tačiau buvo identifiкуotos šios sisteminės problemos: vaikų, kurie gimė skurdžiausiose šeimose paramos, nukreiptos į jų amžiaus tarpsnį atitinkančios mitybos klausimus, nebuvimas; lankomosios priežiūros stoka; paslaugų grįžus iš gimdymo namų vakuumas; platesnės socioekonominės problemos, susijusios su gyvenamuoju būstu, aukštomis nuomos kainomis, vienišų tėvų / motinų su vaikais iššūkiams, keliančiais ilgalaikį stresą tėvams ir vaikams, kas neabejotinai turi įtakos vaiko atsakui į stresą ir paveikia kitus jo vystymosi aspektus. Autorės rekomendavo sukurti nacionalinę P1000D apsaugos programą, numatyti ją koordinuojančią instituciją, prioriteto tvarka sukurti kūdikių amžiaus tarpsnį atitinkančios mitybos bei lankomosios priežiūros sistemas.

Svarbu paminėti ir tai, kad pirmosios 1000 dienų nėra išskiriamos Lietuvos švietimo sistemoje, nors LR Švietimo įstatyme dalis šio periodo patenka į ikimokyklinio ugdymo apibrėžimą, kurio riba žymima nuo vaiko gimimo. Ikimokyklinis ugdymas pirmosiomis 1000 dienų nėra privalomas ir yra paliktas tėvų apsisprendimui bei atsakomybei (Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas 1991).

Žvelgiant į Lietuvos masinės žiniasklaidos lauką, galime atrasti neuromokslų diktuojamo biomedicininio požiūrio sklaidą, kurį palaiko socialinė iniciatyva „MaMaDu“ (Lietuvos radijas 2021). Pastebimos ir pavienių gydytojų iniciatyvos, kuriomis siekama šviesti tėvus. Taigi, P1000D konceptas Lietuvos politiniame diskurse nėra pateikiamas nei kaip visuomenės sveikatos, nei kaip demografinė, nei kaip tarpgeneracinė, nei kaip žmogiškojo kapitalo ar tvarios raidos problema.

Diskutuojant galima teigti, kad tyrimas atskleidė biomedicininę, socioekonominę, puoselėjančios globos ir tvaraus vystymosi problemas pateiktis. Iš dalies tai sutampa su Okeyo et al. (2020) išskirtomis pateiktimis, tačiau mūsų tyrimas identifikavo papildomą, tvaraus vystymosi problemas pateiktį. Turėtume pritarti minėtų autorių iškeltai problemai, jog skirtingi tarpsektoriniai problemos apibrėžimai kelia iššūkių bendros viešosios politikos problemos pateikimui ir vieningam tarpsektoriniam darbui. Tačiau skirtingai nei Okeyo et al. (2020), mes manome, kad skirtingų mokslo disciplinų ir skirtingų sektorių balsas apie problemas, susijusias su pirmosiomis 1000 dienų, yra būtinas, ypač nacionaliniu mastu bei turi būti pripažintas kaip svarbus ir susilaukti platesnio politinės bendruomenės pritarimo. Puoselėjančios globos problemos pateiktis, susidedanti iš penkių skirtingų elementų, dėmesį orientuoja į bendrų tikslų siekimą per investicijas į skirtingus sektorius. Panaši logika yra išryškėjusi ir tvaraus vystymosi problemos pateiktyje, orientuojant sprendimus per skirtingų tikslų (sveikatos, mitybos, švietimo ir kita) realizavimą, liudija, jog nevienodi sektorių balsai ir politinė parama gali būti mobilizuota, jeigu problema argumentuojama kaip svarbi ne tik individo, bet ir ateities kartų, šalies ir globalios bendruomenės gerovei (Shawar ir Shiffman 2017). Nacionalinių politikų indėlį į globalių tvaraus vystymosi tikslų realizavimą bei P1000D puoselėjimą į nacionalines darbotvarkes atnešusios šalys tik patvirtina, kad kuriant horizontalią politiką yra svarbus bendras tikslas ir visų sektorių įsitraukimas (Danfėlsdóttir ir Ingudóttir 2022). Holistinis problemos pozicionavimas leidžia sukurti nacionalinius dokumentus, kurie įtrauktų P1000D apsaugą. Atlikta Lietuvos atvejo analizė, parodė šios srities silpnumą, todėl neatsitiktinai Nacionalinis vaiko garantijų veiklos planas visiškai ignoruoja pirmąsias 1000 dienų (Stepanova 2023).

Išvados

- P1000D apima periodą nuo pastojimo momento iki vaiko antrojo gimtadienio. Jis įeina į ankstyvosios vaikystės vystymo koncepciją kaip viena iš sudėtinių dalių, o kai kuriose šalyse yra traktuojamas kaip atskiras politikos objektas.
- Apžvelgus literatūrą buvo identifikuotos šios P1000D pateiktys: biomedicininė, socioekonominė, puoselėjančios globos ir darnaus vystymosi. Kiekviena nustatyta pateiktis siūlo atitinkamus sprendimo būdus. Biomedicininė yra labiau orientuota į sveikatos sektoriaus vaidmens išryškinimą. Tuo tarpu socioekonominė problemos pateiktis iškelia bendruomenių aplinkos stiprinimo bei platesnių politikos kontekstų įtaką. Ji paremta šiuolaikiniais vystymosi mokslais, ypač epigenetika, kuri ypatingą dėmesį skiria aplinkos ir vaiko vidinių sistemų sąveikai. Žmogiškųjų išteklių problemos pateiktis pabrėžia investicijų į P1000D atsiperkamumą ilgalaikėje perspektyvoje. Per investicijas siekiama užtikrinti žmogiškojo kapitalo plėtrą, sveikatą, pagerinti švietimo, gerovės rezultatus ir sustiprinti ateities darbo jėgos išteklius. Tvarios plėtros pateiktis formuojama per tarpgeneracinę kompleksinių problemų matymą ir darnaus vystymosi tikslų darbotvarkę.
- P1000D apsaugos poreikio Lietuvoje nereglamentuoja joks konkretus politinis dokumentas ir ji nėra laikoma prioritetine sritimi. Nėščiąjų ir vaikų preventinė asmens sveikatos priežiūra yra vykdoma nusistovėjusia bendra tvarka, neišskiriant pažeidžiamų grupių. Švietimo sistemoje ankstyvasis ugdymas yra apibrėžiamas kaip ikimokyklinis ir traktuojamas nuo vaiko gimimo. Socialiniame sektoriuje P1000D siejamos tik su apsauga gimus vaikui. Ankstyvojo ugdymo prioritetas ar „vienodas startas“ neįtraukia P1000D. Nėra išnaudota galimybė kurti P1000D valstybinę koncepciją ir jos įgyvendinimo strategiją bei veiklos planą pirmajame Vaiko garantijų įgyvendinimo etape.
- Lietuva nėra finansavusi nei vieno sisteminio ankstyvosios vaikystės puoselėjimo tyrimo. Šios srities tyrimai ir interesas paliktas pavienių mokslininkų bei gydytojų iniciatyvoms. 2022 m. Lietuvoje atliktas pirmasis P1000D tyrimas išryškino šio itin svarbaus periodo apleistumo problemas, ypač kompleksinių socialinių sunkumų turinčiose šeimose, kuriose nėra užtikrinama optimali ir konkretų amžiaus tarpsnį atitinkanti vaiko mityba bei tinkamas būstas vaikus auginantiesiems asmenims. Tai užprogrmuoja socialinę nelygybę, sveikatos ir kitas problemas.
- Rekomenduojama Lietuvoje finansuoti išsamius P1000D tarpdisciplininius tyrimus, stiprinti jų sklaidą, burti koalicijas, siekiant įgyvendinti įrodymais grįstas, veiksmingas intervencijos priemones, amžių atitinkančią paramą maistu, jaunų šeimų būsto politiką, nėščiąjų ir vaikus iki 2 metų amžiaus auginančių lankomąją priežiūrą. Kartu su sveikatos priežiūros priemonėmis, būtina alternatyviai plėtoti skurdo prevencijos ir socialinių paslaugų vystymą. Tam užtikrinti yra tikslinga kurti valstybinę P1000D programą, kurios įgyvendinimui būtų galima panaudoti bent dalį Europos vaiko garantijoms įgyvendinti numatytų lėšų.

Literatūra

1. Agarwal, S., Scher, M. S. 2022. “Fetal-neonatal neurology program development: Continuum of care during the first 1000 days.” *Journal of Perinatology* 42(2): 165-168. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41372-021-01282-5>
2. Anderson, L. M., Shinn, C., Fullilove, M. T., Scrimshaw, S. C., Fielding, J. E., Normand, J., ... Task Force on Community Preventive Services. 2003. “The effectiveness of early childhood development programs: A systematic review.” *American journal of preventive medicine* 24(3): 32-46. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-3797\(02\)00655-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-3797(02)00655-4)
3. Attanasio, O., Cattan, S., Meghir, C. 2022. “Early Childhood Development, Human Capital, and Poverty.” *Annual Review of Economics* 14: 853-892. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-092821-053234>
4. Baumeister, R. F., Leary, M. R. 1997. “Writing narrative literature reviews.” *Review of general psychology* 1(3): 311-320. <https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.1.3.311>

5. Bellis, M. A., Hughes, K., Ford, K., Rodriguez, G. R., Sethi, D., Passmore, J. 2019. "Life course health consequences and associated annual costs of adverse childhood experiences across Europe and North America: a systematic review and meta-analysis." *The Lancet Public Health* 4(10): e517-e528. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667\(19\)30145-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(19)30145-8)
6. Black, M. M., Walker, S. P., Fernald, L. C., Andersen, C. T., DiGirolamo, A. M., Lu, C., ... Grantham-McGregor, S. 2011. "Early childhood development coming of age: science through the life course." *The Lancet* 389(10064): 77-90. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(16\)31389-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)31389-7)
7. Britto, P. R., Lye, S. J., Proulx, K., Yousafzai, A. K., Matthews, S. G., Vaivada, T., ... Bhutta, Z. A. (2017). "Nurturing care: promoting early childhood development." *The Lancet* 389(10064): 91-102. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(16\)31390-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)31390-3)
8. Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. 2007. "Framing theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 103-126. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054>
9. Council of the European Union. 2021. Council Recommendation 2021/1004 establishing a European Child Guarantee. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021H1004>
10. Cusick, S., Georgieff, M. K. 2016. *The first 1,000 days of life: The brain's window of opportunity*. New York, NY: UNICEF. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpeds.2016.05.013>
11. Daelmans, B., Darmstadt, G. L., Lombardi, J., Black, M. M., Britto, P. R., Lye, S., ... Richter, L. M. 2017. "Early childhood development: the foundation of sustainable development." *The Lancet* 389(10064): 9-11. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.h4029>
12. Daniélsdóttir, S., Ingudóttir, J. 2021. *The First 1000 Days in the Nordic Countries: Policy Recommendations*. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.6027/nord2022-006>
13. Dmitrijevaitė, A., Šmigelskas, K. 2013. „Neišnešiotus naujagimius pagimdžiusių moterų patiriamas nerimas ir depresijos rizika bei galimai su jais susiję veiksniai.“ *Visuomenės sveikata* (1), 60. [https://www.hi.lt/uploads/pdf/visuomenes%20sveikata/2013.1\(60\)/VS%202013%201\(60\)%20ORI%20S%20Neisnesioti%20naujagimiai.pdf](https://www.hi.lt/uploads/pdf/visuomenes%20sveikata/2013.1(60)/VS%202013%201(60)%20ORI%20S%20Neisnesioti%20naujagimiai.pdf)
14. Draper, C. E., Klingberg, S., Wrottesley, S. V., Milner, K., Fisher, J., Lakes, K. D., Yousafzai, A. K. 2022. "Interventions to promote development in the next 1,000 days: a mapping review." *Child: Care, Health and Development*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cch.13084>
15. Dunne, L., Brennan-Wilson, A., Craig, N., Miller, S., Connolly, P., Leckman, J., ... Walmsley, P. 2021. "Promoting social cohesion and peacebuilding through investment in early childhood development programs." In *Transitioning to Peace: Promoting Global Social Justice and Non-violence* 305-322. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77688-6_17
16. Eurochild and the International Step by Step Association. 2023. *First Years, First Priority*. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://firstyearsfirstpriority.eu/the-campaign/>
17. Felitti, V. J., Anda, R. F. 2010. "The relationship of adverse childhood experiences to adult medical disease, psychiatric disorders, and sexual behavior: Implications for healthcare." In *The impact of early life trauma on health and disease: The hidden epidemic* 77-87. <https://doi.org/10.13109/zptm.2002.48.4.359>. <https://doi.org/10.13109/zptm.2002.48.4.359>
18. Finlay, S., Roth, C., Zimsen, T., Bridson, T. L., Sarnyai, Z., McDermott, B. 2022. "Adverse childhood experiences and allostatic load: a systematic review." *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews* 104605. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104605>
19. Gaillard, R., Jaddoe, V. W. 2023. "Maternal cardiovascular disorders before and during pregnancy and offspring cardiovascular risk across the life course." *Nature Reviews Cardiology* 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41569-023-00869-z>
20. Gormley Jr, W. T. 2011. "From science to policy in early childhood education". *Science* 333(6045): 978-981. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1206150>
21. Guio, A. C., Frazer, H., & Marlier, E. 2021. *Study on the economic implementing framework of a possible EU Child Guarantee scheme including its financial foundation: Second phase of the Feasibility Study for a Child*

- Guarantee. Final Report. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=8382&furtherPubs=yes>
22. Gutauskas, A. 2021. "Baudžiamoji atsakomybė už gimusio gyvybingo vaiko sunkų sveikatos sutrikdymą dėl neatsargumo." *Teisės apžvalga* 1 (23): 144-163. <https://doi.org/10.7220/2029-4239.23.8>
 23. Hamner, H. C., Nelson, J. M., Sharma, A. J., Jefferds, M. E. D., Dooyema, C., Flores-Ayala, R., ... Perrine, C. G. 2022. "Improving nutrition in the first 1000 days in the United States: A federal perspective." *American Journal of Public Health* 112(S8): S817-S825. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2022.307028>
 24. Hong, X. 2021. "Education and peacebuilding: Analysis based on theory and big data." In 2021 4th International Conference on Humanities Education and Social Sciences (ICHESS 2021) 2358-2363. Atlantis Press. <https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211220.408>
 25. Hughes, K., Bellis, M. A., Hardcastle, K. A., Sethi, D., Butchart, A., Mikton, C., ... Dunne, M. P. 2017. "The effect of multiple adverse childhood experiences on health: a systematic review and meta-analysis." *The Lancet Public Health*, 2(8): e356-e366. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667\(17\)30118-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(17)30118-4)
 26. Kalinauskienė, L., Cekuoliene, D., Van Ijzendoorn, M. H., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., Juffer, F., Kusakovskaja, I. 2009. "Supporting insensitive mothers: the Vilnius randomized control trial of video-feedback intervention to promote maternal sensitivity and infant attachment security." *Child: care, health and development* 35(5): 613-623. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2214.2009.00962.x>
 27. Kudzytė, J. 2022. "Natūralus maitinimas. Papildomi produktai, jų davimo terminai ir pagrindumas." *Lietuvos bendrosios praktikos gydytojas* 26 (6): 425-428. <https://doi.org/10.37499/LBPG.991>
 28. Lawn, J. E., Ohuma, E. O., Bradley, E., Idueta, L. S., Hazel, E., Okwaraji, Y. B., ... Babu, G. R. 2023. "Small babies, big risks: global estimates of prevalence and mortality for vulnerable newborns to accelerate change and improve counting." *The Lancet* 01(10389): 1707-1719. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(23\)00522-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(23)00522-6)
 29. Lietuvos radijas ir televizija. 2021. Per pirmąsias 1000 dienų vaiko smegenys formuojasi aktyviausiai: į ką tėvai turėtų atkreipti dėmesį. Žiūrėta 20 spalio, 2023. <https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/gyvenimas/13/1457960/per-pirmasias-1000-dienu-vaiko-smegenys-formuojasi-aktyviausiai-i-ka-tevai-turetu-atkreipti-demesi>
 30. Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas, LR Švietimo įstatymas priimtas, 1991-06-25. I-1489, galiojanti suvestinė redakcija 2023-04-01 - 2023-06-30. Žiūrėta 20 spalio, 2023. <https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.1480/asr>
 31. Loughton, T. 2017. "Building research findings into policy and policy into action." In *Transforming Infant Wellbeing: Research, Policy and Practice for the First 1001 Critical Days* 272-278. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315452890>
 32. Magalhães-Barbosa, M. C. D., Prata-Barbosa, A., Cunha, A. J. L. A. D. 2022. "Toxic stress, epigenetics and child development." *Jornal de Pediatria* 98: 13-18. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpmed.2021.09.007>
 33. Malave, L., van Dijk, M. T., Anacker, C. 2022. "Early life adversity shapes neural circuit function during sensitive postnatal developmental periods." *Translational psychiatry* 12(306). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41398-022-02092-9>
 34. Marope, P. T. M., Kaga, Y. 2015. *Investing against evidence: The global state of early childhood care and education*. UNESCO Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.54675/IBQA9325>
 35. Martorell, R., Zongrone, A. 2012. "Intergenerational influences on child growth and undernutrition." *Paediatric and perinatal epidemiology* 26: 302-314. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-3016.2012.01298.x>
 36. McEwen, C. A. 2022. "Connecting the biology of stress, allostatic load and epigenetics to social structures and processes." *Neurobiology of Stress* 17: 100426. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yinstr.2022.100426>
 37. Merrick, M. T., Ford, D. C., Ports, K. A., Guinn, A. S., Chen, J., Klevens, J., ... Mercy, J. A. 2019. "Vital signs: Estimated proportion of adult health problems attributable to adverse childhood experiences and implications for prevention-25 States, 2015-2017." *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* 68:999-1005. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6844e1>
 38. Nurturing Care Framework. 2018. Country profiles. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://nurturing-care.org/resources/country-profiles>
 39. Ntini, T., & Omona, J. 2022. "Peacebuilding Through Early Childhood Care and Education in a Post-Conflict Society: The Roles of the Parents and the Early Childhood Development Centres in Gulu District, Northern Ugan-

- da." Southern African Journal of Social Work and Social Development 34(1): 1-19. <https://doi.org/10.25159/2708-9355/9535>
40. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2022. „Early childhood education and care workforce development: A foundation for process quality.“ OECD Education Policy Perspectives 54. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/e012efc0-en.pdf?expires=1697820834&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=B25F253ECD25325D0C73F6A4F7A7165C>
 41. Okeyo, I., Lehmann, U., Schneider, H. 2020. “The impact of differing frames on early stages of intersectoral collaboration: the case of the First 1000 Days Initiative in the Western Cape Province.” Health Research Policy and Systems 18: 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12961-019-0508-0>
 42. Paulavičienė, I. J., Drazdienė, N., Vaitkevičienė, R., Vezbergienė, N., Gudaitienė, R., Tamulienė, L., ... Duksienė, L. 2012. „Ypač mažos gestacijos naujagimių gydymo rezultatai.“ Sveikatos mokslai 22(6):33-37. <https://doi.org/10.5200/375>
 43. Plėštytė-Būtienė, I. 2023 1000 pirmų gyvenimo dienų: kaip rūpintis vaiku, kad jis užaugtų sveikas ir stiprus? Žiūrėta spalio 20, 2023. <https://www.alfa.lt/gyvenimas/sveikata/1000-pirmu-gyvenimo-dienu-kaip-rupintis-vaiku-kad-jis-uzaugtu-sveikas-ir-stiprus/285393/>
 44. Rea, D., & Burton, T. (2020). New evidence on the Heckman curve. Journal of Economic Surveys, 34(2), 241-262. <https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12353>
 45. Rosholm, M., Paul, A., Bleses, D., Højen, A., S. Dale, P., Jensen, P., ...Calmar Andersen, S. 2021. “Are impacts of early interventions in the Scandinavian welfare state consistent with a Heckman curve? A meta-analysis.” Journal of Economic Surveys 35(1): 106-140. <https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12400>
 46. Roubinov, D., Browne, D., LeWinn, K. Z., Lisha, N., Mason, W. A., Bush, N. R. 2022. “Intergenerational transmission of maternal childhood adversity and depression on children’s internalizing problems.” Journal of Affective Disorders 308: 205-212. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2022.04.030>
 47. Sakalauskienė, E., Radišauskas, R. 2022. „Mitybos tipas ir jo sąsajos su moterų sveikata bei savijauta nėštumo metu.“ Visuomenės sveikata. 2 (97): 87-93. <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12512/115232>
 48. Seventy-first World Health Assembly. 2018. Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ Health (2016-2030): early childhood development. Accessed October 20, 2023. https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA71/A71_19Rev1-en.pdf
 49. Šeškutė, M., Tamulevičienė, E., & Levinienė, G. 2018. “Knowledge and attitudes of postpartum mothers towards immunization of their children in a Lithuanian tertiary teaching hospital.” Medicina 54(2): 1-9. <https://doi.org/10.3390/medicina54010002>
 50. Shawar, Y. R., & Shiffman, J. 2017. “Generation of global political priority for early childhood development: the challenges of framing and governance.” The Lancet, 389(10064): 119-124. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(16\)31574-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)31574-4)
 51. Stepanova, K. 2023. Lithuania’s Child Guarantee National Action Plan - An overview. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://eurochild.org/uploads/2023/07/Lithuania-NAP-one-pager.pdf>
 52. Suárez-Idueta, L., Yargawa, J., Blencowe, H., Bradley, E., Okwaraji, Y. B., Pingray, V., Lee, A. C. 2023. “Vulnerable newborn types: Analysis of population-based registries for 165 million births in 23 countries, 2000-2021.” An International Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology. 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-0528.17505>
 53. Tamulienė, I. 2021. Dėl plano „Naujos kartos Lietuva“ projekto. Žiūrėta spalio 20, 2023. <https://www.vdu.lt/lt/prof-i-tamutiene-del-plano-naujos-kartos-lietuva-projekto/>
 54. Tamulienė, I. 2023. Vaikai skurdo ir socialinės atskirties paliestose šeimose - apiešti. Žiūrėta spalio 20, 2023. <https://www.vdu.lt/lt/vaikai-skurdo-ir-socialines-atskirties-paliestose-seimose-apiesti/>
 55. Tamulienė, I., Auglytė, V. 2022. Kokia parama ir paslaugos yra prieinamos nėščiosioms ir vaikams iki 2 metų amžiaus? NVO vaidmuo. Žiūrėta spalio 20, 2023. <http://www.nvovaikamskonfederacija.lt/dokumentai/>
 56. Tamulienė, I., Kirka, V., Auglytė, V., Jogaitė, B. 2020. Nuo baudžiamosios intervencijos link puoselejančios globos: tarpdisciplininis žvilgsnis į vaiko apsaugą ir gerovę: monografija. Kaunas: Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas.

57. Te Hiringa Hauora. 2022. First 1,000 Days Programme Summary. Accessed October 20, 2023. https://www.hpa.org.nz/sites/default/files/1220423_1.pdf
58. The Centre for Community Child Health. 2021. Strong Foundations: Getting it Right in the First 1000 Days. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://www.rch.org.au/uploadedFiles/Main/Content/ccchdev/2109-PolicyBrief-32-v2.pdf>
59. Vaitkevičiūtė, M., Stonienė, D., Samsonaitė, P., Ulvydaitė, A., Juotkutė, M. 2021. "Naujagimiams palankioje ligininėje gimusių naujagimių žindymo ypatumai pirmaisiais gyvenimo metais." Lietuvos akušerija ir ginekologija 24(4): 284-289. <https://doi.org/10.37499/LAG.744>
60. Victora, C. G., Hartwig, F. P., Vidaletti, L. P., Martorell, R., Osmond, C., Richter, L. M., ... Black, R. E. 2022. "Effects of early-life poverty on health and human capital in children and adolescents: analyses of national surveys and birth cohort studies in LMICs". The Lancet. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(21\)02716-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)02716-1)
61. World Bank. 2019. World Development Report 2019: The Changing Nature of Work. 123-136. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2019>
62. World Health Organization. 2018. Nurturing care for early childhood development: a framework for helping children survive and thrive to transform health and human potential. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/272603/9789241514064-eng.pdf>
63. World Health Organization. 2020. Improving early childhood development: WHO guideline. Accessed October 20, 2023. <https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/97892400020986>
64. Zitkute, V., Snieckuviene, V., Zakareviciene, J., Pestenyte, A., Jakaite, V., Ramasauskaite, D. 2020. "Reasons for breastfeeding cessation in the first year after childbirth in Lithuania: a prospective cohort study." Medicina 56(226): 1-12. <https://doi.org/10.3390/medicina56050226>

Ilona Tamutienė, Vaida Auglytė

FRAMING THE FIRST 1000 DAYS OF A CHILD'S LIFE AS A PUBLIC POLICY ISSUE

Summary. *This article aims to reveal evidence-based problems of the first 1000 days of a child's life and their positioning in Lithuania. The article is based on a narrative literature review. The data were analysed using public policy problem framing approach, restricted to identifying different framings of the problem. The main framings of the problem of the first 1000 days of a child's life were identified: (1) biomedical (emphasis on influence of environmental factor when considering child's development, as well as future of his health outcomes); (2) socio-economic (emphasis influence of poverty on child development, returns from early investments in children, the strengthening of future human capital); (3) nurturing care (emphasis the importance of health care, social protection, nutrition, responsive relationships); (4) sustainable development (emphasis the concern of early childhood, the necessity to resolve health, poverty, and environmental issues, and strengthening peace and solidarity). All framings focus on the life course perspective of child's life and the intergenerational nature of problems. Different fields' problem-presenting frameworks do not compete with one another but serves as the foundation for a robust policy agenda for early childhood development.*

Both in science and in the media, Lithuania is dominated by an exclusively biomedical framings of the problem. Although in the Lithuanian education system, early childhood education is defined as pre-school, treated from the birth of the child, but the educational solutions of the first 1000 days of the child's life are left to the responsibility of the parents. In the social sector, the first 1000 days are more associated with protection against violence after the birth of a child. Preventive health care for pregnant women and children in Lithuania is carried out in an established general guideline, without excluding vulnerable groups and without prioritizing the first 1000 days of a child's life. Systematic research, advocacy coalitions and the inclusion of

the problem on the political agenda are lacking in this field. It is recommended to finance interdisciplinary research on the first 1000 days of a child's life, to create coalitions and a state program for the first 1000 days of a child's life in Lithuania.

Ilona Tamutienė, vyr. mokslo darbuotoja, profesorė, Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas, Kaunas, Lietuva
El. paštas: ilona.tamutiene@vdu.lt

Vaida Auglytė, Politikos mokslų doktorantė, Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas, Lietuva
El. paštas: vaida.auglyte@vdu.lt

Ilona Tamutienė, Senior Researcher and Professor, Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas Lithuania
E-mail: ilona.tamutiene@vdu.lt

Vaida Auglytė, PhD Student of Political Science, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania
E-mail: vaida.auglyte@vdu.lt



Nurodymai autoriams

Žurnalui pateikiamų straipsnių apimtis neturėtų viršyti 7000 žodžių. Tekstas turi būti parengtas Times New Roman šriftu su 1 tarpais tarp eilučių. Straipsnio pradžioje rašoma ne trumpesnė kaip 300 žodžių anotacija, parašyta ta pačia kalba, kaip ir straipsnio tekstas, o pabaigoje – ne trumpesnė kaip 300 žodžių reziumė (eng. abstract) anglų kalba. Jeigu straipsnis parengtas anglų kalba, anotacija rengiama lietuvių kalba. Straipsnio medžiaga pateikiama šia tvarka: straipsnio pavadinimas; autoriaus (-ių) vardas (-ai) ir pavardė (-ės); darbovietė (-ės) ir jos adresas (-ai); anotacija (jei straipsnis pateikiamas lietuvių kalba) arba abstract (jei straipsnis pateikiamas anglų kalba); raktažodžiai lietuvių ir anglų kalbomis; straipsnio tekstas; literatūros sąrašas; anotacija (jei straipsnis pateikiamas anglų kalba) arba abstract (jei straipsnis pateikiamas lietuvių kalba), duomenys apie autorių (-ius) anglų ir lietuvių kalbomis laikantis žemiau pavyzdyje nurodyto formato:

Alvydas Raipa – Mykolo Romerio universiteto Politikos ir vadybos Fakulteto Viešojo administravimo instituto profesorius, socialinių mokslų daktaras. E. paštas: alvydasraipa@mruni.eu

Alvydas Raipa – Doctor Habilitatus of Social Sciences, is a Professor at the Institute of Public Administration, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mykolas Romeris University. E-mail: alvydasraipa@mruni.eu

Straipsnio turinys turi būti suskirstytas į paragrafus. Įvadiniame paragrafe (Įvadas) būtina pagrįsti temos aktualumą, naujumą ir apibrėžti mokslinę ar praktinę problemą, tyrimo objektą ir tikslą, uždavinius bei tyrimo metodiką; nurodyti santykį su kitų tyrinėtojų darbais. Glaustai ta informacija turi būti pateikta ir anotacijoje bei reziumė. Straipsnio teksto pabaigoje padaromos svarbiausios išvados. Išvados privalo būti sunumeruotos.

Remiantis kitų autorių darbais arba dokumentais, tekste pateikiamos nuorodos, naudojant “Chicago Manual of Style 17th edition” citavimo stilių. Literatūros sąrašė šaltiniai spausdinami originalo kalba “Chicago Manual of Style 17th edition” citavimo stiliumi.

Author Guidelines

The articles should not exceed 7000 words. The text must be prepared using Times New Roman font with 1 space between the lines. The article should begin with an abstract of no less than 300 words written in the same language as an article and should end with an annotation of no less than 300 words in Lithuanian. If the article is prepared in English, at the end the annotation in Lithuanian must be prepared. If the article is prepared in Lithuania, at the end the abstract in English must be prepared. An article should include the following sections: the title, author’s name and surname, workplace and its’ address, abstract, keywords in Lithuanian and English, text, conclusions, bibliography, annotation, and author’s data at the end of the article strictly according to the following format:

Alvydas Raipa – Mykolo Romerio universiteto Politikos ir vadybos Fakulteto Viešojo administravimo instituto profesorius, socialinių mokslų daktaras. E. paštas: alvydasraipa@mruni.eu

Alvydas Raipa – Doctor Habilitatus of Social Sciences, is a Professor at the Institute of Public Administration, Faculty of Social Sciences, Mykolas Romeris University. E-mail: alvydasraipa@mruni.eu

The article should consist of chapters. The essential thing of the first chapter (Introduction) is to substantiate subject relevance, novelty and define the problem, subject, aim, tasks and methods of the research, and describe the relation with the works of other investigators. The same information should be condensed in the abstract and annotation as well. The main conclusions should be stated at the end of the article. The conclusions must be enumerated.

Bibliographic references should be given in the Chicago Manual of Style 17th edition. In the bibliography list, the references are given in the original language and should respond to the Chicago Manual of Style 17th edition requirements.

PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION Vol. 23, No 1
VIEŠOJI POLITIKA IR ADMINISTRAVIMAS T. 23, Nr. 1

Mokslo darbai

ISSN 1648-2603 (print)

ISSN 2029-2872 (online)

Redagavo: Rasa Daugėlienė

Maketavo: Dalia Paškevičienė

SL 344. 2024-02-29. 14,5 leidyb. apsk. l. Tiražas 8 egz. Užsakymas 38.
Išleido Kauno technologijos universitetas, K. Donelaičio g. 73, LT-44029 Kaunas
Spausdino leidyklos „Technologija“ spaustuvė, Studentų g. 54, LT-51424 Kaunas